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This dissertation presents a reading of Juan Rulfo’s novel Pedro Páramo in relation to the 
Mexican Revolution. Exploring its narrative construction of a fictional world of supernatural life 
forms, I argue that these life stories serve to denounce the Christian worldview regarding the 
nature of life dominant in pre-revolutionary Mexico and to equally reject the post-revolutionary 
secular conception of the world that replaced it as the authoritative narrative on the reality of life 
and basis for social organization. I show that the novel’s invented, supernatural perspectives 
denaturalize both definitions of reality to reframe them as en/gendered social narratives 
contending for conflicting vested interests. I explore the novel’s invitation to reconsider the 
question of life’s meaning and value – the question of the good in relation to life and its social 
organization – outside all truth-claims and the violence they justify in the name of the common 
good. Contextualizing the novel’s emphasis on fictionality in relation to indigenous mythical 
worldviews as well as recent theories on the nature of life in contemporary life sciences, I read 
the novel’s engagement with the question of co-existence outside of the logic of representation. I 
rely on contemporary Latin American cultural theory for the critique of modernity as a 
hegemonic worldview but suggest that the novel moves beyond the political impasse that 
characterizes representational politics, which delimit culturally specific representational claims 
to truth without undoing either the category of truth or of representation. Situating this view of 
culture as a representational system relative to an external world within the context of its 
emergence through scientific and cultural revolutions in modern Europe, I relativize this 




that the novel moves beyond both competing truth-claims between different value systems and 
the ethical impasse in cultural theory through a denunciation of the category of truth itself as the 
most dangerous fiction, in turn inviting the invention of empowering fictions as the basis for 
nonviolent co-existence. In the process I discuss how the novel enables a revaluation of the 





Critics generally consider the novel Pedro Páramo by the Mexican writer Juan Rulfo an 
important precursor to the literary genre of magical realism. Arising out of the coexistence of 
multiple cultural realities, magical realist novels are stories about fundamental social 
contradictions that form the stuff of everyday reality in postcolonial Latin America. Such super-
imposition of multiple realities emerged from the colonial encounter between the Spaniards and 
the various indigenous populations and cultures or ways of life; contradictions and conflicts that 
persist well beyond independence and the formation of modern nation-states.  
Emerging in the 1960s out of socio-political issues specific to Latin America, the genre 
has gone global in recent times. A literary style that juxtaposes contradictory realities to raise 
questions about shared social temporalities and to critique linear historical time, and through 
which juxtaposition myth (magic) and history emerge as contemporaneously co-existing and 
conflictive cultural perceptions of time-space or reality itself, magical realist narrative techniques 
have been taken up by writers in numerous postcolonial nations outside of Latin America to 
narrate the effects of colonization and the persistence of fundamental cultural contradictions in 
worldviews and aspirations contemporary to their own national contexts.1 
                                                
1 A bibliographic survey yields a large number of fictional works from every continent critically discussed through 
the lens of magical realism, as well as several anthologies related to magical realist narratives produced outside of 
Latin America. See for example Hart, Stephen M. and Wen-chin Ouyang. A Companion to Magical   
Realism. Woodbridge, Suffolk  ; Rochester, NY: Tamesis, 2005; Linguanti, Elsa, Francesco Casotti, and Carmen 
Concilio. Coterminous Worlds: Magical Realism and Contemporary Post-Colonial Literature in English. 
Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1999; Zamora, Lois Parkinson and Wendy B. Faris. Magical Realism: Theory, History, 




While the genre is gaining widespread acceptance as a narrative tool for making visible 
social contradictions in various postcolonial national contexts however, a tradition of scholarly 
writing on magical realism centered around its emergence and relevance to the history of Latin 
America is simultaneously announcing the exhaustion of its critical potential.2  Derived from 
Indian subaltern studies and their influence on post-colonial cultural criticism more generally, 
the field of Latin American subaltern studies has tended to read magical realist novels as 
narrative syntheses and representations of the discrete and contradictory fragments of cultures 
and worldviews that make up the reality of Latin America. Interpreting these novels as going 
against the grain of historical narratives – against historicization itself – in order to represent 
better the truth of the region’s self-contradictory spatio-temporal realities, subalternist readings 
of the genre show these representational claims to be necessarily as partial and limited as truth-
claims based on Western forms of knowledge and historicization imposed upon it through 
colonization.  
The insights afforded by subaltern studies are of crucial import to the question of politics 
or social organization given that fundamental social contradictions are implicated in questions of 
violence, both in the imposition of hegemonic social forms and the myriad radical as well as 
reactionary movements aspiring to other forms of social organization engaged in contestation 
with dominant social orderings. Staking their ethical position on the impossibility of truth in the 
recognition of the culturally specific nature of knowledge of reality and the fundamentally 
unequal power relation between differing cultural systems of knowledge production in the 
postcolonial world, subaltern studies cautions against all totalizing claims to knowledge or 
                                                
2 Most notable of these is Moreiras, Alberto. The Exhaustion of Difference: The Politics of Latin American Cultural 
Studies. Durham: Duke UP, 2001. Also see Moretti, Franco. Modern Epic: The World-System from Goethe to 




representation of the collective good whether local, national or global; against all claims to 
defining the premise for a more unified social organization, which would merely result in the 
formation of a new hegemonic social order.   
 The critical insight of subaltern studies is profound in its identification of cycles of 
endemic violence rooted in claims and counter-claims between the various contending social 
factions to the category of truth as justification for the power to impose its organization on co-
existent and often mutually conflicting visions of the world and the attendant contradictions in 
the various definitions of and aspirations for a good life. Such truth-claims, they show, would 
universalize a social premise or common ground for social belonging based on what are in fact 
culture and context specific narrative perspectives and interests or systems of meaning and value. 
At the same time, however, this ethical position leaves at an impasse the question of agency for 
social transformation and the possibility of imagining or inventing a better life by those 
disempowered under the present global hegemonic order, specifically that of capitalist ideology 
of socio-economic development and progress underpinning the modern nation-state as the 
dominant socio-political form consolidating itself globally after the independence of former 
colonies. This form of social organization tends towards increasing concentration of power 
through predetermination of the parameters of socio-economic relations while producing ever 
increasing suffering through re-distribution of the costs of national and transnational capitalist 
development both socio-economic and environmental – costs and violence to both life itself and 
to other ways of life, other social forms and formations.  
My work on the novel Pedro Páramo by Juan Rulfo begins at this seeming impasse. 
Published in 1955, the novel is a critique of the failures of the postrevolutionary Mexican state in 




relations of dominance, dispossession and exploitation of the people by the ruling military, 
oligarchy, and the Catholic Church. Emerging out of the Mexican revolution and the widespread 
disintegration of social consensus, violence, and demands for conflicting forms of justice, the 
postrevolutionary state emerged as the institution of power through the reconsolidation of the 
various social fragments and demands into a modern, secular nation-state and the promise of 
universal equality under democratic rule of law as well as inclusion into a history of progress 
towards shared prosperity. National consolidation however was effected through the defeat and 
exclusion of demands for other forms of social organization, most notably that of regionalist as 
well as indigenous communal claims to autonomy from the centralized state itself. Secular rule 
also displaced Catholicism as the premise for governance and the state systematically imposed a 
cultural education program to dislodge the rural poor from their ‘backward’ or premodern ways, 
resulting in the Cristero counter-revolution that was violently put down.    
By the time of the novel’s publication such social contradictions as well as those 
produced by capitalist relations of expropriation and uneven development in the name of national 
progress had resurfaced to make a lie of the promise of social equality, justice, and prosperity for 
all. Thematically engaged with conflicting cultural systems embodied by secular, Christian, and 
multiply existing indigenous narratives of the meaning and value or goal and purpose of life, 
Rulfo’s novel begins with a story that allegorizes the faith and hope invested in modernity’s 
promise of progress towards mankind’s unity and plentitude in order to lay bare the violence and 
exclusion that make such promise possible. This story ends half way through and the narrative 
passes from the troubled, secular world of unrealizable hopes of plenitude that both produce and 
conceal real violence and suffering into a mythical reality. Within this mythical reality emerges a 




make visible the reproduction of its narrative logic and value system within secular ideology. 
Through the mythical frame of the second half of the novel distinguished from Christian 
mythology, what is generally considered magical, fictional, or not credible as real from the 
secular perspective as well as untrue and heretical from the Christian worldview emerges into an 
alternative story of life to make visible the process by which the secular narrative of the meaning 
and value of life comes to be credible and to determine the very idea of the real, to consolidate its 
totalizing truth-claim over the very nature of life itself.  
Thematically concerned with Christian, secular, and indigenous narratives of life, the 
novel is a reflection on the historical question of cultural contradictions and hegemonic social 
formations, in other words the violent imposition of one cultural value system regarding the 
common good of life over another within the context of colonialism, the persistence of the 
established feudal order through national independence, as well as the postrevolutionary 
establishment of modern social organization in Mexico. It is structurally complex and I want to 
briefly foreground my reading of the novel’s structural construction before going on to discuss in 
more concrete terms what the novel is doing thematically relative to these cultural and historical 
narratives and themes about existence and co-existence or questions of social organization.  
 Pedro Páramo is told in fragments without linear chronology. For the purpose of my 
reading these fragments can be usefully grouped into three main narrative threads. Spatially, all 
the stories take place in the town of Comala. The first half of the novel is primarily about Juan 
Preciado, and this story appears to be told from Juan’s first person narrative point of view and 
from the time-space of secular modernity in postrevolutionary Mexico. A quest for the father and 
communal belonging that resonates with contemporaneous nationalist discourse and social 




order, Juan’s story dominates until his death half way through the novel. In the second half of the 
novel he is dead and buried in the grave and listening to the stories of Dorotea and Susana San 
Juan, two other dead and supernatural or mythical characters who become the protagonists 
instead. Their stories are in complimentary ways exact reversals of Juan’s story: one a rejection 
of the feudal social order that makes visible Christian worldview’s structural reproduction within 
Juan’s secular perspective; the other an explicit rejection of Christianity as well as the secular 
ideology that replaced it as the social organizing principle after the revolution. Together they 
form the second narrative thread and point to alternative ways of being and knowing to open up 
possibilities for different narrative organization of life.  
 The third plot line is that of the story of Juan’s father Pedro Páramo and of other 
subordinate characters. It is a story about life in Comala during Pedro’s emergence into power 
and consolidation of his rule over the village against the established power of the church, and 
which narrate the historical transition from the feudal social order to the modern one. This plot 
line is interspersed with the other two narrative threads. It also functions as a story of the past in 
relation to (and provide the historical and biographical context for making sense of) Juan 
Preciado’s story: Comala or community during the transition from the feudal to the post-
revolutionary period narrated through the story of Pedro Páramo the father, in relation to Comala 
in the modern time as revealed to Juan Preciado the son. Pedro’s story line also forms the 
historical and biographical past as context to the stories of the dead Dorotea and Susana -which 
is to say a story of their respective lifetimes before death in Comala during the period of Pedro’s 
emergence into power, a time before their mythical or ghostly kind of presence as the undead in 




outside to the narrative of communal history and individual biography that structure the relation 
between Juan and Pedro.    
 The stories of Pedro the father and Juan the son play a dominant role in the novel. This is 
partly through the obvious reason that together they begin the novel, the first half of the novel 
constantly switching back and forth between these two narrative threads. More importantly 
however it is because these two stories more readily lend themselves to a historical reading. 
After all, history is often a story about the temporal passage from father to son. Significantly 
then, the stories of Dorotea and Susana begin as narratives of a mother and a daughter but 
through their deaths come to function as counter-narratives to their roles in the reproduction of 
individual and communal identities or of biography and history. I argue that their mythical 
undoing of the idea of reproduction serve to undermine the spatio-temporal continuities of both 
Christian and modern social orders and make them visible as narrative constructs that attempt to 
exclude or subsume to their respective social orders alternative relations between life and time, 
and thus other possibilities of life’s organization and co-existence.  
 What I am interested in doing in this dissertation is to consider from various interpretive 
frameworks the enigmatic middle in the novel and the narrative displacement through which 
Juan Preciado goes from being alive to being dead, from being a protagonist whose point of view 
guides the reading of the novel to being an audience and the recipient of some kind of solace and 
counsel from both Dorotea and Susana San Juan, whose stories, as I have mentioned, are in 
different ways reversals of his own. My argument is that this narrative break and displacement 
work as a kind of opening and invitation to reframe the questions of and quest for lawful 
communal co-existence posed in the novel’s first half from the perspectives and temporalities of 




of Dorotea and Susana in the novel’s second half far exceed the historical framework of the first 
half of the novel and invite us to unearth as well as invent multiple alternatives of intersecting 
and non self-unified spatio-temporal possibilities for social organization, and to conceive of their 
co-existence outside of any unity as a way to minimize needless violence. This last, moreover, is 
inseparable from the organizational process the novel demands from the act of reading itself, and 
which further require the operation of selecting and organizing the various contexts and 
frameworks of reference for reading. Through this process the novel itself emerges as one such 
non self-unified organization of meaning intersecting with multiple other narratives.  
 In chapter one I read the novel’s engagement with the nation’s feudal past and its 
dominant Catholic narrative meaning of life to explore the unconventional, non-secular 
perspective through which Pedro Páramo relativizes and rejects Christian reality. I show that the 
novel offers a view of Christianity as a narrative construction of the world whose cultural system 
of meaning and value – whose reality itself – it rejects, not through an alternative truth-claim to 
reality but through a complex denunciation of Christianity’s production of suffering through its 
subordination of life to the promise of future plenitude in the higher teleological order of 
Heaven. I argue that the narrative process through which this rejection is accomplished provides 
an alternative framework of value: a fictional perspective on the nature of life that the novel 
constructs as the basis from which we are invited to read its equal rejection of the secular world 
and worldview, and thereby to consider a different conception or meaning of the human and its 
agency in order to invent other possibilities and frameworks for co-existence. At the end of the 
chapter I begin a reading of the novel’s treatment of the historical rise of secular social 
organization that displaced the feudal Christian order in Mexico in order to lay out Pedro 




future plenitude as the basis for its truth-claim on the nature of human life’s meaning and value, 
agency and purpose.   
In the second chapter I rebegin my reading through the critical insights provided by 
Patrick Dove’s reading of the novel, a work exemplary of subaltern studies’ view regarding the 
culturally specific nature of all knowledge conceived as representational system. Dove’s brilliant 
reading of the novel in relation to the cultural and socio-economic contexts of contention 
preceding and succeeding the Mexican Revolution forms the basis for my own reading of the 
narrative process through which the novel problematizes secular point of view, and which – 
following Dove’s argument – emerges into view as a critique of the modern state’s claim to the 
establishment of a just and lawful secular national social organization. I foreground Dove’s point 
that secular social organization is premised upon the historically contingent interests or value 
system of capitalism, which point leads Dove to read the novel as a narrative delimitation of the 
modern scientific worldview’s representational claim to a value free, objective, and universal 
truth regarding the nature or reality of life, and which knowledge system grounds the 
representational claims of secular rule and democratic social organization.  
For Dove, the novel’s delimitation of modern perspective marks and makes visible a 
historical site of political impasse, a site of mutually contradictory claims to the universal truth to 
the nature of life as ground for human socio-political organization. He localizes this site in the 
context of the historical contention over land between secular state and indigenous peoples, and 
which contention emerge into view in Dove’s reading as mutually exclusive claims to ownership 
and use of the same land as the basis for different forms of territorial cultural and socio-
economic self-organization – and which contending socio-cultural meaning of life include 




My own reading of the novel in chapter two begins with this connection established by 
Dove between truth and territorial claims in order to suggest in the third chapter that the 
fictional, mythical perspectives the novel constructs works precisely against the idea of 
territoriality – against a conception of nature as a unity of self-reproducings relations and as 
object of human subjective knowledge and agency. I argue that the novel’s problematization of 
modern conception of natural law makes visible the very idea of truth as a value system of vested 
economic and cultural interest relative to nature as property and resource, and which forms the 
basis for the idea of human individual and cultural self-cultivation and perfection towards lawful 
or moral freedom as the highest ideal of social organization. I discuss these questions through a 
consideration of the scientific reformulation of the dualist relation between culture and nature in 
early modernity in Europe, which I constrast with the view of nature in contemporary life 
sciences as well as to mythical worldview in order to construct, through a reading of the fictional 
lives in the novel, an epistemological basis for thinking the good of life in its sociality outside of 
the idea of truth and of an investment in a lawfully self-reproducing socio-cultural relations.  
In chapter three, I return to the novel and read its narrative construction of this investment 
in self-reproducing cultural logic or lawful social order both Christian and secular, something 
narrated as inseparable from the production of hierarchy and thus of violence, exclusion, or 
subordination. I show that the novel shows the investment in or desire for a lawful social order as 
guarantee of plenitude to be inseparable from willful subjection to violence and hierarchical 
social ordering that law justifies, and through which hierarchy of value it endlessly reorganizes 
social life to defer promised plenitude. The novel contrast the stories of identification and 
complicity with a hierarchically unified lawful order with fictional forms and views of life 




invite a rethinking of the very idea of the human and its knowledge and agency outside of 
representational truth-claim and the dichotomy between nature and culture, and thus offer a 
different view on the question of sociality and co-existence outside of the illusory promise of 
lawful unity and plenitude. I end the chapter with a discussion of the novel’s foregrounding of 
reading itself as a process of inventive organization of meaning and value, and which 
undermines the idea of pregiven reality to which a text may correspond, as well as that of self-
unified textual meaning to which reading corresponds or represent. I discuss this process of 
reading foregrounded in the novel in relation to a revaluation of genre of magical realism outside 




Chapter 1: Me trajo la ilusión/ llusion Brought Me Here:  
 Fictionality, Deviation, and the Feudal Context 
Originally published in 1955,  when the failures of the postrevolutionary Mexican state’s 
promises of justice had become all too apparent, the novel Pedro Páramo by Juan Rulfo both 
foregrounds the fictional character of the state’s narrative account and construction of a national 
social order and exposes the purpose of that narrative: to homogenize the myriad ways of being 
and aspirations regarding social organization into one national framework, to unify and make 
primary the meaning of life in relation to the identity of the nation (Mexico, individual 
Mexicans), and to make the nation the only framework within which such life may be defined. 
As my reading of the novel will suggest, in its critique of the modern national social order the 
novel in fact foregrounds as fictive all accounts of reality and attempts to define existence by 
taking away place as given or ground. It undoes the idea of a reproducible people that make up 
the population of a place as territoriality that persists as self-same over time. It does so by 
making visible the parallel nature of the competing claims between the Ecclesiastical order and 
that of the secular state, between the Christian, mythical conception of reality and the modern, 
historical one in their totalizing attempts to define the very nature of life. 
The novel begins with what is more or less identifiable as a first person narrative point of 
view of Juan Preciado recounting his journey home to Comala, a story framed as a search for 
Pedro Páramo or the father as the embodiment of law and justice. The character and quest of 
Juan Preciado is locatable in the modern time-space of postrevolutionary Mexico, the period of 




for past colonial, Catholic feudal social relations of expropriation, of an end to social conflict and 
contradictions and the establishment of a just and unified national community as home or place 
of belonging. The story of Juan’s quest for this promised justice and unity dominates until his 
abject death half way through the novel, where we find him in the grave with Dorotea, whose 
own story of a search for her son in a feudal village life as a Catholic parallels Juan’s search for 
the father. The failure and end to both pursuits allows the quest narrative and the question of 
justice to resonate with both realities and make visible structural narrative similarities between 
the Christian and secular social orders.  
Juan’s death midway through the novel marks the moment of the novel’s rebeginning, a 
break in narrative continuity which abruptly relocates Juan’s life and story to an enigmatic frame 
of an afterlife to the modern social order. Within this new narrative context the preceding story 
not only abruptly ends but also remerges as having been told from within the grave and in 
conversation with Dorotea from the very beginning. This structural displacement of Juan’s story 
and its narrative reframing as one told within the story of Dorotea, whose own life story emerges 
at the midpoint of the novel as a different beginning, effects an important shift in the framework 
of interpretation. It also invites a different reading of the novel narratively structured around this 
different beginning and end, as the significance of Juan and Dorotea’s stories emerge in the 
second half of the novel as recontexualized within other stories told by the dead. Exploring a 
series of enigmatic contradictions and paradoxes pertaining to the very nature of existence, 
space, and time that emerge at this mid-point of the novel in the story of Dorotea’s afterlife, 
specifically as a rejection of Christian conception of life, can serve as a way to begin to grasp 
how Pedro Páramo – through the narrative of Juan’s life and death – equally challenges the 




justice is defined. In this it permits the reader to reframe the very premise for conceptualizing the 
ethico-political idea of the good in relation to life through a different valuation or reading of the 
very meaning of life and the time-space of its sociality or co-existence.   
Aquí se acaba el camino1 
This is the End of the Road2 
“El Cielo para mi, Juan Preciado, está aquí donde estoy ahora” (124), “For me, Juan 
Preciado, heaven is right here where I am now” (66, translation modified), declares Dorotea. The 
story as told by Dorotea to Juan is that the two are buried in a shared grave. Dorotea had helped 
bury him, whom another villager and herself had found dead. Dorotea then decided to end her 
own long suffering life, sat down to die, felt her soul leave her body when it failed to convince 
her to go on living-suffering, and was buried by the other villager in the same grave. Or so 
Dorotea says.  
There are many strange things about this story of a here and now of a grave, about this 
Dorotea claiming to be dead and buried who is yet clearly alive and speaking, and who moreover 
claims to have discovered heaven by abandoning the soul. Strange this existence that she tells of: 
an afterlife not of the soul but to the soul which, according to herself, may as well be called 
Doroteo, male, without it making any difference since Juan did not know and there was no way 
of telling what she was. Once a poor Christian villager, Dorotea had willfully ended her life and 
abandoned her soul to purgatory for the sin of suicide, abandoned in other words the defining 
                                                
1 Rulfo, Juan. Pedro Páramo. Edición de José Carlos González Boixo. Madrid: Cátedra, 2003, 125. All section 
subheadings in my work are quotes from the novel. As with this citation, I have footnoted the page numbers for all 
subsequent quotes from the original Spanish text of the novel used as subheadings. All quotes from the novel used 
within each section will be parenthetically cited within the text itself. 
2 Rulfo, Juan. Pedro Páramo. Trans. Margaret Sayers Peden. New York: Grove Press, 1994, 66. All translations are 
from this edition, and when used as a section subheading will be cited in the footnote. All translations used within 
each section will be parenthetically cited within the text itself. In some instances I have modified the translation to 
exchange Sayers Peden’s poetic rendition for a more literal equivalent in order to bring out the complexity of the 




principle of life according to Christianity itself – the reality according to which she once lived 
and within which she had a soul. Yet Dorotea enigmatically continues to live and to have a better 
life for it. More important and enigmatic still, while this existence is deemed impossible within 
the Christian conception of the soul as the locus of life, this Dorotea dead and buried which the 
soul and the Catholic worldview by which she once lived would deem mere inanimate body or 
thing, this existence called Dorotea does not conversely or in any way negate the life of that soul 
even as her own life contradicts its very definition of what existence is, the definition by which 
the soul exists. Dorotea speculates that her soul must continue to exist, probably suffering, doing 
penance and begging living beings for prayers with continued hope of making it to Heaven.  
How do we make sense of this story, this story of a strange existence in a strange here 
and now of a grave that is also a strange heaven? What can we make of this existence called 
Dorotea narratively foregrounded as one of an enigmatic life-story and point of view regarding 
the very meaning and value of existence, this story that Dorotea tells to make sense of and 
explain her existence to Juan Preciado to help him make sense of his own?  
As Dorotea tells Juan, the two are dead and buried together in the grave. But this life after 
death, this here and now of the time-space of the grave, this togetherness, this Juan and this 
Dorotea are all problematic categories. To begin with: 
      –¿Eres tú la que ha dicho todo eso, Dorotea? 
      –¿Quién, yo? Me quedé dormida un rato. ¿Te siguen asustando? 
      –¿Oí a alguien que hablaba. Una voz de mujer. Creí que eras tú. 
     –¿Voz de mujer? ¿Creíste que era yo? Ha de ser la que hablaba sola. La de la 
sepultura grande. Doña Susanita. Está aquí enterrada a nuestro lado. Le ha de haber 
llegado la humedad y estará removiéndose entre el sueño. (135) 
 
     “Was that you talking, Dorotea?” 
     “Who, me? I was asleep for a while. Are you still afraid?” 




     “A woman’s voice? You thought it was me? It must be that woman who talks to 
herself. The one in the large tomb. Doña Susanita. She’s buried close to us. The damp 
must have got to her, and she’s moving around in her sleep.” (78) 
 
Preceding this was a monologue by another enigmatic voice claiming to be dead and buried, and 
whom we now find out from Dorotea must be Doña Susanita or Susan San Juan. But there is 
something strange with regards to time and space in this exchange. If Juan and Dorotea are 
buried together as Dorotea says, Juan should not be able to confuse a voice from far away with 
one speaking right next to him. According to Dorotea, they buried her right in his arms, where 
she fits perfectly. Now it may not be all that strange for Dorotea to immediately be able to tell 
that it must be the voice of Susana San Juan, and to be able to locate her tomb as next to theirs 
since she will later claim to have been there when Susana died and thus perhaps knows Susana’s 
burial place relative to her own. Yet it is still odd that she would know – and perhaps the point at 
first is that she speculates – that Susana must be moving about in her sleep because some 
humidity has gotten to her. 
Immediately following their commentary on what Susana had said, this exchange occurs: 
      –Cuando vuelvas a oírla me avisas, me gustaría saber lo que dice. 
      –¿Oyes? Parece que va decir algo. Se oye un murmullo. 
     –No, no es ella. Eso viene de más lejos, de por este otro rumbo. Y es voz de hombre. 
Lo que pasa con estos muertos viejos es que en cuanto les llega la humedad comienzan a 
removerse. Y despiertan. 
      <<El Cielo es grande. Dios estuvo conmigo esa noche. De no ser así quién sabe lo que  
hubiera pasado. Porque fue ya de noche cuando reviví…>>  
      –¿Lo oyes más claro? 
      –Sí. (136) 
 
      “When you hear her again, let me know. I’d like to know what she’s saying” 
      “You hear? I think she’s about to say something. I hear a kind of murmuring.” 
      “No, that isn’t her. That’s farther away and in the other direction. And that’s a man’s 
 voice. What happens with these corpses that have been dead a long time is that when the 
 damp reaches them they begin to stir. They wake up.” 
      “The heavens are bountiful. God was with me that night. If not, who knows what 





      “You hear it better now?” 
      “Yes.” (79)  
 
Dorotea wants Juan to tell her if he hears Susana speak again. In a later exchange she will tell 
him to report to her the words of Susana, which he will word for word, because as Dorotea 
claims he is younger and with better hearing. However, here she hears better than Juan 
something that comes from even further away, and can tell that it is a man’s voice rather than a 
women’s and even the direction it comes from, when Juan could not and who earlier also could 
not tell a voice from a distance from one literally spoken from within his arms.  
Even more strange is that Dorotea seems to know a lot about what happens with the dead 
in the tombs surrounding them, how they are awaken by humidity, as if she has been buried there 
for a long time and has observed the happenings of those long dead. Yet as she relates, Dorotea 
was only buried right along with Juan after having helped bury him. So how is it that she knows 
so much more and can explain to him the almost seemingly habitual happenings in the lives of 
those buried in this graveyard reality? As will recur throughout their interaction, it appears that 
Dorotea is making sense of this reality and of herself in relation to this community by making up 
or inventing the significance and meaning of what goes on around them in their graveyard 
dwelling. 
On the one hand, it would seem that this invented supernatural reality is specifically 
constructed in opposition to or as a departure from modern perspective on the nature of spatio-
temporal reality of life itself, as everything to do with speech and hearing – the sense or 
perception of space, in other words of measurable distance and direction, auditory quality and 
level, etc. – all contradict our notion of space. This is true as well of the sense of time. Dorotea’s 
knowledge of what is happening to those around them – the effect of humidity on the dead and 




be impossible, because told as if she had been there for long enough and longer than Juan to have 
observed these general occurrences over time and established their causes and significance. On 
the other hand however, the passage immediately following makes things even more enigmatic. 
This is what they hear spoken by the man identified by Dorotea as buried in a grave further away 
in a particular direction: 
      <<…Tenía sangre por todas partes. Y al enderezarme chapotié con mis manos la  
sangre regada en las piedras. Y era mía. Montonales de sangre. Pero no estaba muerto. 
Me di cuenta. Supe que don Pedro no tenía intenciones de matarme. Sólo de darme un 
susto. Quería averiguar si yo había estado en Vilmayo dos meses antes. El día de San 
Cristóbal. En la boda. ¿En cuál boda? ¿En cuál San Cristobal? Yo chapoteaba entre mi 
sangre y le preguntaba: ¨¿En cuál boda, don Pedro?¨ No, no, don Pedro, yo no estuve. Si 
acaso, pasé por allí. Pero fue por casualidad... Él no tuvo intenciones de matarme. Me 
dejó cojo, como ustedes ven, y manco si ustedes quieren. Pero no me mató. Dicen que se 
me torció un ojo desde entonces, de la mala impresión. Lo cierto es que me volví más 
hombre. El Cielo es grande. Y ni quien lo dude. >> (136) 
 
     “...I was covered with blood. And when I tried to get up my hands slipped in the 
puddles of blood in the rocks. It was my blood. Buckets of blood. But I wasn’t dead. I 
knew that. I knew that don Pedro hadn’t meant to kill me. Just gave me a scare. He 
wanted to find out whether I’d been in Vilmayo that day two years before. On San 
Cristobal’s day. At the wedding. What wedding? Which San Cristobal’s? There I was 
slipping around in my own blood, and I asked him just that: ‘What wedding, don Pedro? 
No! No, don Pedro. I wasn’t there. I may have been near there, but only by chance...’ He 
never meant to kill me. He left me lame – you can see that – and, sorry to say, without the 
use of my arm. But he didn’t kill me. They say that ever since I’ve had one wild eye. 
From the scare. I tell you, though, it made me more of a man. The heavens are bountiful. 
And don’t you ever doubt it.” (79) 
 
Juan asks whom the man is who speaks and Dorotea tells him it could be any one of the many 
killed in revenge by Pedro Páramo. Pedro had killed all he suspected of being involved in his 
father’s death. The voice in the passage however insists that he knows he was not dead. 
Addressing an audience of ustedes which is the plural “you”, the man tells of how he revived, 
came to understand God had been with him that night, and that Pedro Páramo had only meant to 




How are we to make sense of this voice, identified by Dorotea as a man from a tomb 
further off, whose story contradicts everything Dorotea says, which is to say according to whose 
perspective he is clearly neither dead, nor buried, and certainly not alone? In other words, 
through the voice of the man above emerges a story that contradicts Dorotea’s meaning of the 
already enigmatic words like life and death to bring to the fore the question of what existence 
itself might mean, in a here and now that begins to appear that it may or may not be a grave, or 
better said, to be more than one thing depending on the point of view that makes sense of and 
tells of it.  
At this point therefore, even the idea of a common space-time, common place as ground 
for comparing these various perspectives and their contradictory accounts of what the reality of 
that place is has come undone as each point of view makes sense of where they are in ways that 
contradict one another in their accounts of being alive, dead, buried, or elsewhere; natural or 
supernatural. In other words as far as the perspective of something like a textual narratee is 
concerned, there is no common ground from which to make sense of these contradictory stories: 
no common ground between the narratee and these perspectives, and no common ground 
between the different perspectives themselves even while these perspectives or narratives are 
clearly making up a common story that is also their reality, at least between Juan and Dorotea, 
and thus for the reader implied by the two’s points of view.  
A little later, Dorotea once again asks Juan to tell her what he heard Susana say. Juan 
repeats, almost as if word for word even though transposed into a third person account, the words 
he tells Dorotea that he heard Susana speak. 
      –¿Qué es lo que dice, Juan Preciado? 
      –Dice que ella escondía sus pies entre las piernas de él. Sus pies helados como piedras  
frías y que allí se calentaban como en un horno donde se dora el pan. Dice que él le  




acurrucada, metiéndose dentro de él, perdida en la nada al sentir que se quebraba su  
carne, que se abría como un surco abierto por un clavo ardoroso, luego tibio, luego dulce,  
dando golpes duros contra su carne blanda; sumiéndose, sumiéndose más, hasta el  
gemido. Pero que le había dolido más su muerte. Eso dice. (155) 
 
    “What is she saying, Juan Preciado?” 
      “She’s saying she used to hide her feet between his legs. Feet icy as cold stones, and 
 that he warmed them, like bread baking in the oven. She says he nibbled her feet, saying 
 they were like golden loaves from the oven. And that she slept cuddled close to him, 
 inside his skin, lost in nothingness as she felt her flesh part like a furrow turned by a plow 
 first burning, then warm and gentle, thrusting against her soft flesh, deeper, deeper, until 
 she cried out. But she says his death hurt her much much more. That’s what she said.”  
(99-100) 
 
The words are sexually explicit, detailed in their explicitness, and seemingly reproduced in exact 
details by a young man to an old woman. But is Dorotea old and is she a woman? As she has 
noted and as suggested through Juan’s mis/perception or mis/identification of Dorotea as a man, 
gender as a category no longer makes any sense or difference. In the above passage moreover, 
what is problematized is the narrative voice and perspective referred to by the name of Juan 
itself: perception and voice that are able to reproduce word for word another’s words as if having 
faithfully recorded or written them down rather than recounting from memory. The stylization of 
this narrative voice foregrounds it as written, as literary artifice, as fictional. What seems to be 
coming unraveled through these exchanges are any shred of human attributes we still assign to 
these perspectives, to these voices and their stories of enigmatic existence and co-existence 
whose meanings we are trying to understand.  
What emerges from the above for the implied reader is that there is no reality outside of 
these conflicting perspectives. By reality I mean a given time and space in which things can be 
said to happen and by which the happening can be understood the same by everyone. Moreover, 
this lack of reality does not imply the privileging of individual perspectives, and the very idea of 




undone. There is no consensus as to common reality but there are neither individual ones that 
often form the basis for contestation of shared or imposed social meaning as reality. The very 
idea of perspective has lost its mooring in the individual eye and his/her other senses located in 
time and space. The only thing that remains to be said of such perspectives and realities, the only 
sense that can be made of these stories and the here and now of their existence is that they are 
made up or fictive. 
On the one hand, the juxtaposition of perspectives and understanding of reality between 
Dorotea and the unnamed man deters us from unifying their stories into any one perspective or 
elevating as dominant a particular one in order to define a given reality of space or time. This 
may be said to occur at the level of the point of view of the textual narratee. On the other hand, 
we can and do read Dorotea’s story, foregrounded as existing in a complicated relation to other 
stories, and thus of any sense made from her story as existing in a complicated relation to other 
possible meanings and realities. As I will show in the next chapter, Dorotea’s reading of her own 
life and the lives of those around her allows Juan’s life story to take on a different meaning from 
what it was before his death. Dorotea’s narrative allows Juan as well as the reader to re-read 
Juan’s story from a different point of view in what will amount to a different perspective on life 
itself.   
As initially noted and as I will discuss in further detail in subsequent sections, the story 
Dorotea goes on to tell Juan of her suicide narrates a rejection of the Christian reality within 
which she once lived, and which makes of this enigmatic existence something like an afterlife to 
the soul. This life story foregrounded as told by someone dead as a Christian however, and 
moreover as buried in the grave, is also highlighted as outside of secular perspective. This 




the novel’s mid-point, and from which perspective we can initially read Dorotea’s story as 
supernatural and thus as fictional. As I discussed above, this supernatural life and reality are also 
constructed as unnatural specifically through its departure from our modern perspective on the 
nature of human life and its spatio-temporal reality itself.  
While on the one hand we are presented with Dorotea’s narrative that can be read as 
supernatural within our secular conception of the nature of life, Dorotea’s claim to this 
supernatural-ness is simultaneously challenged by a contradictory voice and view, and which 
relativizes her claim to knowledge of the nature of space and time of their existence. Thus from 
the view of the implied reader there are divergent meanings or points of view that emerge to 
render indeterminable whether or not Juan and Dorotea are really in the grave, thus whether or 
not their lives are supernatural, or if Dorotea’s account of their supernatural life is itself fictional.  
It is in this lack of narrative basis for resolving the contradiction and establishing the 
truth of the matter on co-existing, contradictory views of nature and of human life that I propose 
we consider the question of value that began our reading of Dorotea’s narrative, her important 
remark that heaven for her is in the here and now. The question then becomes, to what purpose 
are Juan and the reader in their secular perspectives invited by Dorotea to think as heaven or as 
life' highest value a spatio-temporal reality of existence that is without any determinable or given 
meaning and thus inseparable from story telling and narrative invention? Within this story 
moreover the idea of heaven or of the good in relation to life emerges as a rejection of Christian 
Heaven on the one hand, and on the other can be read as an invitation to Juan and the reader to 
consider through a problematization of our secular reality and value system.  
In the rest of this chapter and the next two I will read in detail how the sense Dorotea 




existence, place, and time that underlie both the Christian feudal order and the postrevolutionary 
Mexican state’s secular world and worldview, each of which contend for the power to define 
reality, to explain the nature of existence according to their spatio-temporal ordering of reality, 
including the social field; in effect to be reality. Dorotea’s story about existence, read alongside 
that of Juan Preciado, offers a different view of life, one that does not claim to be an exclusive 
definition (which is to say an all-inclusive, unitary, and universal one), and which therefore 
undermines the production of dominance and hegemony based on the universalization of a 
particular perspective on reality. 
Dorotea’s existence does not belong either to the Christian narrative of the afterlife of the 
soul nor to the secular conception of reality that succeeded it as hegemonic social organizing 
principle. As I will discuss in the next chapter in a reading of Juan’s story, not unlike the 
Christian order it claims to supersede, the secular conception of reality defines and attempts to 
universalize its own particular meaning and purpose of life organized around a utopia that 
functions much like Christian Heaven. Specifically in the context of statist discourse and national 
social organization, the democratic ideals of freedom, equality and justice, of social unity and 
harmony of individual parts and social whole – something construed as achievable through social 
and economic growth and progress towards shared prosperity – narrativize the modern telos or 
secular version of Heaven: becoming a fully developed, lawful and prosperous nation. This in 
turns makes of the here and now a necessarily fallen, underdeveloped state while at the same 
time justifying expropriations and injustices in the service of the attainment of promised utopia. 
The future secular Heaven comes to define, in the same way as its Christian version, the meaning 
and purpose of the here and now of life both individual and social by subordinating it to a higher 




Juan suggests a departure from both Catholic and secular narratives of life and narrate a mode of 
living and knowing outside of this ill-fated search for illusory Heaven promised by both. 
Ahora que estoy muerta me he dado tiempo para pensar y enterarme de todo3 
Now That I Am Dead I Have Given Myself the Time to Think and Understand Everything4 
If on the one hand as I have discussed, Dorotea’s story foregrounds the fictional character 
of perspective or knowledge, this notion of fiction is further complicated by the introduction of 
an idea of illusion. This idea further qualifies and differentiates the idea of fictional knowledge 
into more than one kind and emerges as a different ethical framework for conceiving the 
question of value or the idea of the good in relation to life, one no longer tied to the concept of 
truth or reality. On the thematic level, moreover, the question of illusion is also specifically 
related to both Juan’s quest for the father and Dorotea’s search for the son, the failures of both of 
which find them in the same grave to rebegin a different story in which both figures of father and 
son are understood as illusions. Dorotea asks why Juan came to Comala: 
     –Mejor no hubieras salido de tu tierra. ¿Qué vinist a hacer aquí? 
     –Ya te lo dije en un principio. Vine a buscar a Pedro Páramo, que según parece fue mi 
 padre. Me trajo la ilusión. 
     –¿La ilusión? Eso cuesta caro. A mí me costó vivir más de lo debido. Pagué con 
 eso la deuda de encontrar a mi hijo, que no fue, por decirlo así, sino una ilusión  
 más; porque nunca tuve ningún hijo. Ahora que estoy muerta me he dado tiempo  para 
 pensar y enterarme de todo. (119) 
 
      “You’d have done better to stay home. Why did you come here?” 
      “I told you that at the very beginning. I came to find Pedro Páramo, who they say was  
 my father. Illusion brought me here. 
      “Illusion? You pay dear for that. It made me live longer than is owed, longer than I 
 should  have. And that was the debt I paid to find my son, who in a manner of speaking 
 was just another illusion. Because I never had any son. Now that I’m dead I’ve given 
 myself the time to think and understand everything.” (60, translation modified) 
 
                                                
3 Rulfo, 119. 




Thus far I shown that the story of Dorotea and Juan in the grave contain no truth outside of 
perspective and storytelling. Yet the idea of illusion or false perception emerges here as another 
enigma, as the concept depends on an idea of reality against which it is defined as false by lack 
of correspondence. What might be the nature of knowledge and understanding in Dorotea’s 
statement that would enable her to mark a certain distinction in both meaning and value between 
a non-illusory perception and an illusory one regarding her son’s existence, when all possible 
grounds for any assertion of true perception or knowledge of the reality of existence has been 
narratively undone, rejected, and replaced by fictional ones? 
To complicate matters, the word “ilusión ” (illusion) refers not only to the idea of false 
sensory perception but also to false or unrealistic hope, and in addition the Spanish term ilusión 
refers at the same time to the idea of enthusiasm, thrill, or joy. The first two meanings are 
especially pertinent to my reading, and share for their definition a dependence on an idea of 
reality against which the meanings are conceptualized or measured. At the same time the Spanish 
word ilusión also overlaps in meaning with another word for hope, the verb esperar, which 
expresses a particular relation between existence, knowledge, and time, a relation which perhaps 
becomes clearer in the other meanings of the same word. Esperar has several related meanings 
that are relevant to the idea of illusion in relation to perception of time or the temporal order. 
Meaning “to hope” on the one hand, the term also means “to wait,” as well as “to expect.” In the 
reflexive form, esperarse can also be used to express the act of holding or hanging on to 
something. What these words make visible is the idea of the future as something predictable 
within a series of expectable outcomes, and therefore as a continuation of present existence and 




knowable order for the unfolding of life past present and future, something Dorotea and Juan’s 
enigmatic existences will be shown to problematize.    
Dorotea’s statement that she now understands without illusion is important for our pursuit  
of the significance of the idea of heaven in the here and now in relation to both Dorotea’s and 
Juan’s stories. In the section that follows I will show that the idea of illusion does not refer to a 
false perception of reality in opposition to true knowledge of it but rather, quite simply, to the 
perception of there being one true reality and therefore to all claims to truth or to true knowledge 
of reality. To put it differently, I will show that the idea of illusion, both as false perspective and 
false hope, refers to a belief and an investment in universality or a unified temporal order. What 
becomes visible as illusion is the very idea of a given reality as something that can stay the same 
or perpetuate itself as the same over time, and which Dorotea’s story foregrounds as a product of 
a universalized perspective.   
Le perdí todo mi interés5 
I Lost All Interest6 
 Hacía tantos años que no alzaba la cara, que me olvidé del cielo. Y aunque lo hubiera 
 hecho, ¿qué habría ganado? El cielo está tan alto, y mis ojos tan sin mirada, que vivía 
 contenta con saber dónde quedaba la tierra. Además, le perdí todo mi interés desde que el 
 padre Rentería me aseguró que jamás conocería la Gloria. Que ni siquiera de lejos la 
 vería... Fue cosa de mis pecados; pero él no debía habérmelo dicho. Ya de por sí la vida 
 se lleva con trabajos. Lo unico que la hace a una mover los pies es la esperanza de que al 
 morir la llevan a una de un lugar a otro; pero cuando a una le cierran una puerta y la que 
 queda abierta es nomás la del Infierno, más vale no haber nacido... El Cielo para mí, Juan 
 Preciado, está aquí donde estoy ahora.  
      –¿Y tu alma? Dónde crees que haya ido? 
      –Debe andar vagando por la tierra como tantas otras; buscando vivos que recen por 
 ella. Tal vez me odie por el mal trato que le di; pero eso ya no me preocupa. He 
 descansado del vicio de sus remordimientos. Me amargaba hasta lo poco que comía, y me 
 hacía insorpotables las noches llenándomelas de pensamientos intranquilos con figuras de 
 condenados y cosas de ésas. Cuando me senté a morir, ella me rogó que me levantara y 
 que siguiera arastrando la vida, como si esperara todavía algún milagro que me limpiara 
                                                
5 Rulfo, 124. 




 de culpas. Ni siquiera hice el intento: <<Aquí se acaba el camino – le dije –. Ya no me 
 quedan fuerzas para más. >> Y abrí la boca para que se fuera. Y se fue. Sentí cuando 
cayó en mis manos el hilito de sangre con que estaba amarrada a mi corazón. (124-5) 
 
     “After so many years of never lifting up my head, I forgot about the sky. And even if I 
 had looked up, what good would it have done? The sky is so high and my eyes so 
 clouded that I was happy just knowing where the ground was. Besides, I lost all interest 
 after padre Rentería told me I would never know glory. Or even see it from a distance...It 
 was because of my sins, but he didn’t have to tell me that. Life is hard enough as it is. 
 The only thing that keeps you going is the hope that when you die you’ll be lifted off this 
 mortal coil; but when they close one door to you and the only one left open is the door to 
 Hell, you’re better off not being born...For me, Juan Preciado, heaven is right here.” 
      “And your soul? Where do you think it’s gone?” 
      “It’s probably wandering around like so many others, looking for living people to pray 
 for it. Maybe it hates me for the way I treated it, but I don’t worry about that anymore. 
 And now I don’t have to listen to its whining about remorse. Because of it, the little I ate 
 turned bitter in my mouth; it haunted my nights with black thoughts of the damned. When 
 I sat down to die, my soul prayed for me to get up and drag on with my life, as if it still 
 expected some miracle to cleanse me of my sins. I didn’t even try. ‘This is the end of the 
 road,’ I told it. ‘I don’t have the strength to go on.’ And I opened my mouth to let it 
 escape. And it went. I knew when I felt the little thread of blood that bound it to my heart 
 drip into my hands.” (65-6) 
  
As Dorotea tells it, she had sinned. Told by the priest that she will never make it to 
Heaven, she committed suicide, accepting the fact that she could never know Glory. Thus 
Heaven loses the power to determine her actions, to demand that she go on living and suffering 
for a hope no longer viable. The separation between her and her soul hinges on this 
differentiation between retracted and retained interest or investment. The soul, as if it expected 
that some miracle would cleanse her of her sin, continued to hope, to beg Dorotea to go on living 
a life of suffering and penance and not to commit the sin of suicide. When released by Dorotea, 
her soul continues to exist in suffering, supplicating and seeking prayers to pay for its sin in 
continued investment in the possibility Heaven. In committing the capital sin of suicide, Dorotea 
affirms and in fact through her action makes of Heaven an impossibility, renounces any interest 
in and turns away from what becomes through her own suicide an unrealizable, unreal, or 




life in suffering. Without this hope, the here and now of imperfect (and inescapably sinful) 
existence becomes the only one of importance and value, and Dorotea’s death is an end to a life 
lived in suffering for an impossible future ideal which defines, devalues and justifies the 
degradation of this here and now of life.  
Without this hope for redemption, demands for suffering and self-abnegation were no 
longer justifiable or tolerable. Through actively sinning in suicide and banishment of the soul 
Dorotea jettisons the Catholic narrative of the meaning of life, which makes of the here and now 
a fallen order as a result of Original Sin and loss of originary paradise. In other words, Dorotea’s 
suicide is a rejection of pain and self sacrifice sanctioned by Catholicism, whose meaning of 
earthly life is one of suffering and punishment for the Original Sin inherited at birth, a life lived 
as payment for the debt of sin owed through that inheritance, and in hope of a promised future 
reward or repayment in the form of recovery of that higher order of better existence and 
attainment of a life without pain, suffering, and death at the individual level, and without conflict 
and violence at the social level: communion of individual souls with Divinity.   
Y todo fue culpa de un maldito sueño7 
And It Was All the Fault of One Accursed Dream8 
     –¿La ilusión? Eso cuesta caro. A mí me costó vivir más de lo debido. Pagué con 
 eso la deuda de encontrar a mi hijo, que no fue, por decirlo así, sino una ilusión  
 más; porque nunca tuve ningún hijo. Ahora que estoy muerta me he dado tiempo para 
 pensar y enterarme de todo. (119) 
 
      Illusion? You pay dear for that. It made me live longer than is owed, longer than I 
 should  have. And that was the debt I paid to find my son, who in a manner of speaking 
 was just another illusion. Because I never had any son. Now that I’m dead I’ve given 
 myself the time to think and understand everything. (60, translation modified)  
  
                                                
7 Rulfo, 119. 




If we read Dorotea’s death as the death of a hope for redemption, as rejection of having 
being born into that life as given reality –“más vale no haber nacido” (124), “you’re better off 
not being born” (66) – the story she tells in the here and now of existence is a re-reading of the 
meaning of life which understands or makes sense of that hope as an illusion, and illusion as 
what produces, justifies and perpetuates suffering. But the idea of illusion is more complicated 
than this, as we will see in the story of Dorotea’s search for her son. The passage above 
establishes a complex relation between the idea of illusion, the figures of father and son, and the 
question of debt and obligation that also define a particular mode or meaning of life. As Dorotea 
continues telling the strange and complicated story of her son: “Ni siquiera el nido para 
guardarlo me dio Dios” (119), “God never gave me so much as a nest to shelter my baby in” 
(60). Only “esa larga vida arrastrada” (119) or a drawn out existence of wretched supplication 
that she had, and in which she dragged herself here and there, looking out the corner of her eyes 
as if trying to see past people, suspicious that this or that one had hidden her baby from her.  
For Dorotea had a dream that she had a son, and as long as she lived she always believed 
it was true. At first she carried the baby everywhere with her, and then she lost it. Much later in 
life when she was already very old she had another dream in which she went to heaven “y [se 
asomó] a ver si entre los angeles reconocía la cara de [su] hijo. Y nada. Todas las caras eran 
iguales, hechas con el mismo molde” (119), “and peeked to in to see whether [she] could 
recognize [her] son’s face among the angels. Nothing. The faces were all the same all made from 
the same mold” (60). There they told her they had made a mistake with her. “Que [le] habían 
dado un corozón de madre, pero un seno de una cualquiera” (119), “That they’d given [her] a 
mother’s heart but the womb of a whore” (60). When she had asked about her son after not 




nada, hundió una de sus manos en [su] estómago como si la hubiera hundido en un montón de 
cera. Al sacarla [le] enseño algo así como una cáscara de nuez: ‘Esto prueba lo que te 
demuestra’”(120), “came over to [her] and, without a word, sank his hand into [her] stomach like 
he would have poked into a ball of wax. When he pulled out his hand he showed [her] something 
that looked like a nutshell. ‘This proves what I’m demonstrating to you” (60).  
Dorotea tried to tell the saint that what he pulled out was not her womb but her stomach 
shriveled up from poverty and hunger. But another saint came and pushed her out the door and 
told her to go back to earth and to try to be good so she will not have too long to spend in 
purgatory. That was the dream that clarified for her that she never had a son. As she was already 
very old and the village of Comala was becoming deserted and her life that survived on people’s 
charity was getting even harder, she sat down to wait for death. When she and another villager 
found Juan dead she decided to end her life and was buried in the same grave as him. 
Dorotea’s story is not only full of strange contradictions, reversals, and splitting up of 
causal relations and the temporality they construct, but also tells of the strange relation between 
the dream of a son which produces his existence in reality on the one hand, and on the other 
another dream which produces the reverse effect in reality, determining the non-existence of her 
son. While these contradictions reinforce the fictive nature of the narrative, they also allow us to 
imagine a different criteria for making a distinction with regards to the question of the son’s 
existence, in other words to reframe the question of existence in relation to meaning and value. 
We are invited to distinguish not between truth and falsehood, dream and reality, but between 
fictions that are a blessing and fictions that are a curse, fictions that are culpable as causes of 




 To begin with, Dorotea tells of having had two dreams, one in which she dreamt she had 
a boy and which she accepts as reality for as long as she lived. Clearly this dream was no dream 
as far as her perception of it was concerned. Her son existed, who at the same time owed his 
existence to different order of reality. The second dream however established the truth of the fact 
that she never did have a son. But this claim to a more truthful knowledge of existence was 
according to Dorotea the product of another dream. If the distinction between dream and reality 
holds, she could neither have had a son nor have known that she did not have a son. If the 
distinction does not hold, the fact that she did have a son and Heaven’s clarification that she did 
not would be equally true. The two dreams are marked as different from each other according to 
Dorotea not in relation to any externally given criteria for establishing true reality from fictive, 
unreal or imaginary dream but between the two dreams themselves in relation to diction and 
decree, to words and meaning as narrative logic and law. The dream which produced her son’s 
existence she calls a benediction, the one of Heaven and the saints which contradicts it she calls a 
malediction. The two mutually contradict each other, but the contra-diction is perceived and 
understood as pronouncement of decree by Heaven as a higher order of reality, by Heaven’s 
diction as what lays claim to the truth, to a correspondence with and in fact determination of the 
nature of reality. This dreams she calls a curse.   
While this contra-diction as truth in opposition to falsehood is thus established by 
Heaven, Dorotea says it is also based on Heaven’s mistake, on God’s equivocation, one literal 
meaning of equivocal being to call by the same name two different things, or to confuse two 
things or meanings because of their similarity. Dorotea’s life-story makes sense of God’s 
originary truth about the reality of existence as one established through equivocation, something 




meaning would make visible possibilities of other realities. Within Dorotea’s narrative, God the 
Father as origin of life and the order of its existence is no longer understood to be one, primal, 
determining cause by necessity. It becomes one amongst other possible orderings of existence.   
“Esto prueba lo que te demuestra” (120), ‘This proves what I’m demonstrating to you” 
(60).  Or rather, “this proves what it demonstrates to you.” An odd sentence construction. As 
Dorotea observes: “Tú sabes cómo hablan raro allá arriba; pero se les entiende” (120), “You 
know how strange they talk up there, but you can understand what they are saying” (60-61). In 
any case and despite the declaration’s contortion into seeming subjectless objectivity, the proof 
used to establish the truth of the non-existence of her son was no proof, as according to Dorotea 
what the saint pulled out as self-evident truth of her whore’s womb was in fact her stomach, not 
the organ for life’s production of another life but one for its continued sustenance and 
subsistence. The saint’s words “this proves what it demonstrates” presupposes her ability to see 
what he sees and accept the premise that meaning is shared truth because seeing corresponds to a 
given reality that determines objectively the meaning of what is seen. But this seemingly given, 
physical or bodily reality as objective ground for shared meaning is precisely undone by God’s 
ability to equivocate and by the saint’s equivocation, which removes all deterministic grounds 
for reality. The Metaphysical narrative of physical or earthly existence becomes one possible 
meaning of reality amongst others. Dorotea’s story affirms her ability to see differently: a 
stomach instead of a womb, a son instead of no son. In seeing differently Dorotea exists 
differently from God-defined reality, including in what her body is, does, or creates.  
The figure of the son condenses many of the threads of meaning in this contradictory 
story. In fact, what emerges most clearly from these contradictions is that there is no one, self-




on multiple constructions, convergences and divergences of meaning in relation to various 
intersecting and contentious frameworks and context – in other word in relation to other invented 
stories.  
On the one hand, we could say that Dorotea’s story is a complex affirmation of the 
existence and reality of her son against God’s contra-diction, which decree also denies the 
possibility of her reunion with it in Heaven. This contra-diction as law Dorotea proclaims a 
malediction: wrong (untrue, invented, fictive) and bad or malignant words. The product of a 
dream ambiguously occasioned and disavowed by God, the son can be read as the site of 
Dorotea’s creative agency that (sinfully) deviates from, rivals, and in the process makes apparent 
God’s equivocal and circumscribed (not omnipotent) Will and Creation. As she relates being 
informed after spending a life time in suffering with the hope for her son’s recovery, it was God 
who had given her the heart of a mother: an affective desire or intentionality that makes of 
motherhood her life’s highest aspiration or ‘dream,’ its most valued purpose or meaning. Perhaps 
this same heart was what made her son’s loss unbearable and turned her life’s highest goal to that 
of its recovery. But as the saint also revealed, God had simultaneously made the dream 
unrealizable (and thus a cause for heartache and pain) in giving her the womb of a whore. Within 
the (belated) account of the equivocal nature of God’s intention emerges Dorotea’s own creative 
intentionality as the dream or desire is made real –a creative power much like that of God for 
whom willing is creation, in other words where intention (dream, desire) is action or creation 
(but which agency, also like God’s as it turns out, is partial and finite rather than omnipotent).  
This act of creation moreover challenges the very order of reality in reversing its meaning 
and value as it deviates from God given prerogative of motherhood defined as the vehicle for the 




prerogative of motherhood is further implicated in the punishment for Origin Sin and defines life 
on earth as something eked out through the pain of productive and reproductive labor for its 
sustenance and continuity as God’s fallen creatures. This is so until such time as, having paid off 
and passed on the debt of sin to the next generation, it can recover eternal life in the joy and 
plenitude of Heaven. In this sense Dorotea’s miraculous son makes of her an agent of production 
or creation of life rivaling God’s own power of invention, and which creation is simultaneously 
that of a different meaning and value of life. It may be worth nothing that within this alternate 
story of creation Dorotea’s invented or made up son could be said to embody another sense of 
the term ilusión in Spanish as noted earlier – an empowering sense of enthusiasm, thrill, or joy.  
If the birth, emergence, or coming into being of Dorotea’s son narrates an empowering, 
creative act or a happening that deviates from God’s given order of reality as told through the 
Judaic myths of Creation and of the Fall, her separation from her son and the inability to accept 
the son’s loss or death narrates an identification with or investment in the promise of restoration 
to eternal life proffered by the Christian myth of Redemption – which continues the story of and 
changes the ending to the Fall narrative, thereby changing its meaning – and which forms the 
basis for the Catholic order in which Dorotea lived. As something lost and for which Dorotea 
spends her life hoping to recover, the son can thus be read to resonate with the idea of Eden, and 
of Dorotea’s existence as fallen from and a loss of originary paradise, and which became one 
moment in the larger narrative of salvation and recovery of such existence in Heaven. The story 
connects the son to the soul, God, and the recovery of ideal existence in Heaven in various ways. 
In the dream in which the saints in Heaven contradicted the existence of her son, she had hoped 
to find his soul there, perhaps waiting for her to rejoin him. Dorotea had also frequently 




her death. Such reunion moreover would be inseparable from the reunion or communion with 
God in eternal life. It is this sense of the son as lost and recoverable ideal unity of existence that 
Dorotea eventually rejects in a reinterpretation of her son as the illusion that had made her live 
too long in pain and suffering for its recovery, and which suffering was expected and justified as 
debt-payment and punishment for a loss which now appears as nothing less than an inherited or 
generationally reproduced consequence of the Fall or separation from life’s Edenic unity and 
plenitude through Original Sin itself.    
Dorotea’s is an immaculate conception – there is no mention of marriage or a husband– 
but whose child is not recognized by the Heavenly Father either, making it (twice) a bastard and 
Dorotea (twice) a whore, as pointed out by the saint. In a way a story of a disowned son of God 
that can be read in relation to the familiar figures of the devil or the antichrist, Dorotea’s 
disinvestment in the son shifts the emphasis to something like that of an aborted narrative of the 
making of a Virgin Mary/Mother. The contrasting bastard/whore narrative that emerges 
foregrounds the social function or meaning of mother and son (of man and of God): that of 
reproduction and continuity of the name and order of the Father, in other words of the 
patronymic logos passed down generationally through patrilineal inheritance. Furthermore, it is 
through the Son and Savior (in the Christian narrative of redemption) that man is given the 
chance of reidentifying with the Father and recovering eternal life once lost, and which re-
subordinates earthly existence – its meaning and value, agency and goal – to that of the higher 
order. Within this narrative the (virgin) mother serves to reproduce and perpetuate both orders as 
well as functions as the link that facilitates and perpetuates the subordination of one order to the 
other. Within the social ordering of woman’s subordination to man and to the reproduction of his 




Hell as the lower order of eternally suffering existence, and which deviation encompasses the 
whore or any form of sexuality that produces life as different from and not a reproduction of this 
order. In her retraction of interest or investment in the son and thus in motherhood Dorotea’s 
story is ultimately one of a departure from the Christian order and its hierarchical unity of earthly 
life under Heaven and Hell, a unity which makes of earthly life a reproduction of the productive 
power or creative agency of the higher order, and which subordination of agency is doubly 
embodied by the mother as a vehicle for the reproduction of the Father/father’s identity and the 
social order organized around its perpetuation.    
In contrast to God’s contra-diction, neither Dorotea’s circumvention that is also an 
embodiment of God’s equivocal intentionality, nor her retraction from God’s dual creation of 
mother and whore by rescinding the son altogether constitute a disavowal of the continued 
existence and power of God or the soul. In the same way that as a Christian woman she was 
considered crazy to have walked around carrying a bundle of cloth in her arms as if it were her 
baby, in the here and now of this enigmatic life and story she continues to be so in allowing for 
the existence of God and the soul in a reality apart from her own. In other words Dorotea’s 
invented reality or life-story is foregrounded as owing itself to other invented realities rather than 
as their negation or replacement as the true(r) reality, and which claim would make other realities 
subordinate or non-existent. Her life emerges from and owes itself to the life she left behind, and 
her creation/son comes into being due to another creation/order of existence (dream, Heaven), an 
accidental consequence of God’s unintended intention. And Dorotea’s narrative tells of co-
existent realities without forming a structuring hierarchy between them. Better said (and as will 
be explored in the next chapter), it does so in order undo the various historical iterations of an 




dominant one, whether by predefining some as less real (less significant, meaningful, or 
consequential) than others, by distinguishing between (true) reality and (false) representation 
(appearance, perception, knowledge, meaning) of reality, or in the division of reality into higher  
and lower orders.  
As I have been delineating, Dorotea’s self-contradictory story made up of and premised 
upon overlapping, convergent and divergent meanings (the significance of which I am also 
inventing through continual reframing and adjustment of context of reading) narratively enacts 
the idea of equivocation and proclaims it the foundation of any given reality, against the 
assertion of primal origin or orginary act of creation. But while Dorotea’s story can be simply 
summed up as a rejection of Christian Metaphysics, the story is made complicated by the fact 
that rather than representing the secular perspective that historically overturned the Christian 
worldview and makes of it (and of God’s existence) an untruth, myth, or fiction, her suicide as an 
abandonment of the soul or the Christian conceptions of life, death, and afterlife (life’s origin, 
end, and rebeginning) places her existence and its meaning not in a secular humanist world but in 
a benevolent fictional and mythical time-space of the grave shared with Juan Preciado, whose 
own story which I will discuss in the next chapter similarly tells of suffering and of eventual 
death as an exit from the accursed or malevolent untruth, fiction or myth that is the modern 
worldview on the nature of life and death. What I am highlighting here is how Dorotea’s 
renunciation of the very category of truth, an affirmation of sin (deviation as non originary 
creation), and of what will emerge into an alternative meaning and way of life outside of both 
Christian and secular truth-claims in the figure of Susana San Juan are thematically bound up 
with and narratively accomplished through the complex figure of the son, the polyvalent nature 




fiction, but which distinction is thereby displaced onto questions of productive power of 
invention/creation of existence versus the circumscribed power for the reproduction of given and 
predetermined existence, and whereby what is defined as reproductive power becomes visible as 
a kind of generative, creative agency of existence subordinated to the production, organization, 
and self-perpetuation through time of an invented order of meaning and organization of life, 
which thus claims the status of timeless or universal self-sameness or truth.   
Hay esperanza para nosotros, contra nuestros pesar. Pero no para ti9  
There Is Hope for Us, In Exchange for Our Sorrows. But Not for You10 
Dorotea had many sins. Least of it was a whore’s invention of a son that the Father 
denied, demanding abnegation and repentance in exchange for getting back in His Good Grace, 
and the existence of which no one believed anyhow. Thinking her crazy and consequently as 
incapable of harmful deviance as God is incapable of erring or being defied, the villagers 
perceive her made-up son as a non-threat. As they note in relation to the similarly crazy Susana 
San Juan, “...a los locos no les vale la confesíon, y aun cuando tengan el alma impura son 
inocentes¨ (167), “...crazy people don’t need to confess, and even if they have an impure soul, 
they’re innocents” (112, translation modified,). Dorotea’s other sin however was enough to make 
the village priest pronounce her soul eternally damned. As we will see, Dorotea’s ‘real’ 
(consequential, threatening) sin is but a small part in a much bigger rebellion against God’s 
ordained reality. In contrast to the story of Dorotea’s rather benign withdrawal, this rebellion is 
implicated in the historical rise of the secular worldview as a bid to overturn God’s order and 
establish its own knowledge as truth-claim and dominion over existence. Here is the scene of 
Dorotea’s confession: 
                                                
9 Rulfo, 86. 




      La primera que se acercó fue la vieja Dorotea, quien siempre estaba allí esperando a 
 que se abrieran las puertas de la iglesia.  
      Sintió que olía a alcohol. 
      –¿Qué, ya te emborrachas? ¿Desde cuándo? 
      –Es que estuve en el velorio de Miguelito, padre. y se me pasaron las canelas. Me 
 dieron de beber tanto, que hasta me volví payasa.   
      –Nunca has sido otra cosa, Dorotea. 
      –Pero ahora traigo pecados, padre. Y de sobra. 
      En varias ocasiones él le había dicho: << No te confieses, Dorotea, nada más vienes a 
 quitarme el tiempo. Tú ya no puedes cometer ningún pecado, aunque te lo propongas. 
 Déjale el campo a los demás,>> 
      –Ahora sí, padre. Es de verdad. 
      –Di. 
      –Ya que no puedo causarle ningún perjuicio, le diré que era yo la que le conseguía 
 muchachas al difunto Miguelito Páramo.  
      El padre Rentería, que pensaba darse campo para pensar, parecío salir de sus sueños y 
 preguntó casi por costumbre: 
      –¿Desde cuándo? 
      –Desde que él fue hombrecito. Desde que le agarró el chincual.  
      –Vuélveme a repetir lo que dijiste, Dorotea. 
      –Pos que yo era la que le conchababa las muchachas a Miguelito. 
      –¿Se las llevabas? 
      –Algunas veces, sí. En otras nomás se las apalabra. Y con otras nomás le daba el 
 norte. Usted sabe: la hora en que estaban solas y en que él podía agarrrarlas descuidadas. 
      –¿Fueron muchas? 
      No quería decir eso; pero le salió la pregunta por costumbre. 
      –Ya hasta perdí la cuenta. Fueron retemuchas. 
      –¿Qué quieres que haga contigo, Dorotea? Júzgate tú misma. Ve si tú puedes 
 perdonarte. 
      –Yo no padre. Pero usted sí puede. Por eso vengo a verlo.  
      –¿Cuántas veces viniste aquí a pedirme que te mandara al Cielo cuando murieras? 
 ¿Querías ver si allá encontrabas a tu hijo, no, Dorotea? Pues bien, no podrás ir ya más al 
 Cielo. Pero que Dios te perdone. 
      –Gracias, padre. 
      –Sí. Yo tambien te perdono en nombre de él. Puedes irte. (131-2) 
 
      The first woman in line was old Dorotea, who was always waiting for the church 
 doors to open. 
      He smelled the odor of alcohol.  
      “What? Now you’re drinking? How long have you been doing this?” 
      “I went to Miguelito’s wake, padre. And I overdid it a little. They gave me so much to 
 drink that I ended up acting like a clown.” 
      “That’s all you’ve ever done, Dorotea” 




      On many occasions he had told her, “Don’t bother to confess, Dorotea; you’d be 
 wasting my time. You couldn’t commit a sin anymore, even if you tried. Leave that to 
 others.” 
      “I have now, padre. It’s the truth.’ 
      “Tell me.” 
      “Since it can’t do him any harm now, I can tell you that I’m the one who used to get 
 the girls for the deceased. For Miguelito Páramo.” 
      Father Rentería, stalling for time to think, seemed to emerge from his fog as he asked, 
 almost from habit: 
      “For how long?” 
      “Ever since he was a boy. From the time he had the urges.” 
      “Repeat to me what you just said, Dorotea” 
      “Well, that I was the one who rounded up Miguelito’s girls.” 
      “You took them to him?” 
      “Sometimes I did. Other times I just made the arrangements. And with some, all I did 
 was head him in the right direction. You know, the hour when they would be alone, and 
 when he could catch them unawares.” 
      “Were there many?” 
      He hadn’t meant to ask, but the question came out by force of habit. 
      “I’ve lost count. Lots and lots.” 
      “What do you think I should do with you, Dorotea? You be the judge. Can you pardon 
 what you’ve done?” 
      “I can’t, padre. But you can. That’s why I’m here.” 
      “How many times have to come to ask me to send you to Heaven when you die? You 
 hoped to find your son there, didn’t you, Dorotea? Well, you won’t go to Heaven now. 
 May God forgive you.” 
      “Thank you, padre.” 
      “Yes. And I forgive you in His name. You may go.” (73-75, translation modified) 
 
One of Pedro Páramo’s numerous bastard children, Miguel’s mother had died in 
childbirth. On the priest’s insistence that Pedro take care of the child and derision that the boy 
has Pedro’s bad blood, Pedro Páramo decided to raise Miguel to disprove the priest’s insult. An 
illegitimate son arbitrarily raised as Pedro’s heir and given his last name, the young Miguel is a 
living reproduction of Pedro in his violence, duplicitous dealings, and incessant seduction and 
violation of the village girls. Inheriting a bankrupt estate and nothing but unpaid debts from his 
dead father, Pedro himself had risen to power through a slew of deceptions and coercions: 
broken promises (lies); intimidations; false, invented and baseless allegations of land 




outright murder of Aldrete and presumably of others who stood in the way of his expanding 
acquisition of land and power. Sleeping with the majority of the town’s women and siring 
countless illegitimate children, he literally and figuratively becomes the father whose will is law 
unto the entire village. The priest – noting his own complicity – connects these violence and 
violations with Pedro’s growing social standing that ended up rivaling the role of the church in 
the village, a status reproduced and expanded in Miguel:  
      <<El asunto comenzó  – pensó – cuando Pedro Páramo, de cosa baja que era, se alzó a 
 mayor. Fue creciendo como una mala yierba. Lo malo de esto es que todo lo obtuvo de 
 mí: ¨Me acuso padre que ayer dormí con Pedro Páramo.¨ ¨Me acuso padre que tuve un 
 hijo de Pedro Páramo.¨ ¨De que le presté mi hija a Pedro Páramo.¨ Siempre esperé que él 
 viniera a acusarse de algo; pero nunca lo hizo. Y después estiró los brazos de su maldad 
 con ese hijo que tuvo. Al que él reconoció, sólo Dios sabe por qué. Lo que sí sé es que yo 
 puse en sus manos ese instrumento..>> (127) 
 
      It had all begun, he thought, when Pedro Páramo, from the low thing he was, made 
 something of himself. He flourished like a weed. And the worst of it is that I made it all 
 possible. “I have sinned, padre. Yesterday I slept with Pedro Páramo.” “I have sinned, 
 padre. I bore Pedro Páramo’s child.” “I gave my daughter to Pedro Páramo, padre.” I kept 
 waiting for him to come and confess something, but he never did. And then he extended 
 the reach of his evil through that son of his. The one he recognized – only God knows 
 why. What I do know is that I placed the instrument in his hands. (69)  
 
Considered crazy by the villagers for carrying around a bundle of cloth as if it were her 
child, losing it, and henceforth expending her life in the quest for its recovery, Dorotea lived on 
handouts until young Miguel made a secret deal with her in exchange for a few meals a day, a 
pact only revealed upon Miguel’s untimely death in Dorotea’s confession to the priest above, and 
which pact with the devil as it were allowed her to go on living, suffering, and searching for her 
lost son and the ideal of life he embodies. In aiding Miguel’s relentless sexual conquests and thus 
– much like Pedro– his weed-like self-proliferation through a growing number of bastard 
children, Dorotea’s sin is bound up with the evil flourishing of Pedro’s power over the village by 




Pedro’s evil is involved in the historical question of epochal transference of authority 
from the feudal church and the economy of salvation to that of secular power and capitalist 
political economy.11 In refusing confession, penance, and absolution for his sins, Pedro’s evil 
seem to lie less in his sexual and economic abuses and more in the refusal to subordinate the 
resulting accrued status and power to church authority to shore up and perpetuate the status quo. 
The priest never interfered in Pedro’s worldly affairs, only expected to give penance and pardon 
him when his confession attests to his submission to the church and reaffirms the established 
power hierarchy. As narrated in Father Rentería’s confession to another priest from whom he 
himself sought absolution, when Pedro spurned such display of obsequiousness the priest 
lamented too late his lack of action and tacit complicity with Pedro’s expanding sphere of 
influence that came to surpass that of the church itself, a sin of omission for which Father 
Rentería was not forgiven.   
As will be explored in more historical detail in the next chapter, the overlap, struggle, and 
gradual shift in the balance of power over Comala from Father Rentería to Pedro can be read to 
reflect the complex processes of historical transformations leading up to and beyond the Mexican 
Revolution: the transition from a Catholic and feudal social order (within which capitalist 
economic relations was emergent) to a secular configuration of power and consolidation of 
bourgeois capitalism within a democratic social order, a structural reconfiguration facilitated by 
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(and through the foreclosure of the other possibilities opened up by) the Mexican Revolution.12 
The story of Pedro’s imposition of his will over the village narrates the historical reorganization 
of social relations, the creation of new social reality the laws of which are moreover reproduced, 
consolidated, and extended through his son. In this sense Miguel’s alleged murder of the priest’s 
brother and rape of his niece – the latter feat most likely with Dorotea’s help – serve to dramatize 
how the conflict between Pedro and the priest (and its repetition down the generations) 
narratively embody the violent transference of power: the historical subsumption of one self-
reproducing or perpetuating social configuration of power (established social order) by another.  
Yo no estoy para resignaciones13 
I Am Not One for Resignations14 
     –Y sin embargo, padre, dicen que las tierras de Comala son buenas. Es lástima que 
estén en manos de un solo hombre. ¿Es Pedro Páramo aún el dueño, no? 
      –Así es la voluntad de Dios. 
      –No creo que en este caso intervenga la voluntad de Dios. ¿No lo crees tú así, padre? 
      –A veces lo he dudado; pero allí lo reconocen. (130) 
 
“And yet, Father, they say that the earth of Comala is good. What a shame the land is 
all the hands of one man. Pedro Páramo is still the owner, isn’t he? 
      “That is God’s will.” 
     “I can’t believe that the will of God has anything to do with it. You don’t believe that, 
do you, Father?” 
      “At times I have doubted; but they believe it in Comala.” (72) 
 
From one perspective a story of sin and social degeneration, the structural processes of 
transformation from the predominantly Catholic feudal social universe to a secular one is 
narrated through the perspective and life-story of Pedro Páramo himself as an overcoming of 
debt and servitude towards the attainment of free will and self-determination. The story of 
Pedro’s childhood paints a symbolic picture of feudal filial and social relations: a dwindling 
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Revolution see Wolf, Eric R. “Mexico.” Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century. New York: Harper & Row, 1969.  
13 Rulfo, 82. 




family fortune overburdened by the debt-obligation of tithe to the church; a father whose 
investments in the family estate produced not surplus but more crippling debt, but who proclaims 
the inconsequential worth of his son for his ungrateful disdain for work (whether on the father’s 
estate or his suggestion of priesthood), but where work is visible as nothing but laboring to 
service debt; a mother inscrutably tragic, resigned equally to the drudgery of work and prayer 
and (along with the grandmother) to making sure young Pedro submits his life to the same.  
The death of both parents in Pedro’s adolescence marks a turning point in this narrative 
and the moment of Pedro’s emergence from a relation of dependence on his family into 
independent adulthood as he shakes off the yoke of inheritance of his parents’ debt-relations with 
the community, the church, and with God, and in the process breaks the generational self-
reproduction and continuity of the established order of social relations. By reinventing 
(rewriting) his relation to the past through deceitful (invented falsehoods) and violent erasures of 
ownership and owed debts and through active forgetting of both parents, Pedro recreates the 
world as he reorganizes Comala’s social and economic relations and reality around his own God-
like will and rule, which came to replace that of the Church.15  
On the one hand a story of liberation from subjection to relations of debt and dependence, 
Pedro’s narrative links this free will to a reversal of power hierarchy and to his dominion over 
the village. Thus while a narrative of a break with the established order it is also a story of a 
structural repetition or reproduction of hierarchical social ordering, a replacement of one 
dominant power with another –a notable contrast with Dorotea’s story. More importantly, 
Pedro’s imposition of his will over the village is carried out in the interest and with the purpose 
                                                
15 See Dove, previously cited, for an extensive reading of the process of erasure and reinscription of meaning of 
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this character with the postrevolutionary state as well as the pre-revolutionary figure of the cacique or local 




of making possible his recovery of Susana San Juan, a childhood love whose loss is narrated in 
terms that further recalls the story of Dorotea’s son and the complex narrative configuration of 
the quest for the recovery of Eden in Heaven.  
      <<A centenares de metros, encima de todas las nubes, más mucho más allá de todo, 
 estás escondida tú, Susana. Escondida en la immensidad de Dios, detrás de su Divina 
 Providencia, donde yo no puedo alcanzarte ni verte y adonde no llegan mis palabras.>>  
           (74-75) 
 
      Hundreds of meters above the clouds, far, far above everything, you are hiding, 
 Susana. Hiding in the immensity, behind His Divine Providence where I cannot touch 
 you or see you, and where my words cannot reach you. (12-13)  
 
The locus of his childhood love and affective bond, Susana functions as replacement for 
Pedro’s family as the site of belonging and oneness. As will be discussed further in the next 
chapter, Susana functions to bring together within Pedro’s story the parallel Christian and 
modern secular narratives of prelapsarian and prepubescent unity of self and world, a certain idea 
of childhood as innocent of separation, differentiation and conflict prior to the Fall (or growth 
into an individual as differentiation from the family as a unit), and which sense of oneness is 
recoverable and reproducible through time through development of social bonds of belonging to 
the larger community and its perpetuation through founding of a new family, or as promised 
timeless communion in Heaven.  
Pedro’s memory of separation and pain in the above passage recalls Dorotea’s longing 
for her son, similarly placing Susana in Heaven as Divinely promised destiny of recovery of 
communion. But it also makes visible a process of contestation that replaces the Christian 
narrative with a secular one of reunion as self-reproducing filial and communal oneness. Pedro’s 
rejection of and thus barring from Heaven and its promise of everlasting unity defined as life’s 
destiny or its highest goal and value narrates equally the transition from the Christian universe to 




of self-determination is tied to filial union and communal oneness or another narrative of 
communion defined as life’s highest meaning and value. With his near limitless resources – and 
in an enactment of sovereign will over his own destiny – Pedro tracks down and recovers Susana 
San Juan. In a more secular circumvention of will and usurpation of power Pedro has Susana’s 
father killed to prevent him from taking her way again, and in order to place the now orphaned 
Susana under his own dominion conceived and justified as protection and care over her life and 
its well being. Thus Pedro takes on the function of and replaces both Divine Providence and 
Susana’s father as sovereign provider through assuming the role of her husband.  
Esperé a tenerlo todo16 
I Wanted to Have It All17 
 <<Esperé treinta años a que regresaras, Susana. Esperé tenerlo todo. No solamente algo, 
 sino todo lo que se pudiera conseguir de modo que no nos quedara ningún deseo, soló el 
 tuyo, el deseo de ti..>> (139)  
  
 I waited thirty years for you to return, Susana. I expected to have it all. Not just 
 something, but everything there was to have, to the point that there would be nothing left 
 for us to want, no desire but your wishes. (82, translation modified) 
 
As I have read it so far, the basic narrative arc of Pedro’s life-story as a search for Susana 
San Juan reproduces that of Dorotea’s: a narrative of the Fall as original separation and loss of 
unity, and wherein filial union (and reproduction) grounds both the possibility of Christian 
communion and secular communal self-perpetuation as oneness. This desire is expressed in the 
above passage as a wish for perfect reciprocity as the very end of desire, intentionality or 
capacity for differentiation and thus production of separation and change, in order words a desire 
for the very end to time in an eternally self-enclosed oneness or unity. As will be discussed 
further in the next chapter this passage encapsulate an aspect of the secular idea of sovereign or 
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free individual will which finds its teleological end or destiny in perfect reciprocity with the 
collective will or communality, an idea of shared communal (national) identity that is invested in 
the desire for timeless self-reproduction as one, and which logic reproduces the Christian telos of 
communion which Dorotea’s cautionary tale foregrounds as destructive and disempowering 
illusion.   
Dorotea’s and Pedro’s stories narrate divergent paths of reorganization or invention of 
realities. As I will discuss more fully in the next chapter, Pedro’s story and its narrative 
resonance with the historical process of displacement of the Christian feudal social order by the 
modern one in Mexico is implicated in an ontological shift in world and worldview 
accompanying the rise to dominance of scientific narrative of life between the 16th and 17th 
century in Europe, and which enabled Europe’s own passage from feudal to modern form of 
social organization. The gradual emergence of various scientific narratives about the nature of 
the universe, of the earth’s natural life, and of human life itself eventually replaced the Christian 
world and worldview. In replacing Genesis and the Fall as stories of the origin of the world and 
of human life, scientific knowledge of the world comes to proclaim God and God’s world as 
never having existed and thus as fictional. As the story of Pedro Páramo makes visible however 
and as I will discuss in the next chapter, this ontological shift replacing Christian truth or Divine 
law with scientific and secular one is implicated in the reproduction of the utopian narrative of 
communion through a continuity of the idea of sovereign power or freedom of self-determining 
existence translated from God to Man, and which promise of human existence and co-existence 
as communal (national) unity and plenitude emerges into another destructive logic of dominion 
that subordinates and overdetermines all other life forms and realities to its own self-




Within early 20th century Mexico the postrevolutionary consolidation of secular state 
power over against the feudal Catholic social order grounds itself on the prevailing scientific 
worldview for the establishment of its legitimacy as a lawful social organizing principle. In the 
next two chapter I discuss the complex consequences of the emergence of the secular state not 
only as a violence against Christians and their world and worldviews that also reproduces 
Christianity’s teleological narrative but in contrast with preexisting indigenous cultures and their 
mythical realities equally marginalized by both the Christian and secular orders. For this I 
initially rely on Patrick Dove’s reading of the story of Juan Preciado as a critique of state power, 
and which story makes visible secular rule of law as a hegemonic social formation and violence 
against alternative ways of life. My own reading of the novel suggests however that Dove’s 
critique of modernity implicitly reproduces an investment in the possibility of oneness and 
plenitude as the highest ideal of existence. As I will show, this ideal is premised on the idea of 
human knowledge as cultural system of representation of given and lawful reality of existence 
and is implicated in 17th century scientific rationality and its claim to the truth of the nature of 
existence or natural law. This truth’s technological and economic translation into dominion over 
nature can be said to reverse the Christian narrative of the Fall as loss of such dominion and 
subjection of humans to nature’s power, and which reversal and recovery places Man in the 
position of God. As I have shown with Dorotea and will return to discuss in chapter three in the 





Chapter 2: Los retratos eran cosa de brujería / Representations Were a Tool of Witchcraft:  
Cultural Politics and the Modern Myth of Origin  
In a certain sense, Juan Preciado’s story is a story of his mother Dolores in much the 
same way Dorotea’s story is a story of her son, and Pedro Páramo’s is that of Susana San Juan. 
No less enigmatic, this story is similarly a narrative enactment of divergences and convergences 
of meaning constructed around the illusion or harmful fiction of Eden/Heaven, a plenitude of 
eternal Oneness defined as both origin and end/goal of existence. As I have shown, the complex 
figure of Dorotea’s son embodies the prerogative of motherhood as self, filial, and social 
reproduction of earthly life and of Heaven. This son (or her role in the reproduction of the 
established social and metaphysical order) was ideally to have performed the function of her 
conduit to Heaven as promised by God. Pedro Páramo similarly spends his life accumulating and 
expending near infinite resources in a search for the recovery of a lost childhood paradise 
identified with the figure of Susana San Juan. As I will discuss in the next chapter, standing both 
as the locus of childhood affection (in place of the mother) and the reproduction/recovery of this 
filial love as desired future wife, Susana’s return to Comala relates and simultaneously undercuts 
the narrative of Pedro’s sovereign will. In the preceding chapter I have contextualized this will in 
relation to the momentous historical reconfiguration of power and social organization: the 
displacement of the will of God by that of the modern discourse of the sovereign will of man, 
socio-culturally organized into unified and sovereign nations.  
“Vine a Comala porque me dijeron que acá vivia mi padre: un tal Pedro Páramo” (65); “I 




(3), begins Juan through the first person narrative point of view in the first words of the novel. 
Juan recounts his mother Dolores’s dying wish that he return to her village to search for his 
father.  Within this story, mother and son together form a similar narrative of the search for the 
promise of communion or belonging to a community as self-reproducing and timeless identity. 
The father’s recognition would restore Juan to his place in the community as a legitimate son, 
heir and reproduction of his father’s identity. The reproduction of the identity of the father as 
production of social continuity is also Doroles’s promise of communion. In other words, Juan 
functions for Dolores as her afterlife/soul and conduit towards Comala/community as the sphere 
of social transcendence of individual identity (an overcoming of individual death through 
identity reproduction), in much the same way that the existence of Dorotea’s son is entangled 
with that of the soul and the transcendental order of eternal life after death in a hierarchical union 
with the identity of the Divine. Within both narratives, the promise of communion and 
communal self-reproduction makes visible the hierarchical nature of the union: the subsumption 
of the identity of the mother to that of the father or husband much like that of individual souls to 
that of God.  
The story emphasizes the superimposition of will and intentionality, knowledge and 
agency of mother and son (stylized through the use of italics) in this quest for social identity 
through which the mother is restored to her rightful but subordinate place and role in the family 
and community and the son to the place of the father as his rightful inheritance.  
     Yo imaginaba ver aquello a través de los recuerdos de mi madre; de su nostalgia, entre 
 retazos de suspiro. Siempre vivió ella suspirando por Comala, por el retorno; pero jamás 
 volvió. Ahora yo vengo en su lugar. Traigo los ojos con que ella miró estas cosas, porque 
 me dio sus ojos para ver: <<Hay allí, pasando el puerto de Los Colimotes, la vista muy 
 hermosa de una llanura verde, algo amarilla por el maíz maduro. Desde ese lugar se ve 
 Comala, blanqueando la tierra, iluminándola durante la noche. >> Y su voz era secreta, 





     I had expected to see the town through my mother’s memories, through her nostalgia –
nostalgia laced with sighs. She had lived her lifetime sighing about Comala, about going 
back. But she never returned. Now I had come in her place, I was seeing things through 
her eyes, as she had seen them, because she had given me her eyes to see. Just as you 
pass the gate of Los Colimotes there’s a beautiful view of a green plain tinged with the 
yellow of ripe corn. From there you can see Comala, turning the earth white, and lighting 
it at night. Her voice was secret, muffled, as if she were talking to herself…My mother. 
(4, translation modified)  
 
Resonating with the teleological narrative of the Fall and Redemption, the narrative voice and 
point of view of Juan Preciado through which the story unfolds is overlaid with the voice and 
vision of his mother whose anecdotes about her village as lost Edenic past propels Juan’s journey 
home in her place and structures his expectations of the future as that of its recovery. 
Maldita y condenada Justina1 
Perverse and wicked Justina2 
Patrick Dove’s seminal work on the novel provides a compelling reading of the story of 
the mother and son’s superimposed quest for lost communal oneness and the hierarchical social 
relation it implies as an allegory of the process and problems of secularization and nation 
building in postrevolutionary Mexico. His work, “Exígele lo nuestro: Transition and Restitution 
in Rulfo’s Pedro Páramo”3, reads as both problematic and potentiating the subsumption of the 
mother as natural and self-reproducing life to the production of the father’s identity as social 
organizing principle, culture, and law, and which patronymic law reproduces itself through 
inheritance and functions as the basis for the social order’s continuity. On the one hand, this dual 
premise allows Dove to use Dolores’s quest for justice to problematize modern form of social 
organization and subject constitution, which posits the sovereign individual as the basis for a 
sovereign national order. It allows him to critique and delimit modern state logic based on 
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secular rule of law whose legitimacy is based on the claim to include and represent all individual 
national subjects whose wills equally constitute the law. On the other hand it permits him to read 
her demand for (and failure of) justice as an opening up of thought, reading or cultural system of 
meaning itself to possibilities of emergence or invention inconceivable within patronymic 
cultural logic or system of representational knowledge. 
Using the figure of the exiled and excluded mother to critique of the universalist claim lof 
modern social organization, Dove’s reading of the novel is framed within the question of 
Mexico’s postcolonial cultural contradictions, which he articulates in relation to the subsumption 
of indigenous cultural way of life to modern form of sociality. An incisive reading of the stories 
of Juan Preciado and Pedro Páramo in relation to questions of law, community and cultural 
contradictions in the historical context of social transformations in Mexico, Dove’s work on the 
novel lays an important groundwork that makes possible my own discussion of the novel’s use of 
indigenous culture – or more precisely of mythical imagination – in order to invite an alternative 
constructions of forms of relation and co-existence outside of the framework of culturally self-
reproducing relations of lawfulness and self-determination as ideal form of sociality.  
In this chapter I begin by framing my own reading of Juan Preciado’s story through 
Dove’s conceptualization of its allegorical relation to and exposition of historical contradictions 
preceding and succeeding the Mexican revolution. His insightful historical framing of the novel 
provides an important context for making sense of Juan Preciado’s story. Partly following his 
conceptual discussion of the issues I begin my work in this chapter by reading the trajectory of 
Juan’s story as a narrative movement from the quest for justice that begins the novel to that of a 
problematization of law (on which justice depends), a problematization that is further displaced 




Juan’s death midway through the novel- serve to undermine the postrevolutionary state’s 
promise of a lawful, just, and unified communal order.  
The novel begins with Juan’s return journey to Comala narrated as a quest for the 
righting of the father’s wrong and restoration of justice. In Dolores’s words to Juan: 
 --No vayas a pedirle nada. Exígele lo nuestro. Lo que estuvo obligado a darme y nunca 
 me dio...El olvido en que nos tuvo, mi hijo, cóbraselo caro. (65) 
 
 Don’t ask him for anything. Just what’s ours. What he should have given me but never 
 did... Make him pay, son, for all those years he put us out of his mind. (3) 
 
An abstract appeal, Dolores’s words articulate the desire for something like the return or 
repayment of a debt, fulfillment of some (over)due obligations, and which involve the possibility 
of enforcement of and retribution for broken (false or forgotten) promises, all of which terms 
connote a rightful demand and imply lawful relations as well as their enforcement as guarantee 
of justice and unity.   
Immediately upon arrival in Comala, however, Juan finds out from his guide Abundio 
that Pedro Páramo is dead. His sojourn in Comala reveals a community decimated and 
abandoned to ruin and desolation, and the villagers dead or departed. While Dolores’s 
reminiscences (and Juan’s expectations) reiterate images of past/future communal harmony 
embedded within an image of timeless natural abundance, the Comala that progressively 
emerges in Juan’s narrative voice and perspective is revealed as a place of strife and discord, 
exploitation and complicity, poverty and suffering. Through Juan’s encounter with the few 
remaining villagers and the stories they tell (as well as through the interspersed narrative thread 
of Pedro Páramo), a divergent story of Comala’s past emerges in juxtaposition to Dolores’s 
idyllic vision. As it is progressively revealed to Juan and the reader, Pedro Páramo had tricked 




obligations) a subterfuge for Pedro to wipe out the debt his father owed her father. Subsuming 
her considerable property under his legal status as her husband, Pedro Páramo subsequently sent 
her and their infant son away to live in exile and poverty. The story of a husband/father’s 
injustice to his wife and son is further revealed as embedded within stories of Pedro’s injustice to 
the entire community. As previously discussed, Pedro Páramo had wiped out his family’s debt 
and risen to power through many other similar machinations and violence against anyone who 
would stand in his way, including through seduction and violation of the village women and girls 
who bore him numerous bastard children. Appropriating the village’s productive and 
reproductive resources Pedro Páramo end up reorganizing Comala’s social relations and 
recreating the community in his image, imposing his will upon it as law.   
Juan’s encounter with Abundio early on in the novel exemplifies this narrative 
displacement of the issue of filial injustice onto something like a problematization of lawful or 
harmonious social relations itself. Upon learning that Juan is journeying to Comala to look for 
his father, the guide Abundio announces that he, too, is Pedro Páramo’s son and that, in fact, the 
community abounds in Páramo’s bastard children. Abundio goes on to point out to Juan the 
extent of the Media Luna, Pedro’s vast estate comprising nearly all the land in the village. He 
contrasts Pedro’s wealth with the abandonment to poverty of the mothers (whores) of Pedro’s 
bastard children:   
 Bueno, pues eso es la Media Luna de punta cabo. Como quien dice, toda la tierra que se 
 puede abarcar con la mirada. Y es de él todo ese terrenal. El caso es que nuestras madres 
 nos malparieron en un petate aunque éramos hijos de Pedro Páramo. Y los más chistoso 
 es que él nos llevó a bautizar. Con usted debe haber pasado lo mismo, ¿no? (69) 
 
 Well, all that’s the Media Luna. From end to end. Like they say, as far as the eye can see. 
 He owns ever’ bit of that land. We’re Pedro Páramo ’s sons, all right, but, for all that, our 
 mothers brought us into the world on straw mats. And the real joke of it is that he’s the 





Abundio’s remark exposes Dolores’s rightful demand of a legal wife and Juan’s status as 
legitimate son and rightful heir to a community of illegitimate relations, of women violated, or, 
not unlike Dolores herself, seduced under false pretenses/promises and similarly abandoned to 
poverty along with their children. These children of illicit sexual relations are however without 
recourse to law for justice.   
 In a manner similar to Dorotea’s story of Divine Law as equivocal production of mother 
and whore (and which is implicated in questions of good and evil, Heaven and Hell), the 
narrative of Juan’s quest for justice foregrounds this relation between lawfulness and its 
underside: what the law both produces and defines as illicit in order to establish itself as law. 
Following Hegel, Dove describes this production process as the absolute identity between Law 
and Crime. Juan’s encounter with Abundio implicates his lawful quest for justice in this 
production and exclusion of illicit social relations. But the narrative implicates Juan in this 
injustice in order to further displace the question of social organization and co-existence from 
that of justice and law onto that of truth (and which recalls and anticipates the contested truth-
claims to the existence of Dorotea’s son). As in the course of emergence of these stories of law 
as generalized injustice Juan’s journey takes a fantastic turn. In the process the above accounts of 
communal life that seemed to challenge Dolores’s idyllic version and offer a truer story of the 
past is further complicated by another level of narrative reversal and divergence in meaning. As 
it turns out, the stories of the village’s past are revealed alongside Juan’s discovery that Comala 
in the present of his experience and perspective is a village of the living-dead. Beginning with 
Abundio and in a succession of enigmatic turn of events, each character Juan encounters is 
immediately after revealed to him and the reader as already dead by the next character he meets, 




are revealed as ghostly or supernatural beings whose very existences are hardly credible, 
incomprehensible, and inexplicable (crazy) from Juan’s bewildered narrative point of view 
(within which these multiply embedded stories unfold), their stories about Comala too lose any 
basis for credibility. In what amounts to a narrative undoing of all possibility of truthful 
knowledge about community or the past and present of Comala (and its expected future), Juan 
and the reader are left with nothing but incredible accounts: false, partial stories or multiple 
fictional versions without any premise for ascertaining truth. 
 The story ends with yet another twist however. Crazed with fear, Juan wanders the 
village hearing fragments of stories from and about the past until he encounters an unnamed 
woman he is convinced (and makes a point of ascertaining) is really alive. Through a series of 
complicated interactions he ends up in bed with her, and in another reversal during their sexual 
union her body inexplicably dissolves into sweat and mud while Juan suffocates in the heat. At 
this point exactly half way through the novel in a climactic turn of events that is also a another 
crucial moment of narrative divergence, Juan inexplicably both dies, and -much like with other 
characters- is revealed after the fact as having been dead all along. At this point the very 
narrative point of view that had governed the reading/meaning of the story thus far is itself 
revealed to be without credibility, as the reader suddenly discovers Juan in the grave with 
Dorotea, talking to her as if he’d been telling her the story this whole time. More importantly, 
within this emergent story, Juan is contradicted by Dorotea regarding the manner and place/time 
of his own death, and which narrative of death. He revises into a different version. Through a 
death that both ends the story and replaces the story’s beginning with a different one  – and in the 




comes to be reframed as one more fiction amongst others within the fictional stories of Dorotea 
and Susana San Juan – which dominate the second half of the novel.   
As noted earlier, resonating with the complex question of justice in postrevolutionary 
Mexico, Juan’s story is told from within the time-space of the modern nation. The above 
problematization of truth begins as a confrontation between Juan’s secular point of view with 
stories and realities it cannot credit or comprehend. This include stories and appearances of lost 
souls belonging to the Christian world discredited as fiction by modern worldview, as well as 
other supernatual beings who, I argue, are – like Dorotea – clearly differentiated from these 
suffering souls condemned to remaining in a Comala that their very pursuit of communion in 
Heaven has turned into a hellish purgatory, and which logic is encapsulated by the story of 
Dorotea’s abandoning of her soul to God’s abandonment. This confrontation however gives way 
to a narrative undermining of Juan’s realist point of view itself, and of the narrative meaning of 
the story thus far constructed through identification of the reader with this character as 
representation of the modern individual and its realistic first person point of view as it encounters 
fantastic tales and events. As noted this moment of Juan’s fantastic death in the novel forms a 
narrative break that both ends and rebegins the novel as a different version or organization of 
meaning of Juan’s story, one in which Juan is replaced as the protagonist by Dorotea and 
Sususana San Juan. As we will return to discuss in the next chapter through Tzvetan Todorov’s 
classical formulation, the narrative sequence in this dual problematization of truth can be read as 
a narrative movement from the genre of the fantastic (of the supernatural as told within the 
framework of a realist point of view) to that of the magical (of supernatural and mythical stories 
told without reference or subordination to realist framework). This second move recasts the 




narratively highlighted as fictional, and through which the novel works to expose the very 
category of truth itself as illusion. I will return to discuss this point further in the next chapter 
through a reframing and rereading of Juan’s story.   
La ley de ahora en adelante la vamos a hacer nosotros4 
From Now On, We Are the Law5 
 To return to the questions of justice, law, and truth, the complexity of Juan’s story above 
resonates with the secular quest for promised justice and questions of rightful belonging to a 
lawful community within the emerging democratic national order of postrevolutionary Mexico. 
Premised upon the consolidation of the postrevolutionary modern nation-state, the promise in 
question offers the fulfillment of the Enlightenment’s emancipatory ideals and modern project of 
democracy and equal representation, of inclusion into the sphere of law-making through national 
representational politics founded upon the idea of individual self-determination and self-
governance as the condition for a free, just and unified society.  
 This promise is predicated on an ideal of national progress and development towards 
emancipation of individuals from hierarchical feudal ties and from the accompanying politico-
cultural ideology that justifies usurpation and concentration of land and other resources in the 
hands of the national oligarchy. This ideal of emancipation is further grounded in the belief that 
capitalist development of natural national resources provides a way to overcome poverty and 
scarcity towards shared economic plenitude, and thus to social accord for all members of the 
nation. Through self-development into modern individuals, the newly formed national citizenry 
would thus be liberated from Catholic-feudal ideology and traditional forms of subjection to 
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unequal, hierarchical social relations and instead fulfill the promise of self-realization as free and 
sovereign individuals within a free and sovereign nation.  
 An institutional embodiment of such a promise, the postrevolutionary state emerged out 
of the Mexican revolution, an inchoate period of widespread social fragmentation and violence 
which erupted against the alliance of power between the military dictatorship of Porfirio Diaz, 
the national oligarchy, and the Catholic Church --the established feudal social order that had 
continued in Mexico up until the time of the revolution in 1910, despite formal independence 
from Spain almost a century earlier.   
 On the one hand, the Mexican Revolution was the result of a disintegration of social 
consensus resulting from conflicting economic interests of various sectors that had evolved and 
diversified under the proto-capitalist national economy of the Diaz dictatorship. Diaz’s policy of 
“pan y palo” or “bread and cudgel” rewarded with privileges and concessions those who 
collaborated with the interests of the oligarchy and foreign investment and kept the majority of 
the social underclass -on whose dispossession and exploitation the power of the oligarchy 
depended- in check through violence and intimidation. The Revolution was also a claim for 
social justice through restitution of land and a demand for an end to systemic dispossession and 
exploitation of labor in the agrarian sector, as well as for fair wages and protection of national 
industries over against foreign ownership and dominance.6  
 More than a conflict of economic relations and interests however, the social 
fragmentation that resulted in the revolution entailed the disintegration of consensus regarding 
the very question of co-existence, and thus of ideologies regarding social organization itself. The 
Revolution expressed a conflict among different versions of the politico-cultural forms upon 
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which to organize socio-economic relations. While there were many alliances of interests 
established throughout the period of the revolution there was no clear common ground or agreed 
upon premise based upon which to unify them into one social framework. The eventual 
consolidation of the postrevolutionary state and its universalist claim to include and mediate all 
conflicts of interest and establish a common ground for overcoming social contradictions and 
violence at the national level was in fact achieved through its exclusion of alternative visions for 
social organization. The centralized Mexican state established itself by excluding as possible 
grounds for social organization indigenous demands for autonomous communal existence, as 
well as through the defeat of various other claims for regional autonomy. It also consolidated 
itself through economic liberalization and social reforms aimed at dismantling the power of the 
clergy through confiscation of Church property and criminalization of many of the clergy’s 
former functions including that of education, a reform aimed at dismantling the pre-existing 
feudal social structure grounded in a Catholic cultural worldview regarding the meaning and 
purpose of individual and communal life.7 
 The Cristero rebellion of 1927, in which peasants in the South and Southwest of Mexico 
who had earlier revolted against the Diaz regime fought the newly consolidated secular state in 
the name of Christ and conservative ideology, was a reaction against such liberal policies 
enshrined in the constitution of 1917, as well as against the state’s education program that sought 
to dislodge the peasant populace from their world and “backward ways” by imposing a cultural 
education that the state hoped would produce modern individuals whose worldview and 
economic self-interest would align with that of the secularizing national economy and within a 
social structure founded on progressive ideals based on private property and capitalist 
                                                




development. The defeat of the peasants and the deal brokered between the church and the state 
finally established Mexico as a centralized, modern nation-state committed to the ideals of 
individualism and capitalist development as the basis of national progress towards shared 
economic plenitude; a state, however whose universalist claim to unification, justice and 
inclusion of all individuals as equals within the social structure already excluded claims to 
alternative forms of politico-social organization based on other economic and social relations, 
and which organizations are made illegitimate by the emergent order. 
Tanteando todo los terrenos8 
Getting the Lay of the Land9   
As previously noted, one Patrick Dove’s focus in reading the novel is historically 
localized on the indigenous axis of exclusion in the foundation of an ostensibly universally or 
objectively lawful and just national social order. Dove reads two historical sites of production of 
legitimacy through which the modern state include indigenous people and culture into the 
representational apparatus of national, democratic self-governance in order to exclude the 
possibility of their (pre- or non-national) cultural autonomy and communal self-organization. 
The first site pertains to the cultural discourse of mestizaje. Dove attends to the historical process 
whereby the postrevolutionary state invented an idealized, indigenous cultural past that it then 
incorporates as national heritage into an idea of mestizo Mexicanness  – a synthesis of hispanic 
and indigenous cultures forming a new national cultural identity shared by both. The outpouring 
of state sponsored modernist cultural productions that harkened back to the pre-colonial past and 
blended pre-Columbian images and themes with modernist aesthetics in the various literary, 
artistic, and intellectual spheres  – while creating the image of recovery of lost or subsumed 
                                                
8 Rulfo, 162. 




culture (under colonial Catholicism) and its restoration to the rightful place as origin of the 
nation – in fact served the interest of the state in its self-legitimation as an inclusive or universal 
representational political system, that is to say a representational apparatus that transcends 
particular cultures in representing and mediating the interests of both. This in turn serves the 
telos of cultural and economic modernization justified as a unified national development in the 
equal interest of all.  As Dove writes regarding the claim to inclusion of indigenous cultures into 
a unified national origin and identity that serves the telos of modernization as promise of future 
utopia, and which promise grounds the state’s self-legitimation:  
The increased interest in indigenous and pre-Columbian traditions and iconography 
following the revolution --a tendency strongly promoted by statist institutions-- is far 
from a simple, disinterested hearkening back to an earlier time. This renewed interest in 
the past in fact constitutes an invention of tradition that operates in the interests of the 
state. The state’s claim to have recovered and preserved the past in its meaning or value 
serves as a pretext for this (re)production process: behind the image of a restored national 
tradition unfolds a second space, a space that will in turn be occupied by the state --which 
henceforth proclaims its legitimacy as curator, protector, and guarantor of this 
inheritance. The state’s role is that of a fabulist, projecting a field of legibility in which 
the failures and limitations of the present moment can be passed off as merely temporary 
and epiphenomenal, a necessary collective sacrifice in the process of realizing what the 
historian Hector Augilar Camin terms ‘the true Mexico...the one that had not yet 
appeared and was to be conquered in the future.’ (Aguilar Camin and Meyer, In the 
Shadow of the Mexican Revolution, 159, quoted in Dove,106) 
 
He further adds: 
 
As curator of tradition, the state simultaneously justifies and effaces its presence. It 
legitimates its own existence as well as the dissymmetries it permits and propogates on 
the dual basis of a past to be recovered and a future to be realized. At the same time, it 
masks the fact that it only represents certain particular interests by passing itself off as 
universal law or necessity. A crucial sleight of hand relegates social negativity -that is, 
the moment of loss, violence, uncertainty and contingency that are part of any national 
history- to a merely temporary or accidental existence, or to a condition that the nation, 
thanks to the uplifting power of the state, will some day surpass. Through its 
orchestration of cultural production, the state posits the being of the nation as offstage, as 
a reserve -and thus removed from the transitory nature of history. Cultural production 
following the revolution was, whether knowingly or not frequently complicit in these 
rituals of legitimation. One could examine any number of examples of such complicity 




often claimed to realize a harmonious unification of the pre-Columbian symbolic world 
with revolutionary and modernizing projects; or, similarly, in the essay tradition founded 
by Samuel Romos, Jose Vasconselos, Alfonso Reyes, and Paz, which envisioned and 
celebrated a timeless national character or mexicandidad [‘Mexicanness’]; and, likewise, 
with the literary tradition known as la novela de la revolucion [the Novel of the 
Revolution], which frequently memorialized the revolution in the form of heroic fables. 
(106) 
 
 Dove makes empathatically clear that this claim to inclusion of indigenous cultures 
produces and legitimizes their continued subsumption under a different cultural logic, a cultural 
subjection to a hegemonic socio-cultural form that becomes visible in the politics of land 
appropriation and redistribution. In this second historical site of the state’s invention of its 
legitimacy Dove focusses on competing cultural claims to land owership and mode of its use and 
cultivation as the basis for social organization. As he notes, particular to the context of post-
revolutionary Mexico, the founding exclusion to statist universalist representational claim is 
visible in the conflicting claims over land and in state land reform policy. Mexican history is one 
of repeated, systemic land appropriation and dispossession of the indigenous people, which 
formed one of the impetus behind the early twentieth-century revolution. Land reform and 
redistribution formed one of the promises of redress and justice that legitimated the emergence of 
the postrevolutionary state as mediator between the various social sectors and interest groups. 
Dove’s reading of the above question of land makes visible the inseparable nature of capitalist 
property relations and mode of production from modern institutional forms of knowledge and 
subject constitution of the national people into modern individuals, and which logic underpin and 
justify sovereign state rule of law. 
 As has already been noted, debate over land tenure and ownership forms a fundamental 
 axis in Mexican history. In the colonial period, and likewise following the wars of 
 independence and with the emerging issues of national sovereignty and unity, la tierra 
 marks an intersection for conflicting understandings of ownership, possession, culture 
 and use: for instance, between European and indigenous conceptions of property and 




 tierra is overdetermined in each of these systems, comprising a nexus of multiple and 
 potentially conflicting significations. On one hand land presents an indisputably concrete 
 element for potential struggle, and it is part and parcel of the world that humans set out to 
 transform. At the same time, land - as home, territory, and soil- operates as an index of 
 transcendence in national and prenational Mexican history, designating a communal or 
 national good or right. As a register of transcendence, the land is not a reservoir of 
 permanent meaning but the condensation of a surplus of meaning: the significance of la 
 tierra is always more than the sum of its calculative appropriations and valuations. (133) 
   
 The process of modernization facilitated capitalist incursion into rural parts of Mexico 
and effected a “the displacement of previous systems and practices of land tenure, many of 
which were based on indigenous forms of communal ownership” (Dove, 133). These communal 
land holdings were once granted special protection by the Spanish crown. In the wake of national 
independence, communal form of ownership was eroded in the various waves of national 
agrarian modernization programs aimed at privatization of land for individual ownership to 
facilitate surplus production and accumulation for national growth.  
 As Eric Wolf details in Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century10, the various liberal 
reforms were aimed at breaking up large landholdings that had worked in the favor of Spanish 
colonial interests. Along with other monopolistic economic activities legally protected by law, 
large land holdings or estates were encouraged and granted corporate status and socio-political 
autonomy in exchange for economic contributions in the forms of dues and tributes to the 
Crown. Under this feudal structure prior to independence land was concentrated under the 
Church, large landed estates or haciendas, and indigenous communal land holdings. While 
continually under threat of encroachment and credit bating by the church and especially the big 
haciendas – which decreased the size of their communal land and often turned indigenous 
population into indentured laborers on larger estates to supplement their economic production –  
indigenous communal land holdings were significant in size and number and the majority of the 
                                                




indigenous population lived within and maintained their culturally separate socio-political 
organization at village level despite decreasing measure of relative economic autonomy. 
 Intended as a way to create small, private family farms and encourage the emergence of a 
viable middle class in the post-independence period, successive new governments and waves of 
reform broke up corporate landholdings, but in fact ended up concentrating land as private 
property in the hands of the new oligarchic elite that emerged through close ties with and 
concessions from the government. In effect, the reforms freed up labor from feudal structure of 
debt peonage and from indigenous communal ties to work as landless free wage laborers both in 
the agricultural sector and in the diversifying and industrializing economy. Within the context of 
increasingly internationalized relations of production and subjection to fluctuation in global 
prices, the small number of family farms that did emerge in the process were often forced into 
debt, and which indebtedness invariably resulted in further loss of land to big private estates with 
more resources as leverage.  
 In the context of Indian communities the loss of social organization bound to communal 
holding produced a restructuring of social organization of communal ties and obligations relative 
to economic activities. This restructuring worked against their ability to maintain both land and 
communal self-organization. Most importantly Wolf identifies the cause of land loss to the 
restructuring of traditional processes of communal leadership that displaced the burden of its 
expenses onto limited, privatized resources. He states:  
 The Spaniards had reinforce the cohesion of the Indian communities by granting 
 them a  measure of land and demanding that they make themselves responsible 
 collectively for payments of dues and for the maintenance of social order. The 
 communities had responded by developing, within the framework of such 
 corporate organization, their own internal system of political organization, 
 strongly tied to religious worship. Nearly everywhere, sponsorship of a sequence 
 of religious festivities qualified a man to become of the decision makers for the 




 by meeting criteria laid down by the community; when qualified he had to do so 
 through participating on a committee of elders like himself who acted and spoke 
 for the community. Power was thus less individual than communal. With the 
 coming of new land law, however, the very basis of this system was undermined. 
 Not only did haciendas seize much Indian land, but Indians themselves began to 
 pawn land, to which they were now entitled individually, in order to meet the 
 ordinary expenses of living and the extraordinary expense of religious 
 sponsorship. The very mechanism which at one time had guranteed the cotinued 
 solidarity of the community now turned into a means for destroying it. (Wolf, 17) 
 
 This intensified social restructuring in the agrarian sector had its counterpart in the 
complex expansion of the industrial sector dominated by foreign ownership, and which depended 
on the multitude of landless peasants as cheap source of wage labor. This process of 
consolidation of capitalist relations of production would lead to a deepening socio-economic 
polarization and crisis, the social disaffection with which ignited the revolution during the Diaz 
regime.   
 Dove’s reading of the promise of justice through renewed commitment to redistribution 
of land – which promise legitimated the consolidation of the postrevolutionary state – is focussed 
on showing the repetition of a cultural imposition or rewriting of the meaning of land itself. As 
Wolf notes, initial, limited reform measures granting communal land to indigenous population 
were gradually displaced by private property laws as the postrevolutionary state emerged from 
dependence on negotiated relations between different sectors of economic, cultural and regional 
interests and identities through successive governments to consolidated its power as the 
institutional representation and management of their conflict over the nation’s resources, but 
which was organized to the benefit of larger estates and industries and justified through the logic 
of capitalist and national development and progress. Thus consolidation of state power and 
enforced inclusion into the logic of national modernization effectively eroded the relative socio-




inclusion into democratic self-determination as individual property owner whose self-interest is 
represented by the modern state.  
Entonces ¿qué esperas para morirte?11 
Then, what are you waiting for to die?12 
 Dove’s focus on the indigenous axis of exclusion is elaborated within the contemporary 
critical lens of cultural politics. Consonant with much contemporary poststructuralist and 
postmodernist thinking (albeit the latter term has fallen out of favor), Dove’s is an attempt to 
critique, contextualize, and relativize modern form of knowledge and perspective: in other words 
to delimit the truth-claims (to objectivity) of scientific rationality that allowed the emergence of 
modern perspective and secular cultural logic, wherein scientific secular knowledge replaced 
both Christian and indigenous myths as the principle for social organization. As I will discuss in 
more detail in a subsequent section, the rise and consolidation of a scientific worldview between 
16th and 17th century in Europe revised and replaced the Christian view of the world as the truth 
regarding the nature of existence. As scientific elaboration of the idea of natural, physical law 
came to displace Divine or metaphysical law as the principle governing life, science’s claim to a 
more truthful, rational or objective knowledge of the nature of existence enabled the gradual 
emergence of myriad institutions of modern knowledge (medical, educational, juridical, penal, 
economic, historical, etc) which further consolidated themselves into a biopolitical regime 
explaining, regulating, and managing social life through the subjectivation of human life itself 
under its own particular cultural logic or worldview on the meaning of life natural and social.13 
This in turns underpins and is inseparable from the self-justification of secular rule, which 
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depends on these institutional forms of modern knowledge and subjectivation to legitimize itself 
as a neutral mediating principle for social organization of human co-existence. Claiming to 
objectively represent what emerged at the center of this biopolitical organization of life into a 
modern conceptualization of man as a purportedly sovereign or self-determining individual 
subject, organized into different linguistic/national collectivities or communities, secular rule of 
law replaced earlier human subjection to Divine Rule as an ostensibily universal principle for the 
reorganization of both the human and the natural world.   
Dove’s reading of the novel seeks to relativize this scientific and secular modernity as 
one cultural worldview on reality or nature amongst others. In doing so his work also makes 
visible capitalist private property relations and mode of production as an historically and 
culturally specific system of value or interest underpinning secular rule of law and socio-political 
form of the modern nation-state as the basis for seemingly free national, human cultural self-
organization and development. As he makes clear, however, this conception of culture and 
organization is based on a universalized cultural inscription of the meaning of human life and its 
co-existence or sociality into that of sovereign national collectivity (and shared linguistic/cultural 
identity) of sovereign, self-interested and self-governing private individuals. Situated in the 
context of a similar but belated passage from Christian to secular rule in postrevolutionary 
Mexico in early 20th century, Dove’s work is a critique of the totalizing and self-universalizing 
tendency of modernity, and which opens up the possibility for a revaluation of premodern 
cultural conceptions of the world subsumed to its logic: a political opening up of questions of 
sociality to alternative forms of human subjectivity, knowledge, agency, and social organization.  
Dove’s contextualization of this relativization of modern cultural logic to the history of 




organization allows us to make sense of Juan’s encounter with the supernatual beings in the 
novel as an encounter with other cultural forms of human existence and perception, other ways 
of seeing and of being in the world perceived as unnatural or supernatural (unreal, fictional) by 
modern narrative regarding the very nature of life human, social, and natural, and which makes 
visible as historical remainders earlier forms of aspirations and organizations of life both 
Christiana and indigenous that modern cultural logic and social ordering tries and fail to 
eradicate, supercede, or subject to its own regime of biopolitical inscription and regulation, and 
within which parameters of social law and ordering the novel’s quest for justice begins. This 
framing allows me to read Juan’s death and the end of this encounter between his modern 
perspective and the forms of life that makes visible the underside of its culutural point of view as 
premise and social parameters for the promise of a just and lawfully self-unified social order as 
an end to and passage out of the secular worlview as truth-claim to the nature of the world on the 
one hand, and through association with Dorotea emerges into a narrative rejection of Christian 
truth and reality on the other. As I will return to discuss at the end of this chapter, the emphasis 
on fictionality in the second half of the novel in the chracters of Dorotea and Susana in 
opposition to the  (mutually) exclusive truth-claims to reality of both the secular and Christian 
order emerge into resonance with a mythical view of the world that can be associated with 
indigenous cultures, and in which cultural conception the very relation point of view/knowledge 










Los retratos eran cosas de brujería14 
Representations were a tool of witchcraft15 
Dove’s work does not consider the stories of the dead in the novel as an alternative 
framework of reading. In fact he cautions against any attempt to make sense of the meaning of 
death and madness in the novel other than as delimitation of modern perspective, valuing them as 
narrative markings of the sites at which the culturally contigent pararameters of modern 
perspective and representation of reality emerges into visibility. This injunction by implication 
locates the reader within the same modern cultural perspective, a location or point of view 
seemingly encouraged by the novel itself in its construction of Juan’s modern, first person 
narrative of point of view and implied reader as the guiding narrative perspective for the 
unfolding of the story. As I will return to discuss in the next chapter however, the first person 
point of view is also a staging of a particular reading process that is based on assumptions of 
narrative representation and identification, a staging or dramatization that problematizes this 
narrative point of view’s implication in modern claim to representation of reality not only to 
delimit it – as Dove argues – but in order to enact and reveal the complicity, investments and 
implicit cultural self-positioning of the reader (and his/her view of reality) tricked into 
identifying with it, and thereby showing such reader’s knowledge and reality to have always 
already been identified with and invested in a particular cultural subject position. 
Dove’s work is grounded upon the linguistic turn in psychoanalysis, which understands 
human knowledge, subjectivity, and agency as constituted within discursive systems of symbolic 
cultural meaning that are social constructs and thus culturally specific, rather than an objective 
mirror of reality. But while socially constructed and culturally varied, representational 
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knowledge sytems function more or less through approximation of correspondence to the 
externally given reality (natural, universal), which forms each culture’s origin or point of 
depature for its development. Each cultural system of knowledge thus borders on other cultural 
representations of the same originary nature, at which site of contact between cultures the 
meaning and value of each cultural-linguistic system is visible as limited in its truth-claim to 
correspondence with or representation of natural reality.  
This representationalist framework that forms Dove’s starting premise emerges into 
significance for questions of cultural politics itself in two key moments which connects Dove’s 
reading of the mutually exclusive cultural contention over the meaning, use, and territorial 
communal ownership of land between the state and the indgeneous people to his reading of the  
figure of the exiled mother in the novel. Within Dove’s reading Dolores emerges through Juan’s 
death and the impossibility of inclusion within secular law and justice to stand for and 
narratively mark the site of cultural conflcit without resolution itself. As he writes regarding the 
question of land in a passage which I have cited previously:  
 In the colonial period, likewise following the wars of independence and with the 
 emerging issues of national sovereignty and unity, la tierra marks an intersection for 
 conflicting understandings of ownership, possession, culture, and use: for instance, 
 between European and indigenous conceptions of property and cultivation; and between 
 capitalist and premodern modes of production. Moreover, la tierra is overdetermined in 
 each of these systems, comprising a nexus of multiple and potentially conflicting 
 significations. On the one hand, land presents an indisputably concrete element for 
 political struggle, and it is part and parcel of the world that humans set out to transform. 
 At the same time, land - as home, territory, and soil- operates as index of transcendence  
in national and prenational Mexican history, designating a communal or national good or 
 right. As a register of transcendence, the land is not a reservoir of permanent meaning but 
 he condensation of a surplus meaning: the significance of la tierra is always more than 
 the sum of its calculative appropriations and valuations. (Dove, 133) 
 
 As is visible the idea of land (which figuratively stands for all natural forms and forces of 




posited as objectively existing as “concrete element,” “world,” or a materiality of life grounding 
human social organizations. This objective world or given external reality is understood as the 
site for cultural inscription of human meaning and contextualized within contending forms of 
human knowledge production, each of which make sense of as it makes use of and transforms 
nature for human ends. Land is thus a site of culturally specific production of meaning and 
values of land, (its use, goal, purpose) which forms the basis for the production of meaning of the 
human in its knowledge, agency and social organization. We could say that different cultural 
production of the meaning of natural life and human life ground different social systems of 
knowledge and truths about the very nature of reality, which grounds different organizations of 
human social relations in relation to nature.  
In his reading of Juan’s sexual union with the unnamed woman, whose fantastic physical 
dissolution precedes Juan’s own death, Dove describes the moment as an emergence of a 
physical or bodily materiality of human life outside of language and meaning, and wherein the 
human body emerges in a counterpart to land as materiality of natural existence prior to and 
constitutive of culture and as site of cultural contention or inscription of meaning. The disruptive 
emergence into language of the woman’s body narratively functions – much like land itself – to 
mark the limit of modern cultural logic’s universalized view of natural, physical reality natural 
and human. Posited as the constitutive outside or ground for cultural production of meaning 
itself, the body for Dove marks the limit of all cultural perspectives or symbolic knowledge 
production, marks natural human life as originary or prior to, exceeding, and – as part of nature – 
constitutive of all social narratives regarding the meaning or nature of life human and natural. 
Dove reads Juan’s sexual union with the nameless woman and the dissolution of her body that 




where language or meaning production comes undone to make visible the corporeal female body 
in its reproductive capacity over which Juan’s particular modernist perspective on the meaning 
of life (and death) is inscribed and through which reproduces itself. This materiality emerges into 
visibility, into perspective or sense, only as language and meaning’s constitutive outside, the 
natural ground for the very possibility of human culture as its representation on the one hand, 
and which representational claim is simultaneously made visible as a cultural or biopolitical 
production and inscription of its own particular meaning and value. As Dove writes:  
 ...in the reflexive desbaratarse (‘to fall apart,’ ‘to go to pieces’), which Juan Preciado uses 
 to describe a shattered intimacy with the other, we can also hear one of the intransitive 
 forms of desbaratar: ‘to speak non-sense’ as opposed to the voice of reason. The body of 
 the other performs a double and paradoxical function in organizing the presentation of 
 catastrophic dissolution. With the allegorical presentation of a kind of horror vacui, the 
 somatic body has been evacuated of its transcendence, its spirit or soul. Hollowed out or 
 deprived of its transcendent ground, the body appears to collapse under the weight of its 
 own nothingness. At the same time, however, the body- or the corpse- begins to perform 
 a second function that is antithetical to the first, negated possibility: as its capacity to 
 function as as sign in exhausted, what remains or emerges is the insistence of the body in 
 its materiality. This somatic-corporeal dissolution ‘speaks’ its own ‘language’ precisely  
as its being exhausts itself. (Dove, 154) 
 
 Dove’s assumption of a materiality of life belonging to a natural order of timeless or 
originary unity prior to the time of human cultural self-reproduction, organization, and 
development as subjects of history or agency helps illuminate the importance of the maternal 
figure in his reading of the novel, which is this same site of originary unity or sexual 
reproduction/birth of the human as natural life prior to its entry into the symbolic order of the 
father, in other words prior to and constitutive of the process of subjectification through language 
as symbolization of difference founding the possibility of social relation where communication 
or shared cultural meaning, value, and social accord functions as the basis for oneness of a self-




 Within the framework of knowledge as representation, this originary unity prior to entry 
into language as social subjectivation makes of the maternal figure the site of contact between 
culture and nature (land), and which functions to open every cultural logic and meaning up to its 
constitutive and generative outside that allows for its generational reproduction and thus for 
social continuity, and which at the same time makes its particular social order visible as limited 
in relation to other cultural inscriptions of meaning of the same natural regenerative process that 
grounds its own system of meaning production. Within the novel, the maternal figure for Dove 
points to the cultural inside/outside of modernist logic, the impropriety that founds its order and 
promise of proper communal belonging or inclusion. Thus Dove reads Juan’s death and narrative 
end to modernity’s universalizing claim to representation of the very nature of life as allowing 
the mother’s demand for justice to emerge, much like land itself, as the constitutive limit of 
modern cultural logic and thus to make visible claims to justice that exceed the distributive logic 
of return of land and property within modern social parameters of law. It thus emerge into 
resonance with indigenous cultural claims to autonomous, territorial communal self organization 
and self-reproduction on the one hand, while simultaneously marking indigenous culture itself as 
one exclusive cultural claim to the same land as territory and resource for its self-reproduction. 
          Dove’s injunction against the attempt to read and make sense of the alternative perspective 
offered by the novel is on the one hand a caution against his own implied reader’s modern 
worldview’s reproduction of the violence of subordination of other cultural forms of knowledge 
and ways of being – narrated in the text as through death and madness as the outside of modern 
truth and logic – to modern represenational system of meaning making or reading. It is at the 
same time a caution against reversal of cultural valorization which would replace one hegemonic 




representation and its external delimitation relative to other cultures, the very idea of culture 
emerges as a monolithic discursive system seemingly internally unified, self-enclosed, and self-
reproducing (as self-consistent continuity of development): a totalizing system of inscription of 
social meaning and reality that Dove both critiques as hegemonic, reproduces and affirms its 
reproduction as inevitable, and simultaneously holds out as deferred and indeterminable future 
possibility of emergence of what amounts to another version of self-reproducing cultural unity. 
Dove ends his reading of Mexico’s postcolonial politics of cultural contradictions with the a 
desire for what he began by critiquing: a (different) cultural form or a unified and common we 
that could somehow move beyond hegemonic social formation and be more lawfully inclusive 
and just, a more lawful oneness of shared cultural meaning that through assuring a better sharing 
of prosperity could gurantee against conflicting values, interests, and violence, in other words an 
automous or self-determining and self-reproducing social order of lasting (timeless) peace and 
shared economic justice. An emergence inconceivable withint present form of knowledge and 
logic of representation and left open to an indeterminate future possibility of invention or 
emergence, this possibility of emergence Dove associates with the maternal function as the site 
of contact between nature and culture that can allow for the birth or emergence of a new cultural 
order inconcievable within representational logic. 
As I will discuss in the context of emergence of modernity in Europe itself in the next 
section, Dove’s critique of modern culture’s self-universalization and totalizing claim to 
knowledge of reality and management of life in fact reproduces the modern conception of culture 
itself. In other words, what remains universalized in Dove’s attempt to relativize this logic to 
other cultural forms is the modern conceptualization of the very idea of culture. In the next 




conception of culture. Meaning form and formation, culture and cultivation  – both product and 
process – and thus denoting an idea of organic self-development, the term played a key role in 
the cultural formulation of ideals of human freedom and democratic, moral or lawful, national 
self-governance as Europe itself emerged from a feudalist social order and worldview based on 
Divine Law and predestination through a complex historical transformation based on 
colonization, the emergence of scientific rationalism, the rise of capitalism, and Enlightenment 
ideals for human socio-cultural freedom. 
Se llama de este modo y de este otro16 
Some Call Him One Thing, Some Another17 
 In the most succinct terms, the function of Bildung is that of mediation between the self 
and (national) society. In “Clef a Roman: Some Uses of Human Rights and the 
Bildungsroman”18 Joseph Slaughter provides a useful initial summary of its meaning and role 
based on Wilhelm von Humboldt’s widely influential elaboration of the concept. “Bildung...is 
both the collective culture of a people (a national culture for Humboldt) and the process by 
which one internalizes the dispositions of that culture as part of the propulsion and volitional 
engines of self-expression and ‘self-perfection’” (2-3). Slaughter further clarifies Humboldt’s 
formulation of bildung as the ideal vehicle for the socialization or modernization of the subject:  
 Bildung, for Humbolt, is the fundamental individual capacity by which a Habermasian 
 public sphere is to be animated and legitimized. For him culture and cultivation (bildung) 
 offer the means by which the antagonism between the individual and society is to be 
 mediated; it negotiates the anarchism of individual volition (seen in a capitalist sense as 
 vulgar economic self-interest) and social determinism (seen as economic system-interest) 
 by reconciling the individual to the social through culture such that culture makes some 
 aspect of society’s interests in the individual the individual’s interest in him/herself. (3)  
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 That culture plays a central role in the process of socialization, in fact as increasingly 
totalizing biopolitical inscription, is a familiar notion. In eighteenth century Germany this 
specific meaning of culture as cultivation -as both process and product of self and social 
formation- was elaborated and emerged into prominence. The historical significance of the 
emergent formulation of Bildung and the period of German Classicism itself to cotemporary 
social reality and political thoughts can hardly be exaggerated. As Hans Georg Gadamer 
observes: “The concept of Bildung most clearly indicates the profound intellectual change that 
still causes us to experience the century of Goethe as contemporary, whereas the baroque era 
already appears like a primaeval age of history” (10). Cultural reflections of this period are 
characterized by a turn away from earlier rationalism of the Enlightenment, which had conceived 
the relation between self and society in terms of abstract social principles modeled on universal 
natural law posited as perfectly representable or understandable through human reason. In the 
introductory first chapter to Truth and Method19 Gadamer contextualizes Bildung as a move 
away from formal rationalism within other cultural articulations defending the human and 
historical sciences against the new methodology and exclusive truth-claim of seventeenth 
century natural sciences and Cartesian logic, on which social rationalism was based. His reading 
of Giambattista Vico’s works and its valuation of “sensus communis” or communal/common 
sense as a sphere of knowledge set apart from scientific empirical reasoning based on the senses 
for example provide a useful overview of the question of community, morality and freedom at 
stake in the distinction between the human and natural sciences, and which grounds the later 
formulation of the idea of Bildung: 
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 [Vico] does not dispute the positive aspects of modern critical science, but shows their 
 limitation. Even with this new science and its mathematical methodology we still cannot 
 do without the wisdom of the ancients and their cultivation of prudentia and eloquentia. 
 The most important thing in education is still something else, the training of the sensus 
 communis, which is not nourished on the true, but on the probable. The main thing for 
 our purposes is that sensus communis here obviously does not mean only that general 
 faculty in all men, but the sense that founds community. According to Vico, what gives 
 the human will its directionality is not the abstract generality of reason, but the concrete 
 generality that represents the community of a group, a people, a nation, or the whole 
 human race. Hence the development of this sense of community is of prime importance 
 for living. (20-21) 
 
 Gadamer explores similar ideas found in Shaftesbury, and whose work was highly 
influential in the eighteenth century. In a similar vein the concept of Bildung was elaborated 
against ideals of abstract rationality and universal laws governing social relations to bring to the 
fore questions of freedom and moral duty, and wherein aesthetic criticism and cultural judgment 
play important roles in mediating and reconciling individual will to social law governing the 
common good. Gadamer’s account of the evolution of the term is illustrative: 
 The first important observation about the familiar content of the word Bildung is that the 
 earlier idea of a ‘natural shape’ which refers to external appearance (the shape of the 
 limbs, the well-formed figure) and in general to the shapes created by nature, eg a 
 mountain formation-- Gebirgsbildung) was at that time detached almost entirely from the 
 new idea. Now Bildung is intimately associated with the idea of culture and designates 
 primarily the properly human way of developing one’s natural talents and capacities. 
 Between Kant and Hegel the form that Herder had given to the concept was perfected. 
 Kant still does not use the word Bildung in this connection. He speaks of the ‘culture’ of 
 a capacity (or of a ‘natural talent’) which as such is an act of freedom by the acting 
 subject. Thus among the duties to oneself he mentions not letting one’s talents rust, 
 without using the word Bildung. Hegel, however, already speaks of Sichbilden 
 (‘educating or cultivating oneself’) and Bildung, when he takes up the same Kantian idea 
 of duties towards oneself, and Wilhelm von Humbolt, with his sensitive ear, already 
 detects a difference in meaning between Kultur and Bildung: ‘but if in our language we 
 say Bildung, we mean something both higher and more inward, namely the attitude of 
 mind which, from the knowledge and the feeling of the total intellectual and moral 
 endeavor, flows harmoniously into sensibility and character’ Bildung here no longer 
 means ‘culture’, ie the development of capacities or talents. The rise of the word Bildung 
 calls rather on the ancient mystical tradition, according to which man carries in his soul 





 In Hegel, Bildung becomes a task for mankind, the cultivation of a truly free 
consciousness through sacrifice of particularity for the sake of the universal. “Man is 
characterized by the break with the immediate and the natural that the intellectual, rational side 
of his nature demands of him. ‘In this sphere he is not, by nature, what he should be’-- and hence 
he needs Bildung” (Gadamer, 13). For Hegel Bildung functions to teleologically mediate and 
reconcile man’s intellect and volition with culture (as a higher nature), his freedom with 
universal law, himself with himself through society -the particular national-cultural form of 
human universality. This is achieved through cultural work, labor, and formation of things, in 
which process of self-awareness and consciousness lie self-formation (13-14).  
 Thus on the one hand, the idea of Bildung is defined against mechanistic rationality 
applied to the social sphere. It inscribes the intellect within an idea of culture conceived as a kind 
of teleological directionality of will cultivated towards a ‘sensus communis.’ On the other hand, 
however, this conception of human culture emerges out of and depends on natural science and 
mechanistic philosophy’s conception of nature as a realm of lawful and necessary relations, 
against which human culture (‘the intellectual side of his nature’) is defined as freedom. This 
freedom moreover achieves lawfulness or social order on a higher plane through freedom’s 
reconciliation with social, moral necessity defined in a complex relation of both control and 
overcoming of as well as a return to (higher form of) natural necessity (as cultural law). 
 Carolyn Merchant’s The Death of Nature: Women, Ecology and the Scientific 
Revolution20 delineates a profound redefinition of the concept of nature that took place between 
the sixteenth and seventeenth century, and which forms the basis for eighteenth century 
redefinition of the idea of culture we have been discussing. This reconceptualization of nature is 
                                                




part of a larger, complex, and accelerated process of socio-political transformation in Western 
Europe within this period: the ‘discovery’, colonization and exploitation of the Americas, the 
expansion of production and trade, the emergence of market-oriented economy, as well as the 
spreading use of money as a reliably uniform medium of exchange and store of value, all of 
which facilitated open-ended accumulation of surplus, and which in turn stimulated intensified 
exploitation of natural resources and labor both within Europe and the Americas.  
 This period of nascent capitalism involves a complex restructuring of economic 
production relations and of socio-cultural ideologies justifying new forms and increasing degrees 
of exploitation and disparity in wealth, power, and status on the one hand, and on the other a 
multitude of social reform and revolutionary movements and alternative formulations of socio-
economic and socio-political ideologies and organizations that emerged in reaction to such 
changes. Towards the end of the seventeenth century and inseparable from this restructuring of 
production relations, the Scientific Revolution had produced what could be called an ontological 
shift in the predominant meaning of the world, a redefinition of the relations between God, 
nature, and the place of the human within the physical and metaphysical orders. Mechanistic 
science and philosophy arose to displace the premodern conception of the earth as a living 
organism. The premodern conception comprise a broad spectrum of preexisting cultural 
worldviews regarding nature’s vitality, activity, and sensitivity, its life-force and generative 
capacity whether as inherent to matter (monism) or in various formulations of a transcendent 
principle that mediates and actualizes God’s Law or Will within matter (dualism). This cultural 
system defining the meaning, value, and an implicit system of sanction over human use of nature 
defined as an organically alive and sensitive mother earth was replaced by a mechanistic 




passive and inanimate matter movable only by external force and following mathematically 
predictable mechanical law, manipulable by human rationality, and which underwrites and 
justify its management and exploitation for capitalist and cultural development. 
 As Gadamer noted, in the eighteenth century the meaning of Bildung shifted from that of 
well formed natural shapes to an idea of cultural self-formation. As becomes visible this process 
entails a transference of the organicist idea of vitality or life-force from the realm of nature (and 
God) to that of human culture defined as an inherent, organic power of teleological self-
cultivation. Something like an appropriation of agency through redefinition is visible in the 
writings of Goethe, whose work moreover was highly influential on Hegel in his work on 
history.  
 Mikhail Baktin in The Bildungsroman and Its Significance in the History of Realism 
(Towards a Historical Typology of the Novel)21 traces the development of Goethe’s conception 
and novelistic representation of time-space. In Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister -the prototypical 
Bildungsroman, which Bakhtin describes as a genre definable through the idea of “man’s 
essential becoming” – nature is conceived as a realm of timeless harmonious order and 
spatialized as territory, geography, or terrestrial space, forming a background to the dynamic 
temporary of man’s individual and historical emergence and development. Tracing the genre 
through various stages to its last, most realistic novelistic type that begins with Goethe’s famous 
work, Bakhtin follows the development of the genre through an idea of man’s growth as 
something embedded within cyclical, natural time to the emergence of a more individualistic 
biographical time, and which later becomes embedded within a larger historical temporality.  By 
the time of Goethe and in Wilhelm Meister: 
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 [human emergence] is no longer man’s own private affair. He emerges along with the 
 world and he reflects the historical emergence of the world itself. He is no longer within 
 an epoch, but on the border between two epochs, at the transition point from one to the 
 other. This transition is accomplished in him and through him. He is forced to become a 
 new, unprecedented type of human being. What is happening here is precisely the 
 emergence of a new man. The organizing force held by the future is therefore extremely 
 great here -and this is not, of course, the private biographical future, but the historical 
 future. It is a though the very foundations of the world are changing, and man must 
 change along with them. Understandably, in such a novel of emergence, problems of 
 reality and man’s potential, problem of freedom and necessity, and the problem of 
 creative initiative rise to their full height. The image of the emerging man begins to 
 surmount its private nature (within certain limits of course) and enters into a completely 
 new, spatial sphere of historical existence. Such is the last, realistic type of the novel of 
 emergence. (24) 
 
 Marianne Hirsch provides a generic model of the Bildungsroman deriving from Goethe’s 
prototypical novel, from which we can derive further distinctions based on this solidifying 
division between cultural agency for transformation and nature as timeless law of self-
reproduction. In “The Novel of Formation as a Genre: Between Great Expectations and Lost 
Illusions”22 Hirsch notes that this type of novel “is a story of a representative individual’s growth 
and development within the context of a defined social order...The novel’s concern is both 
biographical and social. Society is the novel’s antagonist and is viewed as a school of life, a 
locus for experience...[The] plot is a version of the quest story; it portrays a search for a 
meaningful existence within society, for the authentic values which will facilitate the unfolding 
of inner capacities...It is the development of selfhood that is the primary concern of the novel of 
formation...this type of novel is a story of apprenticeship and not a full biography. Its projected 
resolution is an accommodation to the existing society” (297-8). Often also known as a coming-
of-age novel, this process of social education as individual development typically begins at 
adolescence: a young boy leaving the domesticity of affective filial relations of natural necessity, 
bodily growth and nascent individual volition to enter the impersonal social or public world in 
                                                




which his will and intellect is socialized towards a higher moral freedom. Biographical growth 
linked to historical emergence begins through entry into the sphere of culture, the temporality of 
development from which the private sphere of nurture and the women associated with them are 
excluded.  
 In their introduction to the anthology The Voyage In: Fiction of Female Development,23 
Elizabeth Abel, Marianne Hirsch and Elizabeth Langland make explicit the problematic relation 
between women and culture within this formulation. “Even the broadest definitions of the 
Bildungsroman presuppose a range of social options available only to men. Only male 
development is marked by a determined exploration of a social milieu, so that when a critic 
identifies the ‘principal characteristics’ of a ‘typical Bildungsroman plot,’ he inevitably describes 
‘human’ development exclusively in male terms” (7). But this adult male world of socially 
integrated individuals is also defined through other exclusions. The utopian vision of universal 
development towards human freedom, social integration and unity aside, the reality of the 
eighteenth century is one of colonization and slavery, the exploitation of natural resources of the 
colonized nations and of the material labor of the colonized, which, through association with the 
realm of natural immediacy and necessity are founding exclusions to the very conception of 
culture as self-development.   
 Defined as natural capacity for organic self-development or cultivation towards a higher 
sphere, the mediating or socializing function of Bildung in fact depends on the construction of 
intermediate spheres associated with nature which production of value is appropriated as 
resource that provides directionality for development, while the naturalized sphere itself is 
devalued and excluded from this temporality. Thus slaves, women, children, the poor, the 
                                                




uneducated (uncultured), racial and ethnic others belong to a naturalized, spatialized sphere are 
excluded from the historical temporality of development the self-universalization of which 
depends on their very exclusion.   
 In this regards Susan Buck-Morss in “Hegel and Haiti”24 makes a convincing argument 
for Hegel’s obvious knowledge not only regarding the economic system based on slavery and 
slave trade that grounds the social reality of his own time but specifically about the Haitian 
revolution, which justified itself in terms of European ideas of universal human freedom and 
which in fact, Buck-Morss argues, informed Hegel’s formulation of the master slave dialectic 
and the movement of spirit. Yet this revolution and Haiti’s freedom, only years after the French 
revolution, was ‘unthinkable’ or unassimilable by Enlightenment thinkers of freedom. As I have 
been delineating this is because it disrupts the invention and naturalization of the organicist 
notion of human individual and social development from nature to culture by breaking out of the 
hidden intermediate spheres the disavowal of which allows for the appearance of temporal 
continuity between natural birth and freedom for organic self and cultural development of the 
human as both natural and exceptional in relation to nature based on its intellect, mind, or the 
ability to use language to represent natural reality itself. This relation between nature and mind, 
language, or culture depends on a naturalization (thus dehumanization) of women as well as of 
class, racial, and cultural others, which naturalized existences form the intermediate sphere of 
corporeal human physicality as capacity for labor productive and reproductive, which together 
with nature form the founding exclusion to the very category of the human defined through its 
freedom for self-determination invented within this narrative. As Buck-Morss discusses, the 
unassimilable nature of emergent claimants to inclusion within the universalist formation of a 
                                                





socio-cultural meaning and place of the human that depends on its subordination as resource 
eventually compels the latter Hegel to dismiss Africans as ‘immature’ and ‘childlike,’ as 
culturally lagging behind (and closer to nature) within the developmental trajectory of universal 
human history, and thus, like women and children, incapable (yet) of attaining moral autonomy 
or cultured, socially responsible freedom.  
The deeply entrenched nature of mechanistic truth-claim to the knowledge of nature and 
the cultural logic of Bildung derived from it becomes clearer when we note that they are 
implicated in both the rise and justification of capitalism and the most prominent form of its 
critique. John Locke’s foundational formulation and theoretical justification of private property – 
which facilitated the consolidation of capitalism and its central role in modern social 
organization and development – is inseparable from the worldview of mechanistic science and 
based on the idea of nature as objectively without value, where value is conceptualized as a 
product of human labor25. Its legacy informs Karl Marx’s equally far-reaching critique of the 
logic of capital, but which is premised on the same labor theory of value and view of nature as 
object of human labor as producer of value.26  
Tú eres mi hija. Mía27 
You Are My Daugther. Mine28 
Over the last century contemporary work in the life sciences have begun to challenge the 
mechanistic view of the world and the conceptual constellations it gave rise to grounded on the 
dichotomy between nature and human culture. As we have seen above within this conceptual 
framework man emerges as both natural and exceptional or set apart from nature, in other words 
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as naturally self-reproducing life form and as subjects of agency and of history in its cultural 
overcoming and development away from natural constraints and limits, and simultaneously 
towards the reproduction of objective lawfulness of relations expressed in nature on a higher 
cultural sphere. This process involves both a cultural translation of preexisting dualist and 
metaphysical ideas of the universe into a modern version of natural law, wherein the entire life-
world emerges as timeless, changeless unity and idealized harmony to be approximated by the 
social order on the one hand, and the devalued as territory, property and resource for human 
national-cultural self-transformation and self-recreation on the other. Within this framework 
moreover the claim to truthful and increasing or cumulative nature of scientific and 
representational knowledge of the natural word/universe serves as justification for nature’s 
transformation and increasing destruction towards idealized and universalized human ends, and 
which ends justify increasing destruction, violence and subordination of all life forms human and 
natural to this cultural ideal.  
Patrick Dove’s project of relativizing cultural truths and delimitations of representational 
claims by the modern secular state to make visible cultural violence is inseparable from the shift 
in sciencifici paradigm I discuss below. As becomes visible however, Dove’s critique of 
modernity and capitalist logic is at the same time deeply invested in many of the assumptions of 
Enlightenment humanism, the most important of which is the representationalist framework itself 
and the dualist relation between culture and nature it expresses. This framework for conceiving 
knowledge binds his reading of nature (through the figure of the reproductive mother and natural 
or corporeal physicality in the novel and of land in Mexican history) to the modern invention of 
the very category of the human and of culture, and as such to the ideal (now pluralized) of 




as well as implied promise of self-reproducing unity and plenitude through sovereign dominion 
over nature. The representationalist framework for conceiving knowledge also binds his reading 
of cultural politics and ethical, historical agency to truth, which loss through cultural 
relativization of forms of knowledge would seem to remove the ground for both criticism and 
action or agency for production of alternatives and more pluralist forms of co-existence and can 
curtail and mitigate the problems of escaling destruction and violence both social and ecological.    
 As I will discuss below, while contemporary work in the life sciences challenging 
mechanistic rationality offers a view of the world that undoes the assumptions foundational to 
modernity as elaborated above, it also resonates with premodern mythical worldview in its 
undermining of truth-claims, in the undoing of the representationalist framework of knowledge 
and reversal of the relation between knowledge and agency, as well as in a dismantling of the 
dichotomy between nature and culture itself. As such it emerges into resonance with the novel in 
its use of fiction and myth as the basis for elaborating alternative possibilities for thinking co-
existence outside of competing territorial truth-claims. The figure of Dorotea as I have discussed 
works to problematize both the idea of reproduction and of nature or natural life. In the figure of 
Susana San Juan in the next chapter I will discuss the novel’s rejection of the idea of lawful 
relations of meaning and well as of social organization.  
Ves visiones, Susana29 
You’re Seeing Things, Susana30 
 The paradigm that is now receding has dominated our culture for several hundred years, 
 during which it has shaped our modern Western society and has significantly influenced 
 the rest of the world. This paradigm consists of a number of entrenched ideas and values, 
 among them the view of the universe as a mechanical system composed of elementary 
 building blocks, the view of the human body as a machine, the view of life in society as 
 competitive struggle for existence, the belief in unlimited material progress to be 
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 achieved through economic and technological growth, and -last, but not least- the belief 
 that a society in which the female is everywhere subsumed under the male is one that 
 follows a basic law of nature. All of these assumptions have been fatefully challenged by 
 recent events. And, indeed, a radical revision of them is now occurring. (Capra, 6) 
 
 Fritjof Capra’s The Web of Life: A New Scientific Understanding of Living Systems 31 
provides an overview of the advances made in the various scientific branches of knowledge 
regarding the very question of the nature of life. He discusses the displacement mechanistic 
science’s suppositions of fundamental laws through new discoveries in the last century in 
organismic biology as well as in the field of chemistry, neuroscience and cognitive theory, and 
which interconnection with the emergence of quantum mechanics provides a profound 
reconceptualization of the nature of life. 
While on the one hand, as I have tried to show, in a translation of earlier dualist tradition 
in the human sciences against mechanistic rationality applied to human social organization, 
modern conception of human life and culture as exceptional life form and organization founded 
itself on mechanistic science to emerge into an organicist life force replacing God as the 
purposive mover of the world towards teleological ends. On the other hand the dualist concept of 
world evolved in other branches of science itself, and the study of the lifeworld in biology 
contain both monist and dualist theories. It is significant therefore that Capra notes that 
contemporary thought in the related branches of science can be understood as a paradigm shift 
from a dualistic to a monistic view of the world. Capra writes of the 19th century debate between 
mechanist and vitalist biology and their overcoming through an emerging monist theory of life:  
While mechanists hold that all biological phenomena will eventually be explained in 
terms of the laws of physics and chemistry, vitalists postulate the existence of a 
nonphysical entity, a causal agent directing the life processes that defy mechanistic 
explanations. Teleology–from teh Greek telos (“purpose”)–asserts that the causal agent 
postulated by vitalism is purposeful, that there is purpose and design in nature. By 
                                                




strenuously opposing vitalist and teleological arguments, the mechanists still struggle 
with the Newtonian metaphor of God as a clockmaker. The currently emerging theory of 
living systems has finally overcome the debate between mechanism and teleology. As we 
shall see, it views living nature as mindful and intelligent without the need to assume any 
overall design or purpose.” (107) 
 
Within a monist view of life matter is inseparable from mind, from the process of 
cognition or perception and knowledge, and which process in fact defines life itself. Before 
discussing the above ideas in cognitive science it is worthwhile to contextualize this emergent 
theory of life as intelligent self-organization within an earlier discussion of the lifeworld itself as 
an integrated system of organic and inorganic life forces and energy, and which displacement of 
mechanistic view relate not only to biological or organic life but equally to inorganic life. In mid 
1960s, James Lovelock through his Gaia theory builds on earlier dynamic theory of living 
systems as both self-organizing systems and open systems (through feeding or continual flow of 
matter and energy through the system -food, water, air, chemical compounds, etc) to produce an 
integrated view of the process of life, which spans individual organisms and their parts as well as 
their social and ecosystems, and which are moreover tightly interwoven with the nonliving 
systems  (rocks, ocean, air, etc). Lovelock invites us to reconsider the Earth itself “as a real 
system, comprising all of life and all of its environment tightly coupled so as to form a self-
regulating entity” (James Lovelock quoted in Capra 103), instead of a dead planet of inanimate 
matter inhabited by life.  
 Simply stated, the [Gaia] hypothesis says that the surface of the Earth, which we’ve 
 always considered to be the environment of life, is really part of life. The blanket of air– 
 the troposphere–should be considered a circulatory system, produced and sustained by 
 life...When scientists tell us that life adapts to an essentially passive environment of 
 chemistry, physics, and rocks, they perpetuate a severely distorted view. Life actually 
 makes and forms and changes the environment to which it adapts. Then that 
 “environment” feeds back of the life that is changing and acting and growing in it. There 





 Expanding on the view of living systems above in relation to questions of knowledge and 
perception, the collaborative work of Chilean scientists Humberto Maturana and Francisco 
Varela on cognitive theory (sometimes called the Santiago theory) identifies the process of life 
itself with cognition, and through which view life emerges as an autopoietic system of self-
invention and self-organization. Their theory proposes to understand “the organizing activity of 
living systems at all levels of life [as] mental activity. The interaction of a living organism – 
plant, animals, or human – with its environment are cognitive, or mental interactions. Thus life 
and cognition become inseparably connected. Mind – or, more accurately, mental process – is 
immanent in matter at all levels of life” (Capra, 172).   
 In this view, rather than a representation of reality perception or cognition specify its own 
reality. Moreover, rather than mental thought processes, this view of cognition involves the 
entire life process and include perception, emotion, and behavior, and does not depend on a brain 
or a nervous system. As Capra clarifies: 
Since cognition traditionally is defined as the process of knowing, we must be able to 
describe it in terms of an organism’s interaction with its environment. Indeed, this is what 
the Santiago theory does. The specific phenomenon underlying the process of cognition 
is structural coupling. As we have seen, the autopoietic system undergoes continual 
structural changes while preserving its weblike pattern of organization. It couples to its 
environment structurally in other words, through recurrent interactions, each of which 
triggers structural changes in the system. The living system is autonomous, however. The 
environment only triggers the structural changes; it does not specify or direct them. 
 
Now, the living system not only specifies these structural changes, it also specifies which 
perturbations from the environment triggers them. That is the key to the Santiago theory 
of cognition. The structural changes in the system constitute acts of cognition. By 
specifying which perturbations from the environment trigger its changes, the system 
“brings forth a world,” as Maturana and Varela put it. Cognition then, is not a 
representation of an independently existing world, but rather a continual bringing forth of 
a world through the process of living. The interactions of a living system with its 
environment are cognitive interactions, and the process of living itself is a process of 





 This world brought forth is moreover specific to each living organisms, since “not all 
disturbances from the environment cause structural changes. Living organisms respond to only a 
small fraction of the stimuli impinging on them” (269) and there are many disturbances that are 
foreign and thus unperceived by the system.  
In this way each living system builds up its own distinctive world according to its own 
distinctive structure. As Varela puts it, “mind and world arise together.” However, 
through mutual structural coupling, individual living systems are part of each other’s 
worlds. They communicate with one another and coordinate their behavior. There is an 
ecology of worlds brought forth by mutually coherent acts of cognition. 
 
In the Santiago theory cognition is an integral part of the way a living organism interacts 
with its environment. It does not react to environmental stimuli but responds with 
structural changes in its nonlinear, organizationally closed, autopoietic network. This 
type of response enables the organism to continue its autopoietic organization and thus to 
continue living in its environment. In other words, the organism’s cognitive interaction 
with its environment is intelligent interaction. From the perspective of the Santiago 
theory, intelligence is manifest in the richness and flexibility of an organism’s structural 
coupling. (269) 
 
 In other words, each organism in the process of living brings forth “not the world but a 
world, one that is always dependent upon the organism’s structure. Since individual organisms 
within a species have more or less the same structure, they bring forth similar worlds. We 
humans, moreover, share an abstract world of language and thought through which we bring 
forth our world together” (270). 
 As Capra further elaborates, Maturana and Varela do not maintain that we create matter 
out of the void, but that the material world has no predetermined features. “The authors of the 
Santiago theory do not assert that “nothing exists”; they assert that “no things exist” independent 
of the process of cognition. There are no objectively existing structures; there is no pregiven 





 Contemporary science offers a view of all living systems as a dynamic process of self-
organization but which organization – through systemic changes in the environment or the flows 
of energy – are capable not only of self-maintenance far from equilibrium or stability but also of 
completely unpredictable evolutions and mutations (85), and within which no teleological 
relation between past present and future is possible. Within this system view the properties of the 
parts are not intrinsic but can only be understood relationally to the whole, but wherein the whole 
itself is open and not given or static outside of the changing relations between the parts 
themselves. We can see therefore how the idea of a primal or timeless totality of all relations of 
life as Truth or Being to which representational knowledge may or may not correspond, and 
which forms the yardstick for action and social organization emerges as a historically and 
culturally contingent social construct. As Capra discusses with regards to scientific knowledge 
itself 
The notion of a scientific knowledge as a network of concepts and models, in which no 
part is anymore fundamental than the others, was formalized in physics by Geoffrey 
Chew in his ‘bootstrap philosopy’ in the 1970’s. The bootstrap philosophy not only 
abandons the idea of fundamental building blocks of matter, it accepts no fundamental 
entities whatsoever - no fundamental constants, laws, or equations. The material universe 
is seen as a dynamic web of interrelated events. None of the properties of any part of this 
web is fundamental; they all follow from the properties of other parts, and the overall 
consistency of their interrelations determines the structure of the entire web. (39)  
 
Capra’s work is intended as a scientific justification for an ecological view that can 
mitigate the destructiveness of modern way of life, and is particularly aligned with deep ecology 
as a movement whose idea of sustainability goes beyond the conceptualization of nature as the 
environment for human life and the anthropocentric values that govern its management. Capra’s 
work on the life sciences invites the consideration of a new and holistic ecological subject 
advocated by deep ecology, which assigns inherent value to nature itself. An attempt to 




Capra’s work on the one hand can be read as another scientific truth-claim, one that would mask 
the specificity of its own cultural value and knowledge system. The alignment with deep ecology 
can also be problematized. In an important cultural analysis of deep ecology’s that makes visible 
its essentialist view of nature, Peter van Wyck32 makes a convincing argument much of the 
discourse within the movement is based on universalization of the human subject, a 
naturalization of the category of the human in its meaning and value outside all historical cultural 
specificity. One could read Capra’s own discussion of deep ecology as presuming the same 
value-free scientific and ecological knowledge as neutral basis for human action.  
On the other hand however, Capra’s work is also clearly value specific and goal oriented, 
an attempt at persuasion and influence over human social behavior away from the destructive 
modern logic and way of life and the ecological and social disintegration such worldview has 
produced. Moreover, we take can as valuable Capra’s overview of cognition, perception and 
communication as coordination of behavior amongst interdependent systems towards specific 
goals (rather than value or interest free knowledge), and which goal is existence and co-existence 
through negotiation between conflicting values and forms of organization outside of given truth 
or reality. Furthermore this body of knowledge can be read to resonate with premodern mythical 
and monist view of the world, which also could be said to function through contingency of goals 
and praxis rather than on truth. Together they provide the basis for thinking the problem of 
knowledge relative to questions of agency through something like an epistemological granting to 
nature not of (timeless) value in itself but of value to itself as process of self-organizing 
perception and life. It is to this narrative of reality as value specific invention of relations 
oriented towards empowerment within an interdependent context of coexistence and negotiations 
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of value and violence that the stories of the dead in Pedro Páramo points, and most specifically 
outside of both Christian and modern invention of the meaning of human life and their 
(ostensibly universal or neutral) value system, which the novel shows to be deeply destructive.  
Se ha de haber roto el cajón donde la enterraron33 
The Box Buried Her In Must Have Split Open34 
Coexistent with Christian mythology, its cultural imposition, as well as the various waves 
secular liberal reforms and modernization were various indigenous myths or stories about the 
meaning of existence. As discussed earlier Eric Wolf provides an account of the disintegration of 
indigenous social organization brought on by successive attempts to break up their communal 
land into private holdings. While Wolf speaks of Indian communities and communal power in 
terms that may at first be read as that of aggregates of individuals, his emphasis on the the 
religious basis of communal power as well as on the fact that there is no uniform Indian culture 
points to multiply existing sociopolitical organizations based on myriad mythical conceptions of 
the world and of the place of the human and its agency within it. 
 We can posit without claiming to represent any particular indigenous myth or all myths 
as sameness that mythical imagination often include a conception of nonhuman agency35 (which 
may be malignant or benign), where animals, trees, rocks, water bodies, etc, and the various 
shamanistic spirits they are imbued with -and which may also include the spirits of human 
ancestors who may also be animals and vice versa- are capable not only of self-transformation 
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but also of transformation of humans as beings that exists in a complicated relation within the 
natural world rather than as above and exercising dominion over it. 
 Within this conception of the world the idea of human personhood and agency is a 
complicated relational position within a web of other agencies and human social organization is 
embedded within the same. The idea of animal ancestors of humans and human ancestors of 
animals found in many myths for example departs from the idea of human sociality as an 
autonomously self-reproducing domain both natural and simultaneously exceptional or set apart 
from and above the rest nature because also self- transformational through cultural development, 
albeit inscribed in a trajectory towards the telos of recovery of self-sameness.  
 Within such a mythical perspective, whatever cultural meaning of possession or property 
exists, it is not that of sovereign rule over land objectified as resource for human self-
transformation and self-recreation. The question of boundary is complicated as well, as while 
each community makes use of a delimited area of land (where there is cultivation) they share 
common areas of forests and rivers (as we do air today) that form part of community’s use (for 
example for hunting of game, gathering of food, wood, medicinal herb, etc, and which 
supplement cultivation where there is cultivation) but which is not a domain proper to any 
community whether owned or through exclusive use rights, but functions as a buffer zone that 
both separates the communities and join them as the commons that is neither property of any 
community nor improper to it in the sense that they are an integral part of the community’s 
economy, production and social organization. Such forest land as both outside and inside of each 
communities productive economy is also home to the spirits, wild games, dead ancestors, and 
other beings who also have a crucial function within the community’s conception of the world, 




human sociality- which owes its existence as well as socio political and economic organization to 
this indeterminate zone that both belong and does not belong to it, while also belonging and not 
belonging to other communities both human and that of other beings animal and spirits who all 
share common origins with that of the human as a specie. The very idea of the human and its 
community then does not fit that of the idea of self-same and self-reproducing place and people 
because it is always open and owing itself to its own outside or to what is different from itself. 
Community is simultaneously both bounded on the one hand, and ontologically open to other 
communities as well as other species or forms and forces of life that borders on, influences and 
transforms it on the other, rather than bounded and closed off from it.  
 Within such a cultural perspective, conflict, contradictions and discords are not improper 
to existence. Without a claim to boundless agency, a conception of finitude that is not only that 
of death but of each life form within the complexity of overlapping, conflictive yet mutually 
determining and transforming sphere of co-existence, the very idea of plenitude as accord and 
unity based on the sharing of resources inscribed as the overcoming of natural limits, human 
scarcity and lack emerges as a dangerous illusion which would make co-existence itself 
impossible. 
Pero cúal era el mundo de Susana San Juan36 
But What World was Susana San Juan Living In37 
 It the next chapter I rebegin by reading the story of Susana San Juan. As I have noted this 
story is a reversed image of the story of Juan Preciado. Beginning similarly through a recalling 
of a dead mother only to reject its social function of social reproduction, it equally rejects the 
father as law or social organizing principle. Moreover, as Pedro Paramo’s lost love and idealized 
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conception of romantic unity, and whose lost precipitates his ruthless rise to power in order to 
recover and reunite with her, Susana is on the one hand the only other character in the novel 
whose story is structured similarly to Juan’s through departure and return to the village, and on 
the other hand as the antithesis of Dolores Preciado in her union with, betrayal by, and demand 
for justice from Pedro Paramo as figuration of law and promise of filial and social unity.  
 As I will show, the story of Susana San Juan is that of a rejection of all fathers as figures 
of law, and which undermines the logic and makes visible as a question of destructive illusion of 
plenitude the ideal of social unity and inclusion into a lawfully self-reproducing social order. It 
further narratively stages the violence of competing truth-claims between the Christian and 
secular order precisely in terms that undermine the idea of naturally self reproducing yet 
exceptional human that belongs to both, which is to say of patronymic cultural logic itself, and 
which makes visible patrilineal filial reproduction as linked to territorial communal 
consolidation. In fact as I will argue, within the novel the idea of law emerges as guarantee or 
promise of privileged access to resource, and communal identity becomes visible as 
identification with a system of vested interest. The illusion of objective nature as ground for 
boundless human agency and self-development however turns the promise of plenitude into 




Chapter 3: Tampoco los muertos retoñan / The Dead Do Not Reproduce Either: 
Lawlessness, Knowledge and Co-existence 
Estoy acostada en la misma cama donde murió mi madre hace ya muchos años; sobre el 
mismo colchón; bajo la misma cobija de lana negra con la cual nos envolvíamos las dos 
para dormir. Entonces yo dormía a su lado, en un lugarcito que ella me hacía debajo de 
sus brazos. 
     Creo sentir todavía el golpe pausado de su respiración; las palpitaciones y suspiros con 
que ella arrullaba mi sueño... Creo sentir la pena de su muerte... 
     Pero esto es falso. (133) 
 
 I am lying in the same bed where my mother died so long ago; on the same mattress, 
 beneat the same black wool coverlet she wrapped us in to sleep. I slept beside her, her 
 little girl, in the special place she made for me in her arms.  
     I think I can still feel the calm rythm of her breating; the palpitations and sighs that 
soothed my sleep... I think I feel the pain of her death... But that isn’t true. (75-6)  
 
Pero si ella ni madre tuvo...1 
But she didn’t have a mother...2 
 Susana San Juan’s story, told from the grave (that may not be a grave), opens with the 
words above which both mirror and immediately overturn the terms and premise set up in the 
story of Juan Preciado. Juan’s story is that of a unity or “we” of the mother and her child. As I 
discussed in the previous chapter, this unity is narratively constructed through superimposition of 
their voices and visions, knowledge and agency as what propels Juan’s journey in search of the 
father as guarantee of a lawful community. This constructed oneness resonates with prevailing 
modern cultural narrative of the private or pre-political sphere of natural filial affections 
preceding a child’s separation in adolescence and entry into the adult social world of impersonal, 
rational, culturally mediated socio-political relations. This idea of originary oneness equally 
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underlies much contemporary cultural theory and critique of modernity premised on 
psycholinguistic theory, i.e. the conception of a child’s prelinguistic existence as a kind of 
natural oneness or lawful, immediate material relation with the mother prior to the stages of 
differentiation and cultural subjectivation through language.    
Susana’s very first sentence is constructed around the idea of this unity through the 
repetition of the word ‘misma’ or sameness, the memory of sharing the mother’s place evoking 
various narratives of the pain of lost unity and desire for its recovery. This desire would imply 
the teleological directionality of growth of the daughter as that of coming to occupy the place, or 
function, of the mother in the social order’s self-reproduction and continuity as self-same 
oneness of community overtime.  
But this is false. The very first words of Susana’s story both mirror and immediately 
reverse the terms set up in Juan’s narrative. It similarly begins with the death of the mother and 
rearticulates the teleological narrative of loss and recovery of oneness only to reject it as premise 
and recast it as falsehood. This rejection of falsehood, however, is equally false. Because Susana 
San Juan is dead.  
      Pero esto es falso. 
      Estoy aquí, boca arriba, pensando en aquel tiempo para olvidar mi soledad. Porque no 
 estoy acostada sólo por un rato. Y ni en la cama de mi madre, sino  dentro de un cajón 
 negro como el que se usa para enterrar a los muertos. Porque estoy muerta. (133) 
 
      But this isn’t true. 
      Here I lie, flat on my back, hoping to forget my lonliness by remembering those times. 
 Because I am not here just for a while. And I am not in my mother’s bed but in a black 
 box like the ones for burying the dead. Because I am dead. (76) 
 
 The immediate revelation of Susana’s story as told by someone already dead recasts her 
account above itself as fiction or untruth, and thereby undoes whatever truth-claim might be 




story whose meaning has no referential claim to truth or reality outside itself, and the 
significance of which must be constructed and framed in relation to multiple other narratives 
within, as well as external, to the novel. 
 To be sure, Susana’s story is not a rejection of the value of or the relation with the 
mother. Her story walks a fine line between a bond with the mother and a rejection of her 
significance  as naturalized oneness or harmony of relations of life prior to differentiation as 
deviation, discord, conflict, suffering, and through which emerges the telos of recovery or 
reproduction of a timeless or self-reproducing lawful relations as the highest value and goal of 
social organization and as justification of the subordination of all other values of life. Between 
descriptions of the indifference of the men hired to bury her mother and her nursemaid Justina’s 
inability to accept this death, Susana’s account depicts her mother’s love as well as the peace of 
her closed eyes, lips, and quieted heart. This is  in explicit contrast to the voice and vision, wish 
and expectation of Juan’s mother superimposed upon and reproducing itself as Juan’s perception 
and agency, and wherein his will emerges as undifferentiated from or subordinated to that of his 
mother’s, whose command to search for the father mandates both differentiation and is directed 
at reconciliaton with the higher social law of the father as promise of a return to or restoration of 
lost unity.    
 As Susana tells it, her mother died in a spring time of abundance and life, including that 
of Susana’s own sexual awakening. The narrative structure reinforces a rejection of the idea of 
undifferentiated or lawful, timeless oneness of life lost with the mother’s death by embedding the 
declaration “[m]i madre murió entonces” (134); “[t]hat is when my mother died” (76) in the 
middle of two long passages detailing her remembrance of the playful joys of animal and plant 




breaking branches, fallen and dried up fruits, butterflies being chased by laughing sparrows. 
Within this narrative of life (the exuberant thriving of which does not exclude but, in fact, 
depends on death) are embedded images of her own bodily pleasures. Rather than a narrative of 
adolescence or puberty as a moment of transition from childhood to adulthood, nature to culture, 
or a loss of innocence recalling sin and the fall from Eden, Susana’s sensual physicality is 
embedded within a joyful relation with nature and seems to both preceed and exceed sexuality 
itself, and to surpass the idea of sexuality tied to filial reproduction. In a later section, I will 
return to this narrative construction in relation to the novel’s thematic overturning of the 
virgin/whore dichotomy, wherein various narrative iterations and valuations of the whore work 
against the prerogative of virtuous (and near virgin) motherhood as the basis for patriarchal 
social self-reproduction based on territorial control over the lifeworld. 
    Mi madre murió entonces. 
    Que yo debía haber gritado; que mis manos tenían que haberse hecho pedazos 
 estrujando su desesperación. Así hubieras tú querido que fuera. ¿Pero acaso no era alegre 
 aquella mañana? Por la puerta abierta entraba el aire, quebrando las guías de la yedra. En 
 mis piernas comenzaba a crecer el vello entre las venas, y mis manos temblaban tibias al 
 tocar mis senos. Los gorriones jugaban. En las lomas se mecían las espigas. Me dio 
 lástima que ella ya no volviera a ver el juego del viento en los jazmines; que cerrara sus 
 ojos a la luz  de los días. ¿Pero por qué iba a llorar? (134) 
 
   That is when my mother died. 
    I should have wailed. I should have wrung my hands until they were bleeding.That is 
 how you would have wanted it. But in fact, wasn’t that a joyful morning? The breeze was 
 blowing in through the open door, tearing loose the ivy tendrils. Hair was beginning to 
 grow on the mound between my legs, and my hands trembled hotly when I touched my 
 breasts. Sparrows were playing. Wheat was swaying on the hillside. I was sad that she 
 would never again see the wind playing in the jastmines; that her eyes were closed to the 
 bright sunlight. Btu why should I weep? (76) 
  
 A refusal to mourn the mother’s death as a loss of undifferentiated or lawful oneness 
idealized as life’s highest value, or to subordinate all other values to its recovery, Susana’s 




frame. However, the account of her own death and the supernatural framework of her life story 
as that of an afterlife differentiates it from secular naturalism. Susana’s story places her life 
within a mythical framework while differentiating this mythical existence from the Christian one 
through association with Dorotea. 
No es cierto3 
It isn’t True4 
    Es, según yo sé, la pura maldad. Eso es Pedro Páramo. 
    –¿Y yo quién soy? 
    –Tú eres mi hija. Mía. Hija de Bartolomé San Juan.  
    En la mente de Susana San Juan comenzaron a caminar las ideas, primero lentamente, 
 luega se detuvieron, para después echar a correr de tal modo que no alcanzó sino a decir: 
    No es cierto. No es cierto. 
    Este mundo que lo aprieta a uno por todos lados, que va vaciando puños de nuestro 
 polvo aquí y allá, deshaciéndonos en pedazos como si rociara la tierra con nuestra sangre.  
 ¿Qué hemos hecho? Por qué se nos ha podrido el alma? Tu madre decía que cuando 
 menos nos queda la caridad de Dios. Y tú la niegas, Susana. ¿Por qué me niegas a mí 
 como tu padre? ¿Estás loca? 
    ¿No lo sabias? 
    ¿Estás loca? 
    Claro que sí, Bartolomé. ¿No lo sabias? (141) 
 
 “...He is, I haven’t a doubt of it, unmitigated evil. That’s who Pedro Páramo is”  
   “And who am I”? 
   “You are my daughter. Mine. the daugther of Bartolomé San Juan.” 
   Ideas began to form in Susana San Juan’s midn, slowly at first; they retreated and then 
 raced so fast she could only say: 
   “It isn’t true. It isn’t true. 
   “This world presses in on us from every side; it scatters fistfuls of our dust across teh 
 land and takes bits and pieces of us as if to wather the earth with our blood. What did we 
 do? why have our souls rotted away? Your mother always said that at the very least we 
 could count on God’s mercy. Yet you deny it, Susana. Why do you deny me as your 
 father? Are you mad? 
   “Didn’t you know?” 
   “Are you mad?” 
   “Of course I am, Bartolomé. Didn’t you know?” (84-5, italic in original)  
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The account of the mother is contextualized within a narrative of disillusionment with 
and renunciation of the father and leads to a declaration of paternity itself (and by association 
God the Father) as untruth. This renunciation is repeated in Susana’s relation to all the father 
figures in the novel: her father Bartolomé San Juan, Pedro Páramo, Father Rentería, and God 
himself. In the above passage, the pronouncement of the fictionality of paternal lineage and 
identity is framed as madness, as knowledge and action without correspondence with truth or 
reality, and narratively functions to emphasize the fictionality of Susana’s narrative perspective 
or story. Susana’s rejection of the father can be read to resonate with the complex process of 
social reorganization of laws of filiation through which inheritance of property was transferred 
from maternal to paternal lineage, which involves the institution of monogamy and regulation of 
female sexuality to ensure paternal identity of the offspring through which wealth and power was 
transferred – in other words, the emergence of patriarchal social order. As Friedrich Engels 
writes in The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State5:  
It develops out of the pairing family, as previously shown, in the transitional 
period between the upper and middle stages of barbarism; its decisive victory is 
one of the signs that civilization is beginning. It is based on the supremacy of the 
man, the express purpose being to produce children of undisputed paternity; such 
paternity is demanded because these children are later to come into their father’s 
property as his natural heirs. It is distinguished from pairing marriage by the 
much greater strength of the marriage tie, which can no longer be dissolved at 
either partner’s wish. As a rule, it is now only the man who can dissolve it, and 
put away his wife. The right of conjugal infidelity also remains secured to him, at 
any rate by custom (the Code Napoleon explicitly accords it to the husband as 
long as he does not bring his concubine into the house), and as social life 
develops he exercises his right more and more; should the wife recall the old form 




                                                






[Monogamy emerges] not as the reconciliation of man and woman, still less as the 
 highest form of such reconciliation. Quite the contrary monogamous marriage comes on 
 the scene as the subjugation of one sex by the other...The first class opposition that 
 appears in history coincides with the development of the antagonism between man and 
 woman in monogamous marriage, and the first class oppression coincides with that of the 
 female sex by the male. (96)     
 
This rejection of patriarchy as social invention however does not reestablish identity 
derived from the mother as the basis for claiming maternal lineage of inheritance as a more 
natural state of being and social ordering. Instead, it gives rise to Susana’s willful death and a 
mythical narrative of existence outside of any such naturalization, and within which the above 
narrative of the mother emerges. As with the undermining of the truth value of the idea of the 
maternal as primal or natural unity, an unmasking of the father as legal fiction is framed as 
madness and thus proclaimed as fictional – in other words, as expressedly contrary to any 
interest or investment in the establishment of a counter truth-claim that would install a new (and 
truer) regime of representation of or lawful correspondence with reality, a new or older (more 
natural or more just) law of identity as the basis of inheritance, an alternate symbolic system of 
authority as the organizing principle for socio-cultural self-reproduction. 
The significance of Susana’s denial of the father’s identity emerges through a complex 
story of father-daughter relation and their relation to questions of community in the context of 
the changing social order in Mexico, and thus in relation to Pedro Páramo. If Comala as a 
territorial community forms the ground of contention between Pedro and the church or secular 
and Christian truth-claims over the meaning of life, the conflict between Bartolomé and Pedro 
forms a counterpart to this conflict and plays itself out over Susana San Juan as the naturalized 
sexual ground for filial and communal self-reproduction of human life as subject of agency over 




as the teleological end or goal of Pedro’s rise to power, an end conceived in terms of the 
establishment of a lawfully self-enclosed and self-reproducing order. A vision of totality that 
both displaces and reproduces the ideal of plenitude of timeless oneness or communion, this 
teleological narrative is implicated in the violent process of dismantling of the earlier feudal 
order on the one hand, and the promise of a establishment of a unified national oneness of shared 
cultural identity as the basis for sharing the benefits of economic development towards 
prosperity in postrevolutionary Mexico on the other. Susana’s rejection of both orders and their 
contention is a rejection of their shared premise or ground – that of natural reproduction as the 
basis for socio-cultural self-reproduction and for self-transformation through accumulation of 
goods or good deeds for social development or the overcoming of sin. As I have suggested and 
will discuss in details in a later section, this rejection is not that of any particular social order, but 
of lawful social ordering itself, which emerges as inseparable from violence and thus from 
lawlessness.  
Susana’s complex story emerges through various characters’ often contradictory 
perspectives. Through Pedro’s account – who tracks her whereabouts – we learn that Susana left 
Comala as a child with her father after her mother’s death, married, became widowed, and went 
back to living with Bartolomé. Father and daughter moved from town to town and eventually 
settled in isolation in self-imposed exile from Comala and other communities near an abandoned 
mine, before finally returning to Comala at the first signs of revolutionary unrest – for Susana’s 
safety and protection, as Bartolomé  informs Pedro.  
Their lives in isolation at the mine are framed by hints of incest. Pedro’s estate manager 
Fulgor Sedano mis/identifies Susana as Bartolomé wife upon their return to Comala. “Pues por el 




more like his wife” (82). Bartolomé himself, in an attempt to thwart Pedro and Susana’s reunion 
mis/identifies himself to Pedro as Susana’s husband: “Le he dicho que tú, aunque viuda, sigues 
viviendo con tu marido, o al menos así te comportas” (141). “I’ve told him that although you’re a 
widow, you are still living with your husband – or at least you act as if you are” (84). Susana 
herself recalls an event that occured at the mine, but her version situates the event in her 
childhood and tells a complex tale of violence. Bartolomé had lowered her through a hole into 
the boarded up and entombed mine to search for remainders of gold. 
 Mucho años antes, cuando ell era una niña, él le había dicho: 
      – Baja, Susana, y dime lo que ves.  
Estaba colgada de aquella soga que le lastimaba la cintura, que le sangraba sus manos; 
pero que no queria soltar: era como el unico hilo que la sostenia al mundo afuera… 
  
     Y ella bajo y bajo en columpio, meciendose en la profundidad, con sus pies 
bamboleando en el <<no encuentro donde poner los pies>> 
      – Mas abajo, Susana. Mas abajo. Dime si ves algo. 
     Y cuando encontro el apoyo alli permanecio, callada, porque se enmudecio de miedo. 
La lampara circulaba y la luz pasaba de largo junto a ella. Y el grito de alla arriba la 
estremecia: 
      – Dame lo que esta alli Susana! 
      Y ella agarro la calavera entre sus manos y cuando la luz le dio de lleno la solto. 
      – Es una calavera de muerto –dijo. 
      – Debes encontrar algo mas junto a ella. Dame todo lo que encuentres. 
     El cadaver se deshizo en canillas; la quijada se desprendio como si fuera de azucar. Le 
fue dando pedazo a pedazo hasta que llego a los dedos de los pies y le entrego conyuntura 
tras conyuntura. Y la calavera primero; a quella bola redonda que se deshizo entre sus 
manos.  
      – Busca algo mas, Susana. Dinero. Ruedas redondas de oro. Buscalas, Susana.  
     Entonces ella no supo de ella, sino muchos dias despues entre el hielo, entre las 
miradas llenas de hielo de su padre. (147-148)  
 
Many years earlier, when she was just a little girl, he had said one day: 
     “Climb down, Susana, and tell me what you see.” 
She was dangling from a rope that cut into her waist and rubbed her hands raw, but 
she didn’t want to let go. That rope was the single thread connecting her to the outside 
world… 
 
     She bumped lower and lower, swaying in the darkness, with her feet swinging in 
empty space. 




     And when she felt the ground beneath her feet she stood there dumb with fear. The 
lamplight circled above her and then focused on a spot beside her. The yell from above 
made her shiver: 
      “Hand me that, Susana!” 
She picked up the skull in both hands, but when the light struck it fully, she dropped 
it. 
      “It’s a dead man’s skull,” she said. 
      “You should find something else there beside it. Hand me whatever’s there. 
     The skeleton broke into individual bones: the jawbone fell away as if it were sugar. 
She handed it up to him, piece after piece, down to the toes, which she handed him joint 
by joint. The skull had been first, the round ball that had disintegrated in her hands.  
      “Keep looking, Susana. For money. Round gold coins. Look everywhere, Susana.” 
     And then she did not remember anything, until days later she came to in the ice: in the 
ice of her father’s glare. (90-91) 
 
A counterpart to the story of Pedro’s lawless rise to power through deception and false 
promises, violence and violations, and through which the character emerges as the figuration of 
law organizing social relations of production and reproduction, the above superimposition of 
Susana’s sexual and economic abuse at the hands of Bartolomé  tells a similar tale of the relation 
between law and lawlessness. Rather than that of a crime at its founding moment, however, the 
story makes visible the ongoing violence of law’s self-reproduction and self-preservation against 
deviation or threat to its established order. Within this story, incest, or violation of law’s own 
founding taboo and demarcation of the illicit from the licit, emerges as the means for the 
perpetuation of an established order’s regime of socio-economic relation, a self-perpetuation 
agains the threat posed by emergent capitalist relations and its institutional consolidation under 
secular rule after the revolution, and which emergent order is embodied by Pedro Páramo. One 
could thematically associate Bartolomé ’s self-exile from Comala and the rejection of other 
communities for a life of isolation with Susana at the mine as an attempt to preserve the 
established parternal authority of the Christian order he embodies, against the complex 
reorganization and modernization of social, cultural and economic relations both preceeding and 




reference to gold coins associate this work with Spanish colonial relations of production as 
perhaps the attempt to revive the gurantee of feudal authority. 
Susana’s story of the event at the mine dramatizes the violent subjection of both her 
reproductive and productive labor to the management and control of the feudal order for the 
preservation of its socio-economic regime of production. This exploitative cultural logic is 
dramatized through Susana’s narrative of danger, pain and fear as well as in the remains of the 
dead miners. The story further emphasizes violence and sexual violation as something committed 
in the service of self- reproduction of paternal identity and law through Susana’s account of 
herself as a child dependent upon, and subjected to, the will of the father.6   
The transference of Susana from Bartolomé to Pedro narrates a repetition of her 
subjection within the new patriarchal order, her (enforced) inclusion into the new order as 
naturalized reproductive ground for the self-reproduction of a new people that will function as 
ground for the emergent order’s self-perpetuation. Giving the command to have her father killed, 
Pedro reiterates Susana’s dependent position relative to paternal law in its management of social 
relations. “Ella tiene que quedarse huérfana. Estamos obligados a amparar a alguien” (142); “She 
must be left an orphan. We’re  called on to look after those in need” (85, translation modified). 
In contrast to what would conventionally be the transfer of a daughter from the father to her 
husband as provider and protector – which forms the very basis for the continuity of the social 
order whose law is embodied by the father/husband – Susana’s violent tranference from 
Bartolomé to Pedro emerges here into a story of a violent transformation of the social order itself 
on the one hand, and as a continuity of paternal law as providence on the other.  
                                                
6 Jean Franco discusses the episode of the mine as Susana’s counterpart to Juan’s journey to Comala, both of which 
lead to an encounter with the dead and narrate the violence of paternal figures who sacrifice affection for their 
children for the sake of money. See “Journey to the Land of the Dead: Rulfo’s Pedro Páramo ” in Critical Passions: 




Pero ¿cómo viviremos?7 
But How Will We Live?8 
We can explain the significance of Susana’s rejection of lawful social ordering by 
contrasting her story to another story of incest in the novel, which is similarly embedded in a 
complex question of social transformation as replacement of one lawfully self-reproducing social 
order with another. This contrasting story narrates not a rejection of but a willful submission to 
and investment in lawful social relations, which narrative makes law visible as violence and 
identification with law as complicity. At the novel’s midpoint and culmination of his journey 
Juan meets what he believes to be a real live woman, who claims to be in an incestuous 
relationship with her brother. As she informs him of the plight of the community and of its few 
remaining people: 
     ...todavía hay algunos. ¿Dígame si Filomeno no vive, si Dorotea, si Melquiades, si 
Prudencio el viejo, si Sóstenes y todos ésos no viven? Lo que acontece es que se la pasan 
encerrados. De día no sé qué harán; pero las noches se las pasan en su encierro. Aquí esas 
horas están llenas de espantos. Si usted viera el gentío de ánimas que andan sueltas por la 
calle. En cuanto oscurece comienzan a salir. Y a nadie le gusta verlas. Son tantas, y 
nosotros tan poquitos, que ya ni la lucha le hacemos para rezar porque salgan de sus 
penas. No ajustarían nuestras oraciones para todos. Si acaso les tocaría un pedazo de 
Padre nuestro. Y eso no les puede servir de nada. Luego están nuestros pecados de por 
medio. Ninguno de los que todavía vivimos está en gracia de Dios. Nadie podra alzar sus 
ojos al Cielo sin sentirlos sucios de vergüenza. Y la vergüenza no cura. Al menos eso me 
dijo el obispo que pasó por aquí hace algún tiempo dando confirmaciones. Yo me le puse 
enfrente y le confesé todo: 
     >>–Eso no se perdona –me dijo. 
     >>–Estoy avergonzada. 
     >>–No es el remedio. 
     >>-¡Cásenos usted! 
     >>–¡Apártense! 
     >>Yo le quise decir que la vida nos había juntado, accorranlándonos y puesto uno 
junto al otro. Estábamos tan solos aquí, que los únicos éramos nosotros. Y de algún modo 
había que poblar el pueblo. Tal vez tenga ya a quién confirmar cuando regrese. 
     >>–Separense. Eso es todo lo que se puede hacer. 
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     >>–Pero ¿cómo viviremos? 
     >>–Como viven los hombres. (111-112) 
 
...there are still a few people around. Haven’t you seen Filomeno? Or Dorotea or 
Melquiades or old Prudencio? And aren’t Sostenes and all of them still alive? What 
happens is that they stay close to home. I don’t know what they do by day but I know 
they spend their nights locked up indoors. Nights around here are filled with ghosts. You 
should see all the spirits walking through the streets. As soon as it’s dark they begin to 
come out. No one likes to see them. There’s so many of them and so few of us that we 
don’t even make the effort to pray for them anymore, to help them out of their purgatory. 
We don’t have enough prayers to go around. Maybe a few words of the Lord’s Prayer for 
each one. But that’s not going to do them any good. Then there are our sins on top of 
theirs. None of us still living is in God’s grace. We can’t lift up our eyes, because they’re 
filled with shame. And shame doesn’t help. At least that’s what the Bishop said. He came 
through here some time ago giving confirmation, and I went to him and confessed 
everything: 
     “I can’t pardon you” he said. 
     “I am filled with shame.” 
     “That isn’t the answer.” 
     “Marry us!” 
     “Live apart!” 
     “I tried to tell him that life had joined us together, herded us like animals, forced us on 
each other. We were so alone here: we were the only two left. And somehow the village 
had to have people again. I told him now maybe there would be someone for him to 
confirm when he came back” 
 “Go your separate ways. There’s no other way” 
 “But how will we live?” 
 “Like anyone lives.” (51-52) 
 
The woman’s story iterates in similar terms the story of a community threatened by life 
forms different from its own and improper to its community and identity, its shared meaning and 
social ordering of life. It reiterates the self-imposed isolation as protection visible in the story of 
Bartolomé  San Juan and similarly narrates incest as the necessary evil for the reestablishment 
and perpetuation of its own particular social order against threatening difference. Within this 
context, the social ordering is based on the reproduction of God’s children that will, in 
perpetuating God’s order, ensure salvation. The story links the question of community to that of 
counting and accounting for of its productive resources to be accumulated towards this promised 




still living to not end up abandoned by God like the lost souls. It does so in contrast to both 
Susana and Dorotea in their abandonment of the soul and disinvestment from the teleological 
temporarily of competing accumulation towards the plenitude of life promised by the 
Father/father.   
The priests’s refusal to legitimate woman’s incest or her hope for confirmation and 
sanction through the reproduction of God’s children leads the woman to solicit that Juan replace 
her brother as the legitimate founding father of a lawful community, which legitimacy she 
believes would rescue her from damnation. As she informs him, claiming Donis’s agreement 
with her desire for a legitimate social order:  
Él siempre ha tratado de irse, y creo que ahora le ha llegado su turno. Quizá sin yo 
 saberlo, me dejó con usted para que me cuidara. Vio su oportunidad. Eos del becerro 
 cimarrón fue sólo un pretexto. Ya verá usted que no vuelve. 
  Quise decirle: <<Voy a salir a buscar un poco de aire, porque siento náuseas>>; pero 
 dije: 
   –No se preocupe. Volverá. (115) 
 
   –Donis no volverá. Se lo noté en los ojos. Estaba esperando que alguien viniera para 
 irse. Ahora tú te encargarás de cuidarme. ¿O qué, no quieres cuidarme? Vente a dormir 
 aquí conmigo. 
   –Aquí estoy bien. 
   –Es mejor que te subas a la cama. Allí te comerán las turicatas. 
   Entonces fui y me acosté con ella. (116) 
 
He’s been trying and trying to leave, and I think this is the time. Maybe, though he 
didn’t say so, he left me here for to take care of. He saw his chance. The business of the 
stray was just an excuse. You’ll see. He’s not coming back. (56) 
 
“Donis won’t come back,” she said. “I saw it in his eyes. He was waiting for someone 
to come so he could get away. Now you’ll be the one look after me. Won’t you? Don’t 
you want to take care of me? Come sleep here by my side. 
     “I’m fine where I am.” 
         “You’d be better off up here in the bed. The ticks will eat you alive down there.” 
      I got up and crawled in bed with her. (57) 
 
The passage above highlights in complex ways the self-interested and willful nature of 




the telos of the common good. On the one hand, the passage tells of the woman lending herself 
as reproductive ground for the founding of legitimate paternal authority. Rather than her 
subjection to law however, it is her will that reestablishes the law which, within this Christian 
context, would restore her to God’s grace and salvation. As is the case with his own mother’s 
demand for Juan to inherit the place of the father and restore her place in the community that can 
similarly ensure her own trancendence over death, it is Juan who is subjected to their will in the 
production of law. In the above passage, this will emerges as the desire for the 
institutionalization of a providential promise of “care” over the woman’s well-being or the 
gurantee of a good life without end on earth and in Heaven. Within the context of Dolores’s 
demand as superimposed will and intentionality, Juan’s own journey had begun with the same 
investment in the father as law or guarantee of a good life, despite his initial rejection of the 
mother’s desire. As he stated after having promised his mother: 
     Pero no pensé cumplir mi promesa. Hasta que ahora pronto comence a llenarme de 
sueños, a darle vuelo a las ilusiones. Y de este modo se me fue formando un mundo 
alrededor de la esperanza que era aquel señor llamado Pedro Páramo, el marido de mi 
madre. Por eso vine a Comala. (65)  
 
     I never meant to keep my promise. But before I knew it my head began to swim with 
dreams and my imagination took flight. Little by little I began to build a world around a 
hope centered on the man called Pedro Páramo , the man who had been my mother’s 
husband. That was why I had come to Comala. (3) 
 
A narrative that repeats all the terms of the story of Dorotea’s son, which began Juan’s 
quest for justice for his mother through his own investment in the illusion of a lawful social order 
as a reordering and inventing of a world itself, the above equally narrates the passage from the 
Christian world to the secular one as a new possibility of organization of social relations through 
modernity’s promise of transformation of the world for common, national human ends through 




secular social order and the promise of modernization in the novel in capitalist, ecological and 
ideological terms, what is promised in the process of intensified exploitation of natural resources 
and of labor and the overcoming the complex web of existing interdepedence of life and death to 
produce this new ordering of social relation is the very possibility of overcoming of constraints 
or limits on human life in its freedom and independence. At the social level, this translates to a 
desire for the overcoming of all limitations not of its own cultural invention, where culture is 
posited as the embodiment and sole limit to freedom in exchange for the promise of 
transcendence through self-reproduction of identity. We could say that the invention of and the 
investment in lawful socio-political organization serves as a means for the self-perpetuation of a 
socio-economic regime of production that promises to ensure human self-determination over its 
own life and death through sovereign control over the entire lifeworld. Within the novel this 
beginning culminates in the Christian order at the heart of community as the mirror reflection of 
modernity’s promise of self-reproducing cultural order of life as timeless national identity. It 
makes visible within both orders the production and justification of endless violence and 
destruction towards that end through Juan’s encounter with a destroyed Comala culminating in 
the women’s desire for its reestablishment through further violence and exclusion of forms of life 
outside of this logic of territorial cultural self-reproduction. 
In seemingly lending herself as reproductive ground for the re/production of the paternal 
order and sovereign law, the woman willed the expulsion of her brother from the community in 
order to ensure her own salvation, much as through its self-reproduction the community would 
expell the dead as other possibilities of life. But this willing and creation of a teleological order is 
made visible as the groundless counterpart to the lawlessnes and violence that establishes 




relativizes every single component of the woman’s story (much like Dolores’s own story and 
investments are contradicted by the stories Juan encounter in Comala, and like the unnamed man 
in Dorotea’s story who contradicts her view of the time-space of community). Most importantly, 
Donis does not seem to acknowledge as ghostly or improper the forms of life outside of this 
cultural logic within Comala, and thus remains entirely outside of the telos of community. In 
fact, according to Dorotea and contrary to the woman’s account which emerges as a deception, 
Donis does return and in fact both discovers and helps Dorotea bury the dead Juan (and later 
Dorotea herself), putting an end to the detructive narrative of community that had dominated in 
the novel until this point. 
Vamos a ponernos de acuerdo9 
We can make a deal here10  
      La verdad es que esperaba una recompensa. Había servido a don Lucas, que en paz  
 descanse, padre de don Pedro; después a don Pedro, y todavía; luego a Miguel, hijo de 
 don Pedro. La verdad es que esperaba una compensación. Una retribución grande y 
 valiosa. (158) 
 
      Se acordaba de don Lucas, que siempre le quedó a deber sus honorarios. De don 
 Pedro, que hizo cuenta nueva. De Miguel su hijo: !cuántos bochornos le había dado ese 
 muchacho! 
Lo libró de la cárcel cuando menos unas quince veces, cuando no hayan sido más. Y 
el asesinato que cometió con aquel hombre...Eso nomás ¿cuánto le hubiera costado a don 
Pedro si las cosas hubieran ído hasta allá, hasta lo legal? Y lo de las violaciones ¿qué? 
Cuántas veces el tuvo que sacar de su misma bolsa el dinero para que ellas le echaran 
tierra al asunto; !Date de buenas que vas a tener un hijo güerito!, les decía. (159-60) 
 
     The truth was that he had expected a reward. He had served don Lucas – might he   
rest in peace – don Pedro’s father; then, and up till now, don Pedro. Even Miguel, don 
Pedro’s son. The truth was that he expected some recognition. A large, and welcome, 
return for his services. (102-30) 
  
 He was remembering don Lucas, who had always put off paying his fees. And don Pedro, 
 who’s started with a clean slate. And his son Miguel. What a lot of trouble that boy had 
 caused! 
                                                
9 Rulfo, 153. 




      He got him out of jail at least fifteen times, if not more. And there was that time he’d 
 murdered that man...How much would just that one time have cost don Pedro if things 
 had moved ahead to legal proceedings? And what about all the rapes, eh? Think of all the 
 times he’d taken money from his own pocket to keep the girls quiet. “You should be 
 thankful,” he’d told them, “that you’ll be having a fair-skinned baby.” (104) 
 
 Complicity with law as guarantee of vested interest seems to characterize Comala itself. 
The words above belong to Gerardo, Pedro’s lawyer, who speaks of having helped Pedro and his 
son evade the law on numerous occasions, saving them from having to repay for what is done or 
owed to others, often paying out of his own pocket as advance for the expenses incurred, 
advocating for and reinterpreting the meaning and value of their action (violation as gift of a 
worthy son), always in the hope of a worthwhile repayment for his services. His relationship 
with Pedro Páramo entails service in violation of established law (or the social accord with the 
larger community), expectation of a share in what Pedro acquires by violating the legal 
obligation of repayment and, ultimately, powerless disillusionment in the face of Pedro’s 
violation of the accord – his failure to honor their agreement – to repay the debt to Gerardo 
himself. This relationship is generalizable to varying degrees, with few exceptions, as the 
relationship between the villagers of Comala and Pedro, and is what makes possible the 
emergence of Pedro as patron/father and law. It further extends to the community’s relationship 
with Miguel Páramo, one of Pedro’s many illegitimate sons that he arbitrarily decides to 
recognize as heir.  
 The men and women of Comala seem to aid and abet Pedro’s and Miguel’s economic and 
sexual exploits. Father Rentería tells of his cofessional booth being always filled with women 
who come to confess their sins for having transgressed moral and social codes in sexual service 
to the married Pedro Páramo. ¨´Me acuso padre que ayer dormí con Pedro Páramo.´ ´Me acuso 




have sinned, padre. Yesterday I slept with Pedro Paramo.” “I have sinned, padre. I bore Pedro 
Paramo’s child.” I gave my daughter to Pedro Paramo, padre” (69).  Signficantly, Fulgor Sedano, 
the overseer for his estate who begins with a sense of superiority in the knowledge – perhaps 
known only to him – that Pedro, in fact, owns nothing but debt (which gives the appearance of 
wealth), decides to work as a subordinate for him, seeing in Pedro a promising youth and 
expecting to benefit from Pedro’s ability to turn his debt into property. Fulgor helps Pedro trick 
Dolores, his creditor, into marrying him with promises of love – something Dolores views as 
elevating her above the rest of the girls in the village all of whom seem to desire him – and 
putting her property into his hands. Fulgor also helps Pedro kill Aldrete who wants to delimit the 
boundary of Pedro’s ever expanding expropriation of land.  
 Even Father Rentería the village priest sees himself as complicit in Pedro’s rise to power 
and considers himself a sinner. From the poor he gets nothing, and Pedro provides for his 
subsistence in exchange, as he says, for his soul. In Ana, the priests’s niece, the idea of 
complicity comes to take on larger dimensions. Ana’s father was killed by Miguel Páramo . She 
herself was violated by him, something ambigously claimed by her, believed by the priest, and 
contested by Pedro. But much like the unnamed woman´s story of incest as both violation and 
complicity, the question of violation here comes to take on extreme ambiguity as the priest´s 
questioning of his niece in his need for certainty and proof of the identity of the violator unearths 
uneasy ambiguities regarding the very claim of being violated.   
      –Estás segura de que él fue, ¿verdad? 
      –Segura no, tío. No le ví la cara. Me agarró de noche y en lo oscuro. 
      –¿Entonces cómo supiste que era Miguel Páramo? 
      –Porque él me lo dijo: <<Soy Miguel Páramo, Ana. No te asustes.>> Eso me dijo. 
      –¿Pero sabías que era el autor de la muerte de tu padre, no? 
      –Sí, tío. 
      –¿Entonces qué hiciste para alejarlo? 




 Los dos guardaron silencio por un rato. Se oía el aire tibio entre las hojas del arrayán. 
      –Me dijo que precisamente a eso venía: a pedirme disculpas y a que yo le perdonara. 
 Sin moverme de la cama le avisé: <<La ventana está abierta.>> Y él entró. Llegó 
 abrazandome, com si ésa fuera la forma de disculparse por lo que había hecho. Y yo le 
 sonreí. Pensé en lo usted me había enseñado: que nunca hay que odiar a nadie. Le sonreí 
 para decírselo; pero después pensé que él no pudo ver mi sonrisa, porque yo no le veía a 
 él, por lo negra que estaba la noche. Solamente lo sentí encima de mí y que comenzaba a 
 hacer cosas malas conmigo. 
      >>Creí que me iba a matar. Eso fue lo que creí, tío. Y hasta dejé de pensar para  
 morirme antes de que él me matara. Pero seguramente no se atrevió a hacerlo. 
      >>Lo supe cuando abrí los ojos y vi la luz de la mañana que entraba por la ventana  
 abierta. Antes de esa hora, sentí que había dejado de existir,>> 
      –Pero debes tener alguna seguridad. La voz. ¿No lo conociste por su voz? 
      –No lo conocía por nada. (89) 
 
      “You are sure he was the one, aren’t you?” 
      “I am not positive, Uncle. No. I never saw his face. He surprised me at night, and it 
 was dark.”  
      “Then how did you know it was Miguel Páramo ?” 
      “Because he said so: ‘It’s Miguel Páramo , Ana. Don’t be afraid.’ That was what he 
 said” 
      “But you knew he was responsible for your father’s death, didn’t you?” 
      “Yes, Uncle.” 
      “So what did you do to make him leave?” 
      “I didn’t do anything.” 
      The two sat without speaking. They could hear the warm breeze sitrring in the myrtle 
 leaves 
      “He said that was why he had come: to say he was sorry and to ask me to forgive him. 
 I lay still in my bed, and I told him, ‘The window is open.’ And he came in. The first 
 thing he did was put his arms around me, as if that was his way of asking forgiveness for 
 what he had done. And I smiled at him. I rmembered what you had taught me: that we 
 must never hate anyone. I smiled to let him know that, but then I realized that he couldn’t 
 see my smile because it was so black that I couldn’t see him. I could only feel his body 
 on top of me, and feel him beginning to do bad things to me.  
      “I thought he was going to kill me. That’s what I believed, Uncle. Then I stopped 
 thinking at all, so I would be dead before he killed me. But I guess he didn’t dare. 
      “I knew had hadn’t when I opened my eyes and saw the morning light shining in the 
 open window. Up until then, I felt that I had in fact died.” 
      “But you must have some way of being sure. His voice. Didn’t you recognize him by 
 his voice? 
      “I didn’t recognize him at all.” (27-8) 
 
 From active complicity to extreme resignation, the villagers of Comala seem to live out a 




father´s debt, Pedro refuses to inherit. Pedro´s grandmother tries to teach him the necessity of 
subordination to the rule of exploitative power for the sake of a share of that power in the future. 
In contrast to Pedro´s power of self-reinventing through reinvention of the world11, however, 
power here signficantly takes the specific form of inclusion into culture as promise of inheritance 
of both property and social position or place of self-determination within the community, and 
whch promise justifies the expropriation of labor narrated as both violence and complicity, as 
self-subordination through apprenticeship defined as socialization.  
     –¿Que haces aquí a estas horas? ¿No estás trabajando? 
     –No, abuela. Rogelio quiere que le cuide al niño. Me paso paseándolo. Cuesta trabajo 
 atender las dos cosas: al niño y el telégrafo, mientras que él se vive tomando cervezas en 
 el billar. Además no me paga nada.  
     –No estás allí para ganar dinero, síno para aprender; cuando ya sepa algo, entonces 
 podrás ser exigente. Por ahora eres sólo un aprendiz; quizá mañana o pasado llegues a ser 
 tú el jefe. Pero para eso se necesita paciencia y, más que nada, humildad. Si te ponen a 
 pasear al niño, hazlo por el amor de Dios. Es necesario que te resignes. 
 Que se resignen otros, abuela, yo no estoy para resignaciones. (82) 
 
     “What are you doing here at this hour? Aren’t you working? 
     No, Grandmother. Rogelio asked me to mind his little boy. I am just walking him 
 around. I can’t do both things - the kid and the telegraph. Meanwhile he’s down at the 
 pool room drinking beer. On top of everything else, he doesn’t pay me anything. 
      You’re not there to be paid. You’re there to learn. Once you know something, then 
 you can afford to make demands. For now you’re just an apprentice. Maybe one day you 
 will be the boss. But for that you need patience and, above all, humility. If they want you 
 to take the boy for a walk, do it, for heaven’s sake. You must learn to be patient. 
      Let others be patient, Grandmother. I am not one for patience.” (20)  
  
 As Dorotea later tells Juan, those who remained in Comala when the village became 
deserted years later because Pedro had left his fields to rot and the revolution had swept up the 
remaining people stayed in hope of inheriting Pedro´s land, which they claim he had promised 
them. In the novel, the idea of inheritance brings together the various economies of hope as 
                                                
11 Carlos Blanco Aguinaga discusses Pedro Páramo as the only active character in the novel, having both an interior 
life and exterior action, in contrast to the rest of the characters who he sees as possessing only interiority and who 
function almost as nature to Pedro’s historical actions and temporality. See “Realidad y estilo de Juan Rulfo.” La 




expectation and the teleological investment and patient waiting for a return: the self-abnegating 
goodness and prayers to pay off inherited debt of original sin in order to inherit the Kingdom of 
God and the fulfillment of Pedro´s promise of a future share of what however comes to be 
continually reproduced and augmented as the basis of the father’s production of authority 
(though produced by, and owed to, others).   
 The limited account of the revolution within the novel is inscribed within the same logic 
of expectation of redistribution and inheritance which would emerge into the conflicting 
factional violence vying for the domain of law as inscription over land or contested territorial 
claims over resource, and which woul eventually emerge into the postrevolutionary state. An 
account given to Pedro Páramo by his henchman Damasio or El Tilcuate – whom Pedro had 
made leader to a band of revolutionaries of indeterminate faction through striking a deal with 
them – describes the Villistas they had encountered thus: 
     –Vienen del Norte, arriando parejo con todo lo que encuentran. Parece, según se ve, 
 que andan recorriendo la tierra, tanteando todos los terrenos. Son poderosos. Eso ni quien 
 se los quite. (162) 
  
     “From the North, leveling everything they found in their path. It seems, as far as we 
can make out, that they’re riding all through here getting the lay of the land. They’re 
powerful. You can’t take that from them.” (107) 
 
 The terms are suggestive of what would emerge into the claim to legitimacy of the 
modern democratic state and its promise of redistribution and reform, that of leveling or 
equalizing and most specifically through a sizing up or measurement of land as resource to be 
redistributed, a promise continually undercut and postponed to be sure, but which makes visible 
the underpinning idea of property as its ground for legitimate social self-reproduction. Within the 
novel, this logic of the domain of law as the condition for justice through management and 




unity and progress through production and assignment of the places of the national people within 
a particular set of production relations – is visible as common to all the various contradictory 
factional interests with various claims to the inscriptions of the meaning and content of the body 
of law and the terms of distribution. The men fighting under El Tilcuate move easily from 
fighting for one faction to the next, including that of the cristero rebellion itself.  
 El Tilcuate siguió viniendo: 
     –Ahora somos carrancistas. 
     –Está bien. 
     –Andamos con mi general Obregón. 
     –Está bien. 
     –Allá se ha hecho la paz. Andamos sueltos. 
     –Espera. No desarmes a tu gente. Esto no puede durar mucho. 
     –Se ha levantado en armas el padre Rentería. ¿Nos vamos con él, o contra él? 
     –Eso ni se discute. Ponte al lado del gobierno.  
     –Pero si somos irregulares. Nos consideran rebeldes.  
     –Entonces vete a descansar. 
     –¿Con el vuelo que llevo? 
     –Haz lo que quieras, entonces 
     –Me iré a reforzar al padrecito. Me gusta cómo gritan. Además lleva uno ganada la 
 salvación. 
     –Haz lo que quieras. (171-2) 
 
El Tilcuate continued to report: 
         “We’re with Caranza now.” 
      “Fine.” 
      “Now we’re riding with General Obregon.” 
      “Fine.” 
      “They’ve declared peace. We’re dismissed.” 
      “Wait. Don’t disband your men. This won’t last long.” 
      “Father Rentería’s fighting now. Are we with him or against him?” 
      “No question. You’re on the side of teh government” 
      “But we’re irregulars. They consider us rebels.” 
      “Then take a rest.” 
      “As fired up as I am?” 
      “Do what you want, then.” 
     “I’m going to back that old priest. I like how they yell. Besides, that way a man can be 
sure of salvation.” 





The moment most critical of this logic of property within the novel comes earlier, 
however, at the very moment of the tyrant striking a deal with the revolutionaries. A band of men 
arrive at Pedro’s estate, where he feeds them and through the false promise of financing their 
cause turn them into men protecting his property and raiding neighboring villages for their own 
upkeep: “Necesitamos agenciarnos un rico pa que nos habilite, y qué mejor que el señor aquí 
presente.” (154)’ “We need to get us a rich man to help outfit us, and who better than this señor 
here” (97). As with Gerardo, the accord or deal they strike for seemingly mutual benefit is 
purported to trade Pedro’s promise or gurantee that far exceeds their expectation for the 
immediate benefit of keeping his land as basis of production which would enable him to 
redistribute surplus to them. This accord and the men’s willful complicity and self-subjection in 
fact elevates Pedro to the status of the providential father through which elevation he would, 
once again, refuse to honor his side of the deal or pay his debt.  
 The failure of the revolution is thematized as following an economy of expectation 
invested in the law and hinges upon the illusory possibility of common accord as fair share in a 
national field of belonging, an economy which ends up reinstating law as guarantee or territorial 
communal managment of property, where promise of progress, debt payment, and the 
inheritance of the benefits of development as inclusion is also presupposed are defined as 
national or cultural inclusion. 
Yo veo borrosa la cara de la gente12 
I see people through a haze13 
An alternative to the logic of complicity above, Susana’s story replaces the 
disempowering fiction of law as guarantee of unity and plenitude with the empowering fiction of 
                                                
12 Rulfo, 134. 




a lover. Rather than an illusion of perfect unity or reciprocity of lawful relations as gurantee of 
plenitude however, it is a fiction of a dead lover, which introduces loss and finitude into this 
alternate story of relational belonging in opposition to that of communion and plenitude.  
Susana’s life under Pedro’s roof is spent in a world of memory or imagination and 
madness, in sleep and “dreams” of a lost lover Florencio.14 In a narrative repetition of the logic 
of Dorotea’s dream as reality, Susana emphatically declares to her nursmaid Justina that she 
never dreams and proclaims her lover’s reality. This reality alternates between torpid desire, love 
and affection, and the pain of loss through his death. However, her pain is significantly narrated 
as guarded against all consolation and illusory promises of its erasure through recovery (both of 
what is lost and from pain of separation). Susana’s invented reality embracing both joy and pain 
is moreoever inaccessible to Pedro as well as to the priest who, when he came to console her for 
her father’s death is received thus: 
<<Se te está muriendo de pena el corazón –piensa–. Ya sé que vienes a confortame que 
 murió Florencioñ pero eso ya lo sé. No te aflijas por los demásñ no te apures por  mí. Yo 
 tengo guardado mi dolor en un lugar seguro. No dejes que se te apague el corazón.>> 
 (149) 
 
“Your  heart is dying of pain,” Susana thinks. “I know that you’ve come to tell me 
Folorencio is dead, but I already know that. Don’t be sad about anything else, don’t 
worry about me. I keep my grief hidden in a safe place. Don’t let your heart go out!” (92) 
 
Susana’s story of a dream/desire made reality includes rather than rejects death, pain, 
loss, and separation, in marked contrast to the initial illusions of Juan and Dorotea whose stories 
began as bound up with the promise of overcoming of separation through death and loss. It also 
forms a constrast to Pedro’s own story of her recovery. The novel correlates this world without 
                                                
14 Textual ambiguities do not allow us to establish whether Florencio is Susana’s dead husband, in fact whether the 
husband was not itself an invention. Jose Boixe Gonzales discusses in the footnote he provides to the episode of 
Susana and Florencio at the beach that the reference to the tropical birds not found in Mexico would suggest that the 
name of the bird was made up. My own suggestion is that this reference invites us to read the account of the beach 





the illusion of oneness with the powerlessness of law in the figure of Pedro Páramo, who, despite 
assuming the role of her provider and protector and whose story narrates an earnest desire to 
consol and erase her pain, cannot bring Susana into relation with him without her investment in 
his promise of restoration of plenitude. 
The story of the lover Florencio, in contrast to the father/husband moreover, places 
Susana unrepentantly on the whore side of the (virgin) mother/whore dichotomy. It is a relation 
of love and joy that appears as uncoupled from the prerogative of reproduction as it is from 
fidelity. The sexualized narrative of Susana giving herself to the sea further serves to undermine 
the naturalization of patriarchal human self-reproduction as the sole basis for relationality and 
co-existence and reenacts the earlier story of her sense of connection with larger forces and 
forms of life.  
Perhaps this can be used to explain Susana’s outcry against God at Florencio’s death: a 
narrative staging of the challenge posed by the illicit figure of the lover to the self-reproduction 
of the Father’s order much like with Dorotea’s bastard son, and which sinful or deviating 
existence God refuses to protect or let live in the same way He denied life and reality to the son 
of Dorotea.  
Señor, tú no existes! Te pedí tu protección para él. Que me lo cuidaras. Eso te pedí. Pero 
tú te ocupas nada más de las almas. Y lo que yo quiero de él es su cuerpo. Desnudo y 
caliente de amorñ hirviendo de deseos; estrujando el temblor de mis senos y mis brazos. 
(156) 
 
     God, you do not exist! I asked You to protect him. To look after him. I asked that of 
You. But all You care about is souls. And what I want is his body. Naked and hot with 
love; boiling with desire; stroking my trembling breast and arms (100, translation 
modified). 
 
Susana denounces God in terms that make explicit the link between lawful sexual 




transcendence. A rejection that declares this narrative of life as fictional, the declaration is at the 
same time complexly highlighted as fictional itself, in other words as without a counter truth- 
claim that would negate God’s existence, word, or world by replacing it with a more truthful 
conception of reality.  
Contla no existe15 
Contla does not exist16 
 Bueno, pues eso es la Media Luna de punta cabo. Como quien dice, toda la tierra que se 
 puede abarcar con la mirada. Y es de él todo ese terrenal. El caso es que nuestras madres 
 nos malparieron en un petate aunque éramos hijos de Pedro Páramo. Y los más chistoso 
 es que él nos llevó a bautizar. Con usted debe haber pasado lo mismo, ¿no? (69) 
 
 Well, all that’s the Media Luna. From end to end. Like they say, as far as the eye can see. 
 He owns ever’ bit of that land. We’re Pedro Páramo ’s sons, all right, but, for all that, our 
 mothers brought us into the world on straw mats. And the real joke of it is that he’s the 
 one carried us to be baptized. That’s how it was with you, wasn’t it? (6-7) 
 
 Juan’s first encounter was with Abundio, who guided him to Comala. As discussed 
earlier, the above passage following Abundio’s revelation that he, too, is a son of Pedro Páramo  
mark the first moment of problematization of the possibility of justice, something visible as that 
of conflicting claims to inheritance of the father’s law of the land, and through Abundio’s 
attempt to include Juan into the category of Pedro’s illegitimate children and thus preempt the 
claim of the legitimate heir which would disinherit the rest of the community and reproduce the 
violence of the father. Abundio’s question above that functions more as claim (he became angry 
when Juan answered ambigously) over Juan as one of the ‘we’ of the illegimate children, 
however, would disinherit Juan himself. Most significantly it would cancel out the mother’s  
claim to the father’s obligation as legitimate wife and rightful member of the community entitled 
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to the benefits and privileges that comes with Pedro’s social position and of Juan’s rightful place 
as heir to it. 
 Within this initial meaning, one dependent on Juan’s perspective, we can contextualize 
the contention within the land reform debate and the mutually contradictory claims to private and 
communal property. More importantly, the conflcit resonates with the mutually exclusive nature 
of the claim to communal property and identity in relation to the state’s territorial claim over the 
nation as the sole legitimate community through modern cultural logic within which all are free 
and responsible before the law as individual Mexicans.   
 The novel sets up these mutually contradictory territorial claims to organization of social 
relations based on different cultural claims to nature as territorial ground and resource for 
communal self-reproduction. But it does so in order to move Juan beyond the impasse through 
the revelation of Abundio’s and the rest of the community’s death –whose mythical existences 
are therefore no longer proper to the grounded temporality of social continuity. 
 Within this reframing the above passage emerges into a new light. Translated above as 
“brought us into this world,” the term malparieron has a range of meanings that render the above 
passage more complex than at first appears. The verb parir in spanish means to give birth, and in 
a related sense it also means to create or to come up with something. Malparir, combing bad 
(mal) and birth, can on the one hand be read within the provided context of poverty (straw mat) 
as being born under bad conditions. The term is also colloquially used to refer to unwanted 
children, and thus can be associated with the thematic question of illegitimacy or bastardy we 
have discussed. In this sense malparir can also function as an insult.  
 The literal meaning of the verb,  however, is to be born before due time, in other words 




coming, or being delivered, into the world already dead. Further, the idea of being birthed before 
due time has thematic resonance through the suggestion of an aborting or shortcircuiting of a 
predetermined or teleological temporal order. Within the framework of Abundio’s mythical life 
after death, as well as in relation to the thematic repetition of the idea of suicide – in Dorotea (as 
a path to a different heaven), in Eduviges (who speaks of suicide as forcing the hand of God, as 
dying before God appointed due time, and of such death as a shortcut to a different heaven), and 
in Susana who too willed herself a serene death – it is the literal meaning of the verb malparir 
that emerges into significance in opposition to the idea of natural birth into the Christian or 
modern meaning of human life, or better said, in opposition to a naturalized idea of human life’s 
birth and death as the beginning and end of time. We could say that like Susana’s life protected 
from law’s teleological promise, this life is neither son nor bastard, but prior to relation with law 
because outside of invented or culturally specific notions of both natural and metaphysical laws 
as timeless unity and origin dominant in Western tradition, and thus without the idea of human 
temporality as deviation from and recovery of lawful oneness. A life outside of relation with law, 
and which relation as necessary to law’s production of both the licit and illicit for its own self-
reproduction as narrated through Pedro taking them to be baptized before their abandoment, 
Abundio’s remark emerges as a commentary on the ironic nature of the desire for or investment 
in lawful relations. Abundio’s patricide at the end of the novel and his own afterlife to the reality 
defined through the father as law narrates the liberation from this logic.17 
 
 
                                                
17See Giorgio Agamben’s discussion of the relation between sovereign power, the juridical order of law, and life 
from the perspective of force and regulartory power of law in Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. 




No puede ser18 
It Cannot Be19 
As I have noted, Juan’s story can be summed up as a staging of Mexico’s secular 
perspective’s naturalized idea of the reality of human life coming face to face with its own 
fictionality. The novel’s trajectory from the story of Juan Preciado to that of Dorotea and Susana 
can be read as a movement from the genre of the fantastic (which narrates an encounter with 
supernatural reality through a realist narrative perspective) to that of the marvelous or magical 
(wherein the supernatural is not subordinated to a realist point of view), the narrative perspective 
of which I have been calling mythical while highlighting its fictional character, i.e. a creative 
worldview without a representational truth-claim. As I will argue below, the second half of the 
novel invites a rereading of the first half of the novel in order to undo the idea of a given or 
unified point (location, ground, as well as premise) from which one views or reads in order to 
reframe the question of reading, meaning making, and valuation that undoes the illusion of 
lawfully determined relations of shared meaning and value itself.  
Patrick Dove’s reading of the novel is based on a fundamental distinction between the 
modern and realist narrative point of view of Juan Preciado and those narratively framed as 
supernatural in order to warn against representing cultural others. Dove cautions against a 
testimonial reading as restitution that would claim to give voice to those silenced by the social 
ordering and cultural logic forming the premise of reading itself. However, as I have already 
shown, the second half of the novel resists a representational reading while thematic making 
visible fiction as the basis for the organization of meaning. As I will further show, it invites a 
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reconsideration of the representational framework of the first half of the novel itself to reveal the 
complicity of the reading process identified with the narrative point of view.  
Tzvetan Todorov’s “Definition of the Fantastic”20 provides a useful starting point for our 
discussion. His conceptualization of the term makes visible a secular perspective as its 
naturalized premise. As he elucidates in an initial formulation of the relation between the real 
and the fantastic, locating the protagonist (as well as the reader) within modern reality and 
worldview:  
In a world which is indeed our world, the one we know, a world without devils, 
 sylphides, or vampires, there occurs an event which cannot be explained by the laws of 
 this same familiar world. The person who experiences the event must opt for one of two 
 possible solutions: either he is the victim of an illusion of the senses, of a product of the 
 imagination – and laws of the world then remain what they are; or else the event has 
 indeed taken place, it is an integral part of reality – but then this reality is controlled by 
 laws unknown to us. Either the devil is an illusion, an imaginary being; or else he really 
 exists, precisely like other living beings – with this reservation, that we encounter him 
 infrequently. 
 The fantastic occupies the duration of this uncertainty. Once we choose one 
 answer or the other, we leave the fantastic for a neighboring genre, the uncanny [in which 
 the fantastic is revealed as merely imaginary], or the marvelous [in which known laws of 
 nature do not apply]. The fantastic is that hesitation experienced by a person who knows 
 only the laws of nature, confronting an apparently supernatural event. (14-15) 
 
Juan Preciado’s story closely follows this formulation. His initial encounter with 
Eduviges sets up a realist point of view as narrative premise. Abundio had recommended he look 
up Eduviges, his old acquaintance but, upon meeting her, Eduviges instead tells Juan that the 
Abundio she knew was deaf, and moreover already dead, and thus must not have been the man 
he had met. “No debe ser él. Además, Abundio ya murió. Debe haber muerto seguramente. ¿Te 
das cuenta? Así que no puede ser él” (78); “Then it can’t have been him. Besides, Abundio died. 
I am sure he’s dead. So you see? It couldn’t have been him” (16). While the words belong to 
Eduviges, they convey the perspective of Juan Preciado, the story’s guiding first person narrative 
                                                




voice/point of view, and Juan affirms her view on the matter. “Estoy de acuerdo con usted” (78); 
“I agree with you” (16, translation modified). It cannot be him. 
 The phrase “no puede ser” or “it cannot be” delimits a particular notion of reality that 
initially guides Juan’s reading, interpretation, and accounting for or narration of events and, with 
it, the perspective of the textual narratee it constructs and addresses. The phrase makes apparent 
as given and shared starting narrative premise between protagonist and implied reader the secular 
worldview and narrative meaning of life gaining currency in the newly reconsolidated Mexico –
over against the earlier dominance of Christian worldview and cultural reality that it supplanted 
on the one hand, and to the continued exclusion of indigenous, mythical worldviews and cultural 
ways of life on the other.  
Juan’s subsequent conversation with Eduviges – whose own point of view quickly turns 
problematic – attests to and delineates the parameters of this secular perspective. This naturalized 
idea of reality defines and delimits what can be: a totality of the possible past, present, and future 
delimited against what it defines as impossible, unnatural, and which cannot be, and further 
forms the premise for assessing claims, narratives, or accounts of reality deemed untrue whether 
as fictitious, imaginary, crazy, magical, mythical or in any other way not credible because it has 
no correspondence to its meaning of natural and human life.  
 In this initial framework of reading, Eduviges’ various strange and self-contradictory 
remarks and anecdotes – while serving many thematic and structural functions – work as a 
counterpoint to Juan’s modern conception of reality to highlight it as narrative premise. Juan is 
baffled by Eduviges’ claim to have recently been in communication with Dolores, Juan’s dead 
mother. She makes contradictory statements about having a room always ready for a guest, and 




then. Upon being told that Dolores is dead Eduviges suddenly ‘understands’ why her voice had 
sounded weak and distant. Then there is her declaration – initially incomprehensible from Juan’s 
point of view (but which resonates with the later story of Dorotea): “Sólo yo entiendo el lejos 
que está el Cielo nosotros; pero conozco cómo acortar las veredas. Todo consiste en morir, Dios 
mediante, cuando uno quiera y no cuando Él lo disponga. O, si tú quieres, forzarlo a disponer 
antes de tiempo” (73); “No one knows better than I do how far heaven is, but I also know all the 
shortcuts. The secret is to die, God willing, when you want to, and not when He proposes. Or 
else force Him to take you before your time” (11). And, finally, the remark that she would catch 
up with Juan’s mother on the way to eternity. In reaction to the above, Juan at first “no sup[o] 
qué pensar” (72) or “did not know what to think” (10). By the end of their conversation Juan, as 
a matter of course, “creía que aquella mujer estaba loca” (73); “wondered if she were crazy” 
(11). In Juan’s modern understanding, Eduviges’ understanding of the world – which references 
the Christian world and includes the existence of God and the soul– bears no relation to reality.  
 From a different framework of reading organized around the supernatural stories of the 
dead however, we can already make sense of Edugives’ idea of suicide alongside Dorotea’s as a 
circumvention of God’s intentionality and temporal order, what the village priest would proclaim 
and act against the will of God through which she lost all her accumulated ‘bienes’ or acquired 
goodness as property of the soul necessary for her salvation. Furthermore, Eduviges’ suicide 
similarly involves questions of illicit sexual relations and the story of a son no father would 
recognize, which recalls and anticipates the story of Dorotea’s rejection of the very order of the 
Father/father.  
Set up as located in modern reality, the point of view of Juan and the reader within an 




this point of view in an encounter with what appears to be senselessness or craziness is 
confronted with the fantastic. Juan’s intial encounter with accounts that make no sense and  
“cannot be true” yields to a series of encounters with a reality that, according to him, “cannot 
be,” and with beings that “cannot exist.” First, a dead man’s scream from the past in a 
condemned room Juan should not have been able to enter to begin with. Then, the appearance of 
Damiana who tells him Eduviges is already dead. Damiana recounts for Juan her own encounters 
with the many lost souls roaming the village begging living beings for prayers, seeming to 
forewarn him against becoming afraid. When she questioned whether she herself was alive, 
Damiana disappears into thin air. As Juan is left alone to wander the streets he comes across 
other supernatural presences that defy reason and understanding within the signaled conceptual 
parameters of what can and cannot be, what can or cannot exist. Presences of beings without 
unity or coherence: audible voices without perceptible bodies; things present/visible but without 
continuity or permanence in space and time and capable of disappearing into this air; sounds of 
rustling leaves, barking dogs, and human conversations where the eyes can see nothing.  
The narrative trajectory of the fantastic is one of accumulation and heightening of 
uncertainty about the nature of reality. “‘I nearly reached the point of believing’: that is the 
formula which sums up the spirit of the fantastic. Either total faith or total incredulity would lead 
us beyond the fantastic: it is hesitation which sustains its life” (Todorov, 18, italic in original). 
In Juan’s case, this lack of certainty, the creeping suspicion that one’s knowledge or perception 
lacks correspondence with reality, presents itself as fear of madness or dissolution of (the 
established order of) sense and meaning. As previously discussed in the stories of Dorotea and 
Susana, madness in the novel is the name given to the function of creative deviation from the 




grounding in external reality, and does not claim to represent reality outside its own perspective 
as knowledge and way of being. It functions thus in opposition to both established truth and to 
counter truth-claims and establishment of a new order. 
In Juan’s case as within Todorov’s parameters of fantastic narrative, the assumed premise 
of representational knowledge produces what the novel characterizes as fear and paralysis in the 
face of a dissolution of certainty of truth, leading to attempts to reestablish the order of things. 
The protagonist of the fantastic is not “convinced of the existence of supernatural forces: a 
conviction which would have suppressed all hesitation (and put an end to the fantastic)” 
(Todorov, 16). He attempts to find a natural explanation, to naturalize the experience of 
supernatural events.  
Juan is found and taken in by the nameless woman and her brother/husband, who heard 
him moaning and banging his head against the door. In the light of day, his rationality reasserts 
itself and Juan ascertains the difference between objective reality and what he had earlier 
experienced, which comes to seem like a dream or a product of the imagination, an experience 
outside of the physical realm of sensory experience and knowledge (as representation) of an 
objective world.   
     La madrugada fue apagando mis recuerdos. 
     Oía de vez en cuando el sonido de las palabras, y notaba la diferencia. Porque las 
 palabras que había oído hasta entonces, hasta entonces lo supe, no tenían ningún sonido, 
 no sonaban; se sentían; pero sin sonido, como las que se oyen durante los sueños. (107) 
 
     My memories began to fade with the light of dawn. 
     From time to time I head the sound of words, and marked a difference. Because until 
then, I realized, the words I had heard had been silent. There had been no sound, I had 
sensed them. But silently, the way you hear words in your dreams. (47) 
 
Assured that he had found what his senses are able to construe to be, at last, real live 




sensory perception. In a sexual union with the woman that forms the narrative climax previously 
discussed as implicated in the reproduction and reestablishment of the naturalized communal 
order against the presence of the supernatural dead or other cultural organization of the relation 
between the social and nature, Juan finds the woman’s body falling apart and (re)turning to mud 
while he suffocates and feels his life breath slip away. At this point, the story abruptly rebegins 
as one being told from a third person narrative point of view in the fictional time-space of the 
grave and to Dorotea as interlocutor.  
 ¿Quieres hacerme creer que te mató el ahogo, Juan Preciado? Yo te encontré en la plaza, 
 muy lejos de la casa de Donis, y junto a mí también estaba él, diciendo que te estabas 
 haciendo el muerto. Entre los dos te arrastramos a la sombra del portal, ya bien tirante, 
 acalambrado como mueren los que mueren muertos de miedo. De no haber habido aire 
 para respirar esa noche de que hablas, nos hubieramos faltado las fuerzas para llevarte y 
 contimás para enterrarte. Y ya ves, te enterramos. (117)  
 
Are you trying to make me believe you drowned, Juan Preciado? I found you in the town 
plaza, far from Donis’s house, and he was there, too, telling me you were playing dead. 
Between us we dragged you into the shadow of the arches, already stiff as a board and all 
drawn up like a person who’d died of fright. If there hand’t been any air to breathe that 
night you’re talking about, we wouldn’t have had the strength to carry you, even less 
bury you. And, as you see, bury you we did.” (58) 
 
 The above interjection into the story by Dorotea at the novel’s mid point forms a break in 
the plot that changes many things. It interrupts the story of Juan Preciado told up to this point by 
a shift in narrative perspective, its location in the place and time of the grave, while – as I have 
discussed in the first chapter– undoing the very idea of the grave as ground or ‘reality’ of given 
space-time to which perspective might correspond, making it visible as a construct of perspective 
itself. This story, told from a limited third person point of view through presentation of multiple 
perspectives ungrounded in any pre-given conception of shared reality, also supplants the earlier 
story of Juan as the true beginning, space-time, and perspective of its telling. Like Juan’s first 




the real story, one that contradicts Juan’s first person narrative account leading up to this point 
by Dorotea’s interrogation of the truth of his story of the moment of his death. Dorotea tells a 
different story of where she found him and how he died and it appears that it is Juan’s account of 
his death that “cannot be true.” Juan revises his testimony and tells a different story 
corresponding to Dorotea’s version of how and where he really died: through an encounter with 
the lost souls who, much like his mother, demands/begs for his intervention in order that they 
may be restored to Heaven. Between Dorotea and Juan there emerges a narrative that, on the one 
hand, appears to be more truthful and accurate explanation or account of “what really happened” 
at the moment and place of Juan’s death while simultaneously – as with other instances of 
reversals and divergences of meaning – problematizing the very idea of reality and truth through 
the two’s fictional existences, their lives confounding the very meaning of the word death the 
moment and manner of which they claim to tell better, and which now appears as or rather can 
be reorganized and understood as but one meaning of death (as the end of one meaning of life) 
that had been naturalized until then.   
 The relocation of Juan and his narrative voice from the natural to supernatural or 
mythical time-space without represenatational truth-claim, Dorotea’s discrediting of Juan’s 
account, and Juan’s own affirmation of the untruth or partial account of his earlier story invite a 
narrative rereading of the first-half of the novel. Taking the novel’s invitation to read the second-
half as another, more useful beginning based on its thematic problematization of the idea of 
given, teleological oneness of origin and end – and which invites a rereading through which a 
different organization of meaning may emerge – we can reread Juan’s story to trace out the 




the implied reader itself to problematize the idea of perspective as representation of meaning 
within Juan’s own story.   
As I discuss below, Juan’s perspective – as is now foregrounded through Dorotea’s 
interrogation of its accuracy but was always implicitly visible – was never adequate to the 
meaning of the first half of the novel. It is through novelistic convention that the perspective 
appears or can be read to organize and unify the story, to tell it as one story. It was, in other 
words, staged as the dominant perspective claiming to represent or narrate the story both of 
Comala and of Juan’s experience of Comala, narrative identification with which implicates the 
reading process itself in the reproduction of hegemonic ordering of meaning. 
 At the most obvious level and as I have noted in relation to the novel’s structure, Juan 
Preciado’s story is legible only within the context of the interwoven narrative thread of the story 
of Pedro Páramo and of Comala as the biographical and historical past. This context, outside of 
Juan’s own narrative point of view, informs our ability to make sense of Juan’s story in relation 
to it. Moreover, within Juan’s story certain narrative divergences emerged that went unmarked 
by the narrative point of view. Abundio’s contradictory remarks as he guides Juan to Comala, 
both that the villagers will be happy to see him no matter who he is and also that no one lives in 
the village, are a first indication not only of a self-contradictory perspective that will emerge into 
something more fantastic, but also of a contradiction not registered by the narrative point of 
view. This contradiction already sets up (more than) a way of reading that diverges from and 
delimits the referential truth-claim of this guiding perspective to the story that emerges. Within 
the narrative point of view itself certain stories that emerge through his encouter with the various 
characters later revealed as supernatural are often both self-contradictory and in contradiction 




story their mutually contradictory as well as fantastic nature emerges as a lack of credibility to 
problematize Juan’s very ability to make sense of existence and community. The implied reader 
however relies on these contradictory and supernatural stories to make sense both of the story of 
Comala past and present and of Juan’s story and death. In this process, not only does reading 
emerges as a selective process of organization of meaning through glossing over of 
inconsistencies and contradictions (which is to say not reading certain elements as significant or 
meaningful), but the measure and selection of what is meaningful would seem to be based on 
their correspondence to the readers’ own asumptions of meaning and sense itself. In other words, 
any meaning of the first half of the story that emerges as legible through a secular point of view 
is legible through its correspondence to the secular reading perspective itself, rather than through 
perspective’s correspondence to any textually given unity of story or narrative.  
 This point is most clearly foregrounded in the novel through the figure of Donis. Much 
like the unnamed man in Dorotea’s story, the narrative point of view of Donis serves to 
problematize Juan’s naturalized secular perspective that narrates his journey to Comala as an 
encounter with the fantastic. Donis, it would seem, does not acknowledge the existence of ghosts 
in Comala. Better said, his point of view does not mark a distinction between natural 
supernatural forms of life as proper or improper to co-existence. Confronted with Juan’s fear, 
Donis at first declares him drunk, and later disparages him as a mystic in search of what 
Providence has promised. In this it highlighs Juan’s perspective’s complicity with the idea of 
lawful social ordering and which forms the counterpart to both his mother and the unnamed 
woman’s investments. Juan’s death and burial by Donis (who significantly declares him to be 
playing dead rather than actually dead) narrates an end to this logic and passage to a different 




 The novel constructs what appears to be a first person narrative point of view in order to 
problematize it as well as any narrative identification with it. In fact, Juan’s first person point of 
view is effectively indistinguishable from the third person point of view in the novel, and is 
highly stylized and foregrounded as literary artifice. Rather than a recounting of his own 
experience, the perspective assumes and directly presents the points of view of others in the same 
way as the third person objective presentation of characters’ voices through dialogues and 
monologues. This objective presentation of other’s accounts is embedded within the supposedly 
first person narrative of Juan. On the one hand, the objective parts of the narrative exceeds the 
bounds of its parameters defined as first person perspective, presenting directly the speeches of 
other characters instead of paraphrasing, summary, or other indirect presentation. On the other 
hand, the first person subjective account is full of unexpected gaps, as when Abundio reveals 
himself to be Pedro Páramo’s son. Rather than a reaction or a reflection, there is a highly stylized 
image of crows flying overhead in a gothic moment of suspense. Similarly, when Juan sees the 
woman in rebozo disappear right before his eyes, the reaction is again not an internal 
reflection/recounting of bewilderment or questioning, but stylized as an objectivized description 
of his footsteps resuming after a suspended moment in time.  
The third person narrative point of view that replaces the first person account in the 
second half of the novel thus barely registers as a change because it functions through limited but 
direct presentation of the voice of the characters in the same way. Through this stylization and 
other ways of delimiting the truth-claim of Juan’s first person point of view, not only in relation 
to the fantastic tales and events but through a staging of the fictionality of the first person point 
of view itself, it would seem that the novel uses the first person narrative point of view to stage 




of reading invested in the possibility of communion as plenitude of shared meaning, which 
vested interest naturalizes into an objectively given textual meaning with its own complex and 





As I have discussed, the novel Pedro Páramo can be read within the framework of the 
genre of the fantastic and as a narrative movement from the fantastic to the magical, from a 
reading of the supernatural within a realist framework to a perspective that is, within this 
framework, supernatural. Through this movement that also reframe the thematic question of 
politics or co-existence, the novel invites a reconsideration of the relation between the two 
perspectives and invites our rethinking of mythical perspective and relation outside of the 
represenationalist framework and the modern cultural view of nature that frames it, and which 
claim to the truth of nature would make magical forms of relationality and knowledge appear as 
unnatural or supernatural. As I have shown the mythical perspective the novel opens on to 
resonates with new advances in contemporary science that problematizes modern 
epistemological framework in both the sciences and the humanities and challenges established 
understanding of ontology. Through its own narrative problematization of truth-claims to 
ontology from within a mythical view the novel opens up a new basis for seeing and engaging 
with the world.  
In relation to the above, it is significant that Rulfo’s novel is considered an important 
precursor to the genre of magical realism as it emerged in Latin Amerca. Taking as a starting 
definition Amaryll Beatrice Chanady’s view1 that magical realism is an antinomy between 
natural and supernatural reality in a non-hierarchical relationship – and which lack of hierarchy 
                                                





distinguishes it from the fantastic – my own reading of Rulfo suggests that the novel in fact goes 
further than a view of the relationship between the co-existent worlds as different cultural codes 
or representational frameworks to invite an undoing of the distinction between natural and 
supernatural itself in order to move politico-cultural thought beyond naturalized territorial 
ground of contestation for cultural productions that have resulted in destructive cultural forms 
and crisis of social and ecological relations. In fact as I have shown, in rejecting the cultural 
premise based on territorial nature and representational knowledge the novel allows us to 
reconsider the premise for such conceptualization of cultural difference itself as culturally 
specific, and which I have discussed in the context of European modernity’s cultural self-
universalization through a complex process of promise and invitation to invest in the illusion of 
human sovereignty relative to the complex relation of co-existence within the larger lifeworld in 
which human cultural self-organization is but one part in a dynamic balance.   
By the time of the novel’s publication in mid twentieth century postrevolutionary 
Mexico, the destructive logic of secular capitalism as the basis for social organization in Mexico 
and elsewhere was already very much in evidence, and have only continued to escalate in the 
present day. In presenting the parallel logic of Christian and secular narratives of life in order to 
reconsider possibilities opened up during the Revolution for other forms of human cultural 
organization foreclosed by the establishment of the postrevolutionary state, the novel opens up 
the possibility for reconsidering the revolutionary demand for land outside of the logic of return 
of property but as a relinquishing of lawful rights to property whether individual or communal as 
the very basis for social organization itself, and to open up questions of use of resource for the 
production of life itself within a framework of finite and contingent relations of knowing and of 




specifically can be considered through the terms of systems theory as a model for contingent 
knowledge within a dynamic network of relationships. I suggest that it also resonates with 
anarchist theory of social relations that can move beyond the secular bias in the very conception 
of the human in its agency and knowledge. Finally it invites us to begin with life itself rather 
than with truth as the basis for invention of multiply intersecting and relationally contingent 
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